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INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE AND INFORMALITY  




Land informality, or the absence of clear property rights, has been identified as a strong cause for lower 
economic development performance. In Africa, despite the presence of a formal institutional setting of 
property rights and established laws, the practice of land rights has favored a persistent informal 
institutional regime. This dissertation addresses the reasons for the persistence of land informality in the 
presence of formal laws in the case of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso. Using process tracing, I dissect the 
processes of land conflict resolutions within the formal and informal institutions in order to pinpoint 
reasons for such prolong informality.  I identify a very coherent and organized institutional set within the 
customary institutions, and the ambiguous relationship these institutions have with formal institutions. 
The inability of the formal institutions to resolve the informality issue is not the result of incompetence; 
it is the result of survival mechanisms from both the informal and formal institutions. Informality is the 
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In the international development field, development is widely understood as economic 
development, and economic development is most often defined as the capacity of a state and its 
institutions to guarantee the possibility of capital accumulation, opening multiple opportunities into the 
economic circuits (Smith, 1776; Marx, 1867; Keynes, 1936; Coase, 1937, 1960, 1974; Williamson, 1981; 
North, 1990). Thus the forms and shapes of these institutions and their functionings become key issues 
in the capacity of a country to develop and prosper.  I focus my dissertation work on the political 
economy puzzle of a two-layered institutional system composed of a state or modern system and an 
informal or customary one. This situation is very common among former colonies that have inherited 
modern institutions from their former colonial power while maintaining forms of customary institutions, 
and is quasi-systematic in sub-Saharan Africa which remains the poorest region in the world.  I choose to 
concentrate on property rights because it is a cornerstone of economic theories and has direct 
outcomes in the relationship between societies’ organizations and their environment and thus impact 
the nature of power distribution and political stability which inevitably guide their economic capacity 
toward development (Marx, 1867; George, 1881; Coase, 1937, 1974; Hardin, 1968; Sandercock, 2003).      
In his acclaimed 1989 book, The Other Path, the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto sheds 
light on the wealth of the informal economy and the importance of property rights. He argues that the 
formal economy is accessed by the privileged and informality is left to the poor; thus poverty issues 
would be resolved if the poor could access the legal system of property rights and enter in the formal 
economy. De Soto identifies a path from the informal to the formal economy in the form of property 
titles as the key to poverty reduction. This theory has been extremely popular among development 
agencies and has served to justify massive development programs of land reform/titling projects around 
the world.  




De Soto’s land titling thesis has been higly criticized as a simplistic silver bullet solution that did 
not take into account past experiences in this field, customary practices, patterns of land distribution, 
complexity of the rule of law, and that considered the ‘poor’ as an homogenous group (Assies, 2001; 
Payne, 2001; Fernandez, 2002; Gilbert, 2002; Mathieu, 2002; Benda-Beckmann, 2003; Mitchell, 2005; 
Nyamu-Musembi, 2006; Bromley, 2008; Joireman, 2008; Payne & al., 2008; Otto, 2009; Bruce, 2012). 
Despite these numerous critiques and the often disappointing results of the massive and expensive land 
titling projects following de Soto’s development thesis, such programs have continued to be popular 
among the international development agencies. In Burkina Faso, the U.S. agency Millennium 
Corporation Account (MCA), invested 60 million dollars in the late 2000s in a land reform project based 
on de Soto’s land titling theory (www.mcc.gov).      
Political economist Timothy Mitchell points out that the enthusiasm for de Soto’s theory is 
based on a strong economic ideology in which land and property are one and a unique economic object 
(Mitchell, 2005). He argues that de Soto’s theory feeds into a neo-liberal framework in which the neo-
institutionalists equate the absence of formal property rights with anarchy and dismiss the possibility of 
social and economic structures embedded in social networks.     
This dissertation builds on Mitchell’s analysis and argues that, contrary to the idea that 
informality is outside the economic object, it is very much part of an economic development policy. 
First, what is often seen as informal, following ‘local customs’, is much more organized than one would 
expect and relies on society-acknowledged and legitimate institutions in the form of customary 
institutions, which are in their contemporary form a colonial construct. Second, I question the historical 
and political roots of the so-called customary institutions and their relationship with the formal 
institutions. By looking at the mechanisms of conflict resolutions regarding land in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso, and its surroundings, I build, through process-tracing, a theory regarding the institutional 
settings in place in former African colonies that brings some explanation regarding the low levels of 




economic development across the continent when accounted though the classic economic indicators 
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or employement rates.   
The main findings highlight the high degree of orderliness and consistency in the customary 
institutions and their capacity to fulfill gaps left by formal institutions. I demonstrate how the false 
dichotomy between the two institutional layers (modern and customary) operates and how this 
situation has developed a dysfunctional state run by schizophrenic institutions, conducting eventually to 
collapsed states (Zartman, 1995). Political scientist William Zartman defined a collapsed state as a 
“situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart 
and must be reconstituated in some form, old or new”; Zartman specifies that “it is not necessarily 
anarchy”, “nor is it simply a byproduct of the rise of ethnic nationalism” (Zartman, 1995: 1). The case of 
Burkina Faso is interesting as it has struggled with the inherited colonial institutions in both its modern 
and customary forms to find a rather non-violent balance but can’t be qualified as stable. I also show the 
economic and political complexity with which a small African state is confronted and curbed into an 
international context.     
This dissertation has two parts: a first part poses the theoretical and methodological context 
(Chapters 1,2 and 3) and the second part presents in detail the case of Ouagadougou and its 
surroundings (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). Chapter 1 takes on the specific nature of the African context and 
its historical challenges. It is important to clarify the wicked nature of the modern versus the customary 
institutions in order to avoid a biased interpretation of the institutional duality of African states 
especially because I chose to keep using these terms. This analysis will help us to re-think the role of the 
institutions in a state-building process.   
In Chapter 2, I review the existing literature related to the concept of informality, economic 
development and their implications for the notion of land and rights in the African context. The organic 
nature of informality and its complex relationship to the formal economy has been defined and re-




imagined over the centuries as a natural and efficient state of a “developed society”. Setting up 
economic development as the standard defined by the Western world raises concerns regarding the real 
nature of the developmental state of African countries.     
In Chapter 3, I expose the central debate that this dissertation is participating in, i.e., the 
institutional debate in the African context and its consequences for the notion of property and land 
rights. Then, I present my research question, the research method I used and the choice of case study.  
The Second Part examines the case of Ouagadougou and represents the core of the research 
work. Chapter 4 describes the Mossi Kingdoms, the traditional authorities at stake in the case of 
Ouagadougou. In order to grasp the full complexity and power of these Kingdoms, I retrace their history 
and ancient state-building process since the 15th Century. The centralized Mossi administration 
developed an efficient land and power equilibrium. The French military conquest of the Moogo at the 
end of the 19th Century marked a turning point in the Mossi institutions as their original form was 
deviated by the colonial administration. The historical adaptation of the Mossi institutions to the 
colonial administration has served the Mossi Kingdoms and especially the Kingdom of Ouagadougou. It 
has resulted in a complex and efficient power equilibrium between a formal state power and a 
customary form of power.      
Chapter 5 presents the institutional setting of the Mossi institutions and the philosophy of the 
customary law theorized by African scholars. It demonstrates the level of resiliency of the Mossi 
institutions and their modern adaptation that perpetuates a representation of tradition at very different 
level in the Burkinabe society.  I also highlight the importance of certain beliefs that are essential to 
understand the usage of the customary institutions on a daily basis. The consideration and exercise of 
the customary institutions as the Mossi tradition have major consequences for social equilibrium, and 
thus the specific nature of land and its management. I close this chapter by exposing the impact of the 
Mossi tradition onto conflict resolution mechanisms.    




Chapter 6 presents the lawful land --administrative setting for land management in 
Ouagadougou and its surroundings-- and its complex practice, as well as the true land -- the functioning 
of the customary institutions in three Mossi chiefdoms. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how 
the two sets of institutions work together in land management. The first part of this chapter gives an 
understanding of the administrative complexity that civil servants and citizens face. It also highlights the 
role of the customary authorities within the administrative organization both in their actions using the 
administrative setting and in the beliefs of the civil servants serving in the administration. Then I detail 
today’s functioning of the customary institutions in three Mossi chiefdoms in Ouagadougou and its 
surroundings: the Chiefdom of Ziniaré, the Chiefdom of Taab Tinga, the Chiefdom of Koubri. The 
Chiefdom of Ziniaré is located about 20 miles (30km) to the north-east of Ouagadougou, the Chiefdom 
of Taab-Tinga is located in sector 28 in Ouagadougou, and the Chiefdom of Koubri is located in the 
Southern outskirts of Ouagadougou.  I review in detail the institutional processes and practices to 
manage land tenure and resolve conflicts. The micro-description of these processes reveals a very strong 
institutional setting as the three independent cases exhibit the exact same rules down to the smallest 
details. 
Chapter 7 presents the historical foundations of the modern legal framework involved in land 
management and conflict resolution in Burkina Faso, the influences that have shaped this legal 
framework and, at last, the state of its practice. I open this chapter with a cyclical interpretation of the 
institutions involved in land management from the 16th century to 2014. The context of colonization 
created a unique cultural and institutional puzzle where the philosophical foundations of the two 
systems are fundamentally different and yet function at the same time in the same place. The notion of 
justice is a key element in any institutional structure that informs us on this institutional structure.  This 
chapter takes a look at the spirit of the law and the forms chosen to apply it from the modern state 
point of view. Finally by analyzing a rare and unique set of data that I collected at the Tribunals de 




Grande Instance of Ouagadougou and Ziniaré, I give a sense of whether people have been using the 
modern institutions framework to resolve disputes or not.  
The conclusion gives a clear analysis of the state of the relationship between the modern and 
customary institutions. The factors feeding their symbiosis and their consequent evolution form a 
schizophrenic dynamic that explains the low level of economic development. I propose a theory on 
African under-development that I name the institutional schizophrenia’s cycles in Africa. I also present a 
dialectic approach for managing African land toward a more stable social environment and more 
efficient economy.   
  
  
































THE READING FRAMES 
DEBUNKING CONCEPTS OF TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
 
 The terms customary institutions and modern institutions are political constructs of not two 
concepts (tradition and modernity) but one whole concept developed simultaneously to create a divide 
between the colonial powers and the colonized population.  However, I choose to keep opposing them 
as the core of the institutional and developmental issues of this dissertation because they are so deeply 
rooted in today’s institutional setting that it would be hard to debunk this narrative without using them. 
This dissertation demonstrates in great detail, in the case of Burkina Faso and the Mossi Kingdoms (in 
the second part), how they are politically constructed and used, and how they have created an 
institutional monster.    
This chapter sets the historical and theoretical roots of the concepts of tradition in its opposition 
to modernity and their implications in the institutional setting in Africa. If historically this divide was 
mainly fabricated to respond to the technical problem of ruling large geographical areas with little 
manpower, the implications over the long term have proven to be far deeper and are still not fully 
recognized. The split concept of modernity and tradition is omnipresent: whether it is in the ways social, 
political and economic identities have been shaped and are lived today, in the ways that institutions 
have evolved and behave, or even in the way the academic world has shaped knowledge (Mitchell, 
2000).  
 The narrative of economic development or “capitalist development” is a narrative of 
modernization that includes industrialization and urbanization in a constrained geographical area --the 
West in opposition to the rest of the world-- with the historical aim of its imperial dimension (Mitchell, 




2000: xii).  Among the first intellectuals and scholars to challenge this narrative was the father of what 
he himself defined as orientalism, the Palestinian American philosopher Edward Said. In 1978, he 
published his landmark book Orientalism in which he redefined cultural representations as western 
representations of perceptions of the non-western world. His work had an enormous impact on Middle 
Eastern Studies. In this field, social scientists have been most active in rethinking political, economic, 
social and cultural dynamics according to the new reading frames of orientalism. Timothy Mitchell is one 
of them, as well as Talal Asad, Lisa Anderson, Beatrice Hibou, Karuna Mantena and others. In African 
Studies, there has been a long tradition of discoursing colonialism in the form of poetry known as the 
Négritude movement1, with Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor to cite the most famous ones. The 
fields of African economics and politics have been kept aside from the orientalist framework with the 
exception of Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan anthropologist of Indian descent and, to a certain extent, 
the French political scientist Jean-François Bayart, who is married to Beatrice Hibou. If more attention 
has been brought recently on the impact of orientalism onto the African political economy, it is still 
rather marginal and contained to the academic and intellectual sphere.         
This chapter will define and analyze critically the concepts of modernity and tradition in the 
African context. First, I reframe the opposition between urban modernity and the rural tradition into a 
power structure that aimed to dominate a large population with little manpower. Second, I reframe the 
question of migration and progress brought in opposition to the static African population as a political 
stake aimed to legitimize power during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods, highlighting 
in some ways an African tradition. Finally, I highlight the importance of this heritage in the international 
and development aid policies which have been playing a major role over the past decades in shaping 
African countries.       
                                                          
1
 The Négritude movement found its intellectual roots in the Hegelian discourse, defining itself as a philosophical movement 
influenced by the Surrealists. If most members pursued a political involvement, it followed the French tradition keen on the 
participation of intellectuals into the political life and debate. But the Négritude movement is too often considered as an artistic 
movement and to some extent a political movement but never linked to the social and economic structures of the colonial 
condition.   




1.1.    Urban Modernity versus Rural Tradition  
The geographical school points out that the low level of urbanization in the African continent 
can be explained by the low population density, the low level of agricultural productivity and the fact 
that the population lives in the highlands (the problematic landlocked countries) or “at least far from the 
coast or navigable rivers” (Bloom and Sachs, 1998: 241-2). This has resulted in an urbanization that is 
solely linked to administrative capitals (Bloom and Sachs, 1998: 241-2). But an historical analysis of 
inherited African institutions highlights a very different story and informs us on the nature of the African 
population which has been characterized by its rurality by colonial historicity.     
The work of the anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani focuses on the formation of political 
identities in Africa which he considers to be an artifact of the colonial administration (Mamdani, 1996). 
He identified a direct form of rule, which implied a direct involvement of the colonial administrators in 
Natives’ affairs. This form of rule required manpower and it was precisely what the empires lacked after 
the slaughter of World War I. Therefore, the colonial empires had to develop other forms of 
administrative rule that involved less European manpower.  The indirect form of rule became the 
dominant form of government in colonial Africa. It was characterized by less involvement from the 
colonial powers in what was defined as the Natives’ affairs, and the creation of two administrative 
layers: one native and the other one non-native. “Customary access to land defined the free peasantry 
in colonial Africa and a regime of compulsions simultaneously breached and marked the limits of that 
freedom in the name of indirect rule” (Mamdani 1996, 52). 
Indirect rule consisted of a two-layer governance: one for the non-native, the citizen, under the 
civil or common law, and the other for the native, the subject, under the customary law. A very strong 
association existed between citizens and urban settlements, and subjects and rural areas. The Native 
Authority became the local or rural authorities. It dealt with a Native Administration, Native Courts and 
Native Treasury. The Chief of the village, “historically” marked by a tribal identity, became the main 




agent of the Native Authority, taking on the responsibilities for tax collection, forced labor, provision of 
military recruits and crop cultivation (Mamdani 1996, 53). The city did not exist anymore for the Natives; 
the African cities disappeared and the modern European cities took over. The Colonial Administration, 
was physically based in the city and embedded the urban identity across the continent (see Figure 3). It 
had physical implications as well as institutional consequences, not only at the local scale but also at the 
national scale.  
Figure 1: The Urban/Rural Divide under the Colonial Ruling. 
 
The development of decentralized despotism, embedded in the indirect rule, was based on a 
combination of financial autonomy for local units and administrative absolutism for its agents. Local 
authorities became the guardians of a static rural tradition understood as the tribal or ethnic identity. 
Settlements defined as indigenous to Africa were excluded from the urban context. The physical urban 
segregation --privileged entry to the city-- was conceived as the reflection of a static rural situation.   
The Colonial administration represented the foreign-state and power and was physically 
expressed in very strict spatial segregation. The capital cities’ business centers and “white” residential 
areas benefited from improved infrastructures and services as the physical and administrative 
representation of the colonial power. In opposition, Native settlements were kept out of the city’s 
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boundaries and grew in time as they followed the increasing demand for labor and service (see Figure 
4). Today’s African capitals still display this layout. Although the Native settlements have been included 
in the city’s administrative boundaries, they usually correspond to the informal settlements and lack 
infrastructures and services. Nairobi is a typical example: the business center skyline is characterized by 
high-rise buildings hosting Western companies and ministerial offices. In the west of Nairobi, the former 
White neighborhoods --Muthaiga and Westland-- are now the wealthiest gated neighborhoods. The rest 
of the city is more or less informal settlements with different incomes levels, like Kibera and Eastland, 
where the population which works in the city center and services Muthaiga and Westland, lives.      
Figure 2: The Capital and Labor Dynamics under the Colonial Ruling. 
 
 Today’s land use regulations, usually in the form of master plans, refer to the inherited colonial 
city, which laid out a segregated space. The physical implication of this heritage can be observed in the 
co-existence of formal and informal neighborhoods. Because these physical implications have not been 
challenged by the independent states, they institutionalized the colonial heritage by keeping the same 
legal and planning documents in use. Furthermore, the independent states, which took over the capital 
cities, followed foreign powers and acknowledged them as foreign, and the newly formed states made a 
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point of using the existing institutions. Thus the capital cities, in the name of modernity2, kept their 
status as foreign entities, non-African, in opposition to the African villages and instead of becoming 
African cities.   
 Mamdani rejects the existence of major differences between the French and the British 
colonies, arguing that if the British mastered the art of indirect rule first, learning from their defeat in 
India, the French eventually followed the British model. Nevertheless, there is a large literature 
highlighting variations between the two institutional heritages. The Argentinian economist Rafael 
LaPorta et al. (1999) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that the nature of the legal systems 
imported to the colonies had an impact on todays’ developmental paths for these countries. For 
example, a country inheriting the common legal system, as opposed to the civil legal system, 
experiences better property rights, quality of government, political freedom and financial development. 
The American political scientist Lauren Morris MacLean (2002) shows in comparing social policies in two 
neighboring countries in West Africa --Côte d’Ivoire (former French colony) and Ghana (former British 
colony)-- that their social policies differ enough to implicate their colonial legacies as their economic, 
cultural and social structures offer tremendous similarities. She suggests that the former British colony 
has suffered more from the indirect ruling system, resulting in more informality, while the former 
French colony relies more on a heavy centralized administration. This has major consequences for the 
capacity of the post-colonial states to provide public services. The French economist Elise Huillery (2009) 
demonstrates that, in the former French colonies in West Africa, the current level of access to public 
services, the school enrollment rates and child health are correlated to the level of investments carried 
out by the colonial administration; in other words, the colonial investments continue to have positive or 
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 The notion of modernity in the post-colonial Africa has to be placed in the historical context of the Cold War. Indeed, 
modernity served a political statement as a representation of the Communist ideology, to break from the colonial period, but 
not necessarily from the former colonial powers (Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1995).   




negative effects today, as the post-colonial institutions reproduce the colonial institutions’ capacity to 
exclude from or provide for public services.  
 Opposing urban modernity and rural tradition is the result of a political construct and has led to 
the institutional bias in the definition of the formality or informality of land in the African context. But 
the deeper consequence of this heritage is the difficult quest to legitimize institutions which is essential 
to push democratic decisions. Participatory processes, typically characterized by a bottom-up approach 
of decision-making, are supposed to legitimize choices carried by public institutions in contexts where 
the population would ordinarily challenge the institution’s legitimacy. In the African context, the way the 
population perceives and defines its identity is so distorted by the heritage of the indirect ruling system, 
that democratic and participatory processes perpetuate the segregation between the powerful and the 
powerless, between the central administrative elite and the non-educated rural population.     
 
1.2. Territories and Population: Conquering Societies versus Enduring Static Population 
The indirect ruling system is not the only institutional problem of the African power unbalance. 
The very specific relationship between land and people is a core issue as it is a question of balance of 
power that is essential in African history and which has been erased by the colonial historicity that made 
the African history start with the European conquest. The land question in the African context is very 
often one of populations. Understanding the relationship between territories and populations requires 
looking at the slave trade and ethno-linguistic fractionalization and their outcomes for state-building. 
The British historian Basil Davidson spent most of his life exploring the complexity and depth of African 
history. In The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of Nation-State (1992), he opened with the 
common assertion of an “Africa without history”, a history that shall start with the slave trade.           
But why then adopt models from those very countries or systems that have oppressed and 
despised you? Why not modernize from the models of your own history, or invent new models?  
In Africa, just as in Central and Eastern Europe, the search for answers has to begin nearly a 
century and a half ago: that is, around the 1850s. This takes us back to times both terrible and 




dramatic: in the African case, to the Atlantic slave trade during years when that great 
persecution was at last being chased and harried to its end. It takes us, however unexpectedly, 
to the decks of a British warship named Bonetta in the years 1848, and to men and women, 
more dead than alive, who were rowed ashore from the Bonetta and somehow manage to stay 
alive.3 
[…] 
Coming from distant homelands along the coast, at first speaking a multitude of mutually 
incomprehensible languages, this unique community of rescued people rose gradually from the 
great wretchedness in their new land to become a people with notable history ahead of it. 
[…] 
The recaptives were all absolutely African in their origins; and yet they were divided from Africa 
by an acute experience of alienation.  
[…] 
Alienation, one may say, thus became naturalized. (Davidson, 1992: 19,25,27) 
 
The question of slave trade and its impact on today’s African population and territories is still an open 
debate. The common view that it is at the roots of Africa’s underdevelopment and fully organized by the 
European powers (Rodney, 1972; Darity 1992) has been challenged by the introduction of variations 
pointing out the facilitation of slavery by local African superstructures (Inikori, 1992), the enrichment of 
the Ashanti, Benin and Dahomey’s states from the slave trade with the Europeans (Fage, 1955), and 
strong correlations between the prosperity of slave trade and the presence of strong local rulers 
(Davidson, 1961). Whether slave trade reinforced or weakened local powers, the high volume of trade 
with the European powers has evidently impacted the local power dynamics and the relationships of the 
population and its territories, as Davidson elegantly pointed it out in the quote above, because of the 
massive population movements. Paradoxically, these movements reinforced the historical construct of a 
static and enduring African population.   
The organization of the African population has puzzled social scientists. There has been a 
growing interest in exploring the role of ethnic fragmentation in economic development. The American 
economists William Easterly and Ross Levine famously explained “Africa’s growth tragedy” by its ethnic 
divisions, showing that high ethnic diversity is closely associated with low schooling, political instability, 
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 In 1807, Britain had banned further conduct of slave trade to Americas and military ships like the Bonetta patrolled the African 
coasts to unsure the blockade. The slaves retrieved from the illegal cargos were brought to Freetown in Sierra Leone.   




underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits and 
insufficient infrastructure (Easterly and Levine, 1997). This view was challenged by the American political 
scientist Daniel Posner who pointed out that the measurement used for ethnic diversity --based on 
Soviet scientists’ work from the early 1960s published in the Atlas Narodov Mira-- was inadequate as it 
employed “enumeration of ethnic groups that [did] not correspond with the groups that [were] involved 
in the political competition that [was] hypothesized to generate the growth-undermining policies” 
(Posner, 2004: 853). Posner developed an alternative measurement but found similar findings to 
Easterly and Levine’s and denounced the social and historical construct of ethnic groups as well as the 
issue of spatial distribution of groups which was difficult to account for in an econometrics analysis 
(Posner, 2004). The Canadian economist Nathan Nunn highlighted the negative relationship between 
economic performance and the volume of exported slaves (Nunn, 2008). He suggested that “slave 
trades may be an important factor explaining Africa’s high level of ethnic fragmentation today” because 
it led to lower level of trust among the population (Nunn, 2008: 142).   
Echoing Diamonds and Sachs, the recent unified growth theory uses human genetic diversity as 
an indicative factor for economic development4. The Israeli economist Oded Galor and the Bangladeshi 
economist Quamrul Ashraf put in place an index called expected heterozygosity, developed by 
population geneticists to measure the level of diversity in genetic material across individuals within a 
given population in order to explain the course of economic development of human civilization (Ashraf 
and Galor, 2011). They find that the “intermediate level of genetic diversity prevalent among the Asian 
and European populations has been conductive for development”, while “the high degree of diversity 
among African populations and the low degree of diversity among Native American populations have 
been a detrimental force in the development of these regions” (Ashraf and Galor, 2011:1). They thus 
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 The Unified Growth Theory advanced by Oded Galor responds to the endogenous growth theory by stressing the determinism 
of the Malthusian equilibrium in the economic evolution of countries.  




confirmed the tremendous migrations and population diversity that Africa has experienced even though 
this population has been considered as static and confined into rural ethnicities.  
Colonial ethnography has been extremely influential in defining the African populations’ 
identities in a static land framework. Mamdani demonstrates how the Hutu and Tutsi identities have 
been made completely rigid under the Belgian colonial authorities with the political consequences --
exclusive claim for land-- it had in the 1990s and still has in the broader region of Kivu (Mamdani, 2001). 
The relationship between the population and land in the African context is a very complex one because 
of its historicity. I choose to highlight two illustrative outcomes of this complex puzzle: the first one is 
the question of migration and the identification of dominant peoples by the colonial historiography; the 
second is the issue of state-building in Africa.   
In 1864, John Hannington Speke’s travel account The Discovery of the Source of the Nile was 
published. The army officer and explorer had been acclaimed by the Royal Geographical Society in 1859 
for the controversial discovery of the Nile source with the explorer Richard Francis Burton. His travel 
account is part of the literature that sets the ground for the Hamitic hypothesis5. The Hamitic hypothesis 
was the scientific foundation advanced by the British Empire to value some ethnic groups more than 
others in Africa by justifying their superiority as a “sub-group of the Caucasian race” (as opposed to 
“Negroid”) which migrated to Africa a long time ago bringing the only degree of civilization that could be 
observed by the discoverers.   
Speke focused on the physical characteristics of the people he studied and used it as an 
explanation for intellect and ability. For example, he described the Wahuma  as more civilized than their 
neighboring groups because they exhibited what was essentially Western-accepted characteristics of 
civilization: they had “the greatest palace, a throne to sit upon, the largest harem, the smartest 




 century revision of the Hamitic hypothesis deemed that only Canaan was cursed, therefore allowing for sons of Ham 
to be the deliverers of civilization to the tabula rasa that was Africa. 
 




officers”, highways and homes that could not “be built without its necessary appendages for 
cleanliness,” and were not allowed to expose themselves on pain of death (Speke 1864, 253) 6. 
Therefore, the Wahumas were defined as a “sub-group of the Caucasian race” (Sanders, 1969; Speke 
1864, 253). The British historian Edith Sanders notes in The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origins and Functions 
in Time Perspective that historians of Africa who perpetuated the Hamitic hypothesis “accepted the 
dicta of the discoverers of that continent as indisputable proven facts and presented them as historical 
explanations of the African past” (Sanders, 1969: 530). The general idea that Africa was a tabula rasa 
and that all “civilized attributes” present there had to be introduced from the outside, by the Hamites 
for example, speaks to the inherent biases that have shaped understanding of the African continent, 
notably the ethnic fragmentation and the relationship of a static population within a set territory.   
Following the Hamitic hypothesis, the notion of arabization of Africa was in turn explained as a 
migration outcome. Indeed, Arab migrations to the Sahel belt were perceived as the only possible 
explanation for commercial activity and the spread of Arabic (James, 1971). However, there is an 
alternative thesis accounting for the arabization of the Sahel region, and this alternative thesis has to do 
with urbanization and state-building.  
 The historian Jay Spaulding conducted extensive work on Sinnay, the capital city of the Sultanate 
of Funj in Sudan (Spaulding, 1985). In the 18th century, the Sultanate experienced tremendous urban 
development going from two major cities, which were primarily administrative, to 20 to 30 commercial 
towns by the end of the century. These commercial towns developed around the merchants and holy 
men, because of the Shari’a’s7 orientation toward commerce. In this period of urban growth, a conflict 
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 The Wahuma are associated to the Bantu’s tribe that is considered to be the origins of the Tutsis. The Hamitic Hypothesis 
“racialized” the Tutsis which has built ground for racial tensions and violent conflicts between Tutsis and other groups such as 
Hutus. Posner (2004) points out that the data from the Atlas Narodov Mira are not accurate and he gives the example of the 
Hutus and Tutsis who are grouped under the “Bantu tribe” in the Atlas Narodov Mira. 
 
7
 Historically, the Shari’a (Islamic Law) was a set of rules attached to the Islamic city, as opposed to the tribal land and the tribal 
law. The Islamic city is where the freemen (free from the tribes) lived, and was the locus of intense intellectual and commercial 
activities. (Stadnicki and Touber, 2008) 




emerged based on the choice of the commercial rules to use: customary rules versus the Shari’a --a 
religious set of rules. In 1762, the Hamaj (warlords) placed regency around the Sultanate and 
proclaimed royalty as descendent of the prophets, to be understood as Arab. The urban domination 
onto the rural political and social network was the push toward what is known as arabization, but it 
should be understood as state formation. The Arab presence at that time was actually very weak 
compared to earlier periods, but Arabic, the language of the Shari’a presented the opportunity to 
develop a bureaucracy.   
 This state building process was interpreted very differently by the British Empire when it took 
over the region. Sir Harold Alfred MacMichael built a very different history of the Natives8. The British 
colonial administrator drawn genealogies, going from one tribe to another tribe, and he reconstructed a 
history of migration of the region (MacMichael, 1922). He created a migration theory on the same 
model as the Hamitic hypothesis: this time the Arabs had migrated to the region and brought civilization 
to the African Natives.  
 The colonization of Africa by the French and the British happened at a time of intense 
urbanization and state building processes. In order to control the colonies, giving the unequal numerical 
balance between colonial administrators and local population, the colonial empires had to develop 
forms of rule that would guarantee a minimum of population control. African cities represented a threat 
to the colonial administrators as they presented opportunities for the opposition to grow efficiently.       
This heritage had tremendous consequences for the relationship between pre-colonial 
institutions and the post-colonial states. The post-colonial era was marked by nationalism and 
modernism. Both concepts were imported from the Western world. The inherited institutions from the 
Colonial Empires, whether it was the French or the British, were not reformed especially at the local 
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 MacMichael entered the service in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. He served in the Blue Nile province until 1915 when he became 
a senior inspector of Khartoum province and then civil secretary in 1926. From 1933 to 1937, he served as Governor of 
Tanganyika, and from 1938 to 1944 Commissioner of the British Mandate of Palestine. MacMichael was central in developing 
the “indirect rule” system described by Mahmood Mamdani. (Mamdani, 1996) 




authorities’ level. After decades of failed nation-states and the eruption of civil wars across the 
continent in the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of “development” became the new modernist ideology. 
The urban agenda did not raise any attention, all focus stayed on rural development and the search for a 
definition of nation-state. Nationalist movements were associated with independence movements in 
Africa and they struggled to define the “nations” they said to represent. The politician John Garang, who 
became the first Vice-President of Sudan in 2005 after having conducted two decades of civil war in 
South Sudan against the central power of Khartoum, always presented himself as a defender of the 
unity of Sudan. He is considered as one of the key figures of Africanism, along with Kenyatta in Kenya, 
Nkrumah in Ghana and Houphouët-Boigny in Ivory-Coast. The Africanist fight was mainly a response to 
the post-colonial period and a search for African identity and unity. The problems arising from this 
ideology became quite clear when they were politically transcribed. Africanists struggled in defining the 
African identity, more importantly they did not consider the urban heritage of colonization because it 
was perceived as foreign. They focused on the rural heritage of colonization, which they never identified 
or refused to identify as shaped by the Colonial Empires. What they defined as African was the static 
rurality that the indirect rule had defined as “indigenous”. In other words, they continued the work that 
the indirect rule system had established.    
Political scientists concerned with the African state-building situation, have touched on the 
difficulties posed by the pre- and post-colonial linkages. The Belgium political scientist Pierre Englebert 
challenges the views that poor institutional quality in Africa is attributed to low level of social capital and 
high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization; instead he argues that one needs to look at the 
mechanisms of state legitimacy as it generates state capacity (Englebert, 2000). He demonstrates that 
the disconnect between the pre-existing political systems and the colonial norms of political authority is 
key in understanding the legitimacy of the African states.  
Although all African states but Ethiopia were imported, not all of them ended up equally 
arbitrary to the societies they now comprise. In some cases, the post-colonial state clashes with 




stateless pre-colonial cultures and brings different state systems together while splitting apart 
long-integrated political cultures. At other times, however, there is a reasonable approximation 
between pre- and post-colonial states both in terms of existing political cultures and 
geographical boundaries. […] Whereas the populations of non-legitimate states live their 
independence as “alienation” from their history […] those of legitimate ones experienced the 
end of colonialism as the restoration of their statehood. (Englebert, 2000: 13) 
 
The American political scientist Catherine Boone looks more specifically at the institutional linkages and 
political bargaining processes in a spatial context of the core and the periphery, in other words the locus 
of centralized power and the rural areas (Boone, 2003). Focusing on Senegal, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, 
she highlights the significant spatial and regional variations in the social organization and thus the 
political capacities of the modern states. Boone points out the electoral role of the African rural areas in 
the post-colonial states and the political mistrust of urban areas by leaders who have less control over 
the urban population. The issue of African states, she argues, is a complex geometrical puzzle where 
land, society and history mismatch in various ways.            
The American political scientist Jeffrey Herbst opens his famous book, States and Power in Africa 
(2000), by stating that “states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their 
borders” (Herbst, 2000: 3). Referring to Charles Tilly’s acclaimed work in Coercion, Capital, and European 
States (Tilly, 1990), Herbst points out that the challenge of state-building in Sub-Saharan Africa is the 
opposite of European states’ one. If for European powers the challenge of state-building was one of land 
competition because of their high population densities and land scarcity, the challenge for African 
powers was one of competition  for people and not land, leading African pre-colonial warfare into 
combat for capturing people and not territories (Herbst, 2000). The French political scientist Jean-
François Bayart agrees that the “index of power [in Africa] was less the control of land than the control 
of people” (Bayart, 2009: 34). He points out the problem of the vicious historicity of Africa and the 
“extraordinary ignorance of Africa’s social formations” whereas this historicity of politics should be 
centered on the terroirs, in other terms concerned with the relationship between the land and the 
people (Bayart, 2009: 265).  




Basil Davidson in his introduction to Lost Cities of Africa, stated, with the British elegance that 
characterized his writing, that “what the nineteenth century achieved for geography of Africa the 
twentieth is well towards achieving for its history” (Davidson 1959, xiv). If the nineteenth century 
geography defined correlations between environment, races and development capacity, the twentieth 
century history created the legitimacy of the advanced society in opposition to the under-developed 
world. A tradition that dies hard.  
 
1.3. The Urban Growth Disease versus the Rural Stability  
The notion of development has always been strongly associated with the concept of 
modernization. But interestingly enough for the development field, development and progress have 
been confined to the rural areas and agriculture. If rural land has been a center of the development 
field’s attention as an essential tool to improve agriculture production, urban land is approached by 
default. The birth of the urban issue in the development world can be traced to the first United Nations’ 
world conference on human settlements in Vancouver in 1976. The Vancouver Declaration raised 
concerns about uncontrolled urban growth and its inequitable economic consequences. The solution 
was seen in the public control of land to manage large-scale comprehensive plans. It actually took a 
strong ideological stand by stating that “private land ownership contributes to social injustice” (Section 
D of the Vancouver Declaration, 1976). But this has to be reframed in a context when urban 
development was seen as a societal problem and where the overall solution was rather to promote rural 
development in order to reduce rural-urban migrations. 
In the 1980s, following the oil and economic crisis, public expenditures became the major 
concern in the developed and the developing world. Under the financial institutions’ pressure in the 
context of the Washington Consensus, governments in the South promoted Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) which resulted in the privatization of public services and the decentralization of 




administrative services  in order to reduce national debts,. The urban issue completely fell off the 
agenda and only a research program was sustained, the Urban Management Programme initiated by the 
World Bank and UN-HABITAT in 1986. Confronted by the disengagement of public services and 
management from rapid urban growth, the idea of grand physical planning seemed obsolete and the 
focus turned to action-oriented management and financial schemes such as public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) in water provision. Urban governance, especially in the context of the decentralization programs, 
rose up as the main planning policy. Land tenure was not a concern.   
In 1992, the notion of urban planning was brought back at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. 
Environmental concerns attempted to restore the spatial component to the management of societies. 
Indeed, the environment variable seemed manageable only through what planning had historically 
tackled, a comprehensive technical method of managing spatial and demographic conditions. But 
planning theory had come a long way and the notion of participatory process in a discipline that was for 
a long time the domain of the experts had become central. A few years later in 1996, the Istanbul 
Declaration, known also as Habitat II, revisited urban governance issues, promoting local democracy as 
the solution to mitigate social and economic concerns. Habitat II has been a cornerstone of the urban 
programs in the developing world. It marked the beginning of a generation of strategic plans based on 
participatory processes. It was established by the international community that good governance could 
only lead to good planning. And the central idea was that local governments when strengthened 
financially were the guarantor of good governance because of their closeness to the population (that 
could be legitimize or delegitimized by participatory processes and local elections). Of course, in the 
African case and the heritage of the indirect ruling system, local governments meant something else.  
In the 2000 Millennium Declaration, the urban issue came back on the international agenda but 
only in the form of the informal settlements without specific focus on land. A very narrow approach was 
taken: it was phrased as “slums”, a specific type of informal settlement --usually in the center of the city-




- and the issue was disconnected from the city as a whole. In fact the only urban goal within the 
Millennium Development Goals is not even a “full” goal, but a target under the environmental goal (Goal 
7: Ensure environmental sustainability) and only considered slum dwellers (target 11 on achieving 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers). The main approach of the international 
community to the slum issue has been one of services upgrading, mainly in water and sanitation. But 
slums actually represent a market success, partly inherited from the colonization, in that they solve 
housing and employment problems (because there are no public transit option, slums are usually 
located within walking distance from the employment areas), problems that have been growing with 
population growth and the lack of investment in the urban infrastructure since the 1980s. There has 
been no effort to come back to a more comprehensive understanding of the developing city, despite the 
massive growth rates experienced in the developing world. Peri-urban areas have been developing in 
the form of “informal settlements” but yet are not necessarily slums in the sense that the housing 
conditions are decent and are not low-income neighborhoods. The complexity and confusion regarding 
land tenure are partly due to the lack of interest from the development field, usually because of the 
political consequences, and partly from the cultural and historical heritage of layered institutions.     
In 2006, responding to growing concerns from member states and local communities, UN-
HABITAT, in cooperation with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the World Bank, initiated the Global Land Tool Network 
(GLTN). The GLTN gathers knowledge on land tenure and property rights and seeks to improve access to 
security of tenure for the urban poor as well as to propose solutions for the local communities in 
managing land issues. UN-HABITAT and the GLTN constitute the primary source of information regarding 
land issues in the developing cities. They offer general overviews on land tenure, from Islamic land tools 
to land tax and valuation through land rights, law and enforcement, and specific geographical cases. It is 
a small program at UN-HABITAT in Nairobi, and has no visibility on the international scale as a 




development program despite the great value of the experts in charge of this program. It is drowned in 
the UN bureaucracy as another program, a tool-kit for development, without any comprehensive 
institutional approach, without political ideas.  
The nature of the international development policies (multilateral aid through the U.N.) aims by 
definition to be apolitical. It is thus left to the domain of economics. The following chapter reviews the 
literature concerning the political roots of the domain of economics and its definition of development. 
There is nothing more political that defining access to land and it cannot be considered as solely an 
economic program. The high level of urban informality in Africa cannot be considered as an economic 











THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF INFORMALITY, LAND AND RIGHTS 
 
 
The making of property rights as an economic object, an apolitical tool, results from a political 
construct operating on a similar framework as described in the previous chapter. The fabricated 
dichotomy between the modernity of clear property rights and traditional land practices is an outcome 
of a long debate in political economy. This chapter’s objective is to propose an historical analysis of 
exclusions’ processes under the label ‘the economy’ and to offer a way to think about land and rights in 
a different framework with the urban theorist Henri Lefebvre.    
I choose to first recount the historical roots of the nature of political economy, in other words, 
the philosophical question regarding the differences of wealth among nations because it sets the 
foundation of the modern economy vs. the traditional societal functioning. Understanding the origins of 
the definition of development is essential to understand why informality is regarded in opposition to the 
formality of modern economic thought as defined by the Enlightenment’s philosophers.  
Then, this literature review highlights the organic nature of informality and its complex 
relationship to the formal economy that has been defined and re-imagined over the centuries as a 
natural and efficient state of a “developed society”. Because development is evaluated on the economic 
performance of the formal economy, all things defined outside this scope, meaning the informal sector, 
are not accounted for in the measurement of development. In other words, the African continent is 
considered “under-developed” according to the economic indices used by the formal Western system 
but may actually experience a higher level of economic development than previously considered that is 
not captured by these economic indices. There is a gap between the demonstrated efficiency of a formal 




economic system as opposed to the informal system and the resilience of the informal economic system 
that cannot be explained solely by lower transaction costs within the informal economy. It is this gap 
that prompted my research question in the first place.   
The second part of this literature review analyzes the making of the dichotomy between clear 
property rights and the puzzle of the commons. I argue that it is part of a broader moral take on the 
nature of statecrafting and nation building.  
The last part of this literature review looks closely at the work of Henri Lefebvre as a central 
legacy to think of space as a place to claim rights. I chose to approach the issue of land and rights within 
the scope of the “right to the city” movement, because it seems to me that it could bring a unique way 
to approach the land puzzle in the African context.  
 
2.1. Economic Development vs. Informality 
2.1.1. The Nature of Economic Development: Western Universality as a Developmental Goal 
The moral core of political economy has been the attempt to explain the differences in wealth 
among nations by correlating economic performance with law and government. The origins of this on-
going debate are found in the moral philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The initial 
motivation of this inquiry was to establish the state of nature, the universal rules to human behavior. 
Hobbes (1651) and Locke (1689) introduced a scientific value into the natural law as opposed to 
Aristotle who had a more pragmatic approach to natural law and for whom the domain of politics was 
prudential by definition. If both Hobbes and Locke shared an Epicurean ideology – the ultimate goal 
being to enjoy utilities understood as pleasure- the means to attain it were different. Hobbes defended 
the principle of redistribution as commanding government to ensure stability and peace, while Locke 
argued for continuous growth as it would insure redistribution of wealth. Hobbes and Locke initiated the 
developing interest regarding the causes of wealth and poverty. In Jealousy of Trade, the Hungarian 




historian Istvan Hont argued that in this initial debate during the seventeenth century, the economic 
questions were rather absent (Hont, 2005). It was when commerce emerged as a problem for political 
theory that the debate was re-oriented toward geographically broader inequality concerns and 
economic nationalism9.  
The Scottish Enlightenment contributed to modern economic thought which is today’s 
philosophical basis for economics, in general, and more specifically, for development policies. David 
Hume (1751) propitiated two schools’ discourses which at that time were believed to be impossible to 
reconcile: the civic virtue approach from Machiavelli and the commercial argument from Mandeville 
(Hont, 2005)10. He rejected the idea of the economy being the result of a natural law and instead posed 
it as the result of the interaction between justice and social virtues, and ultimately the explanation for 
flourishing societies. Later, Adam Smith pioneered the modern foundations of political economics. In An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith highlighted the paradox of the 
“savage society”, where everybody works and yet people are poor, and the “civilized society” where not 
everybody works and yet people are wealthier. For Smith, this paradox was explained by the 
professional division of labor that evolved into what Karl Marx famously redefined as the industrial 
division of labor. Smith explained that the division of labor was related to the size of market, and was 
thus dependent on capital’s availability. Market, labor and capital were then the primary motors of 
development.  
                                                          
9
 In the 18
th
 Century, both France and England were facing massive public debts. The rise of large scale trade presented 
opportunities for new financial schemes: England passed its public debt into a private company, the South Sea Company, 
granting it, in exchange, with a monopoly to trade with South America (slave trade mainly), which ended up with the first 
financial bubble.     
 
10
 Machiavelli argued that a “well-ordered republic” was a necessary condition for stability and therefore was the overall 
population interest, while Mandeville believed that private interests needed to be unleashed as they stimulated individuals 
toward innovation and therefore benefited at large to the entire society (he valued vices over virtue). In other words, 
Machiavelli believed that men were not good or bad but in need of stability and structure for the society’s achievement, while 
Mandeville believed that men were selfish by nature and it was only a matter of channeling their selfishness to serve the public 
interest.    




The debate regarding the causes of development became pretty much set as a matter of 
economic development when in the beginning it was also about the organization of the society and its 
relation with institutional power. Framing the development question as an economic one blocked the 
possibility to address a different institutional or developmental construct. The nineteenth century posed 
industrialization and modernization as universal developmental goals until most of the twentieth 
century. It was the decolonization wave in the 1960s that reopened the notion of development as a 
debate regarding poverty and inequality among nations. The field of development was born from 
decolonization, in the context of the Cold War, and became a political battle. The West took on a 
humanitarian duty to help the “Third World” develop and mature into a capitalist society as opposed to 
a Communist one, locking the idea that development equaled economic development in the classical 
first and then neoclassical economic sense (Bates, 1990a; Hobsbawm, 1996).      
The American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, in his World System Theory, rejected the notion 
of “Third World” and, following the Braudelian tradition, set the world as one, connected by complex 
network of economic exchange relationships, where the dichotomy of labor and capital was central to 
understand power relationships. He extended this dichotomy to the notion of core and periphery, 
defining the difference between developed and developing countries in terms of economic power. 
Wallerstein noted that the “liberal ideology of the Nineteenth century insisted that modernity was 
defined by the differentiation of three social spheres: the market, the state, and the civil society” giving 
birth to the disciplines of economics, political science and sociology (Wallerstein, 1974: 6). Logically 
then, the concept of modernity was echoed by the non-modern society --the traditional, rural, tribal-- 
for which the discipline of anthropology was established, and which underlies the contemporary 
understanding of informality. This highlights two important ideas. The first one is that the market, state 
and civil society are considered as spheres of the developed world and consequently belong to the 
formal world. The second one is that anything cast as non-modern or pre-modern is a candidate for 




development and thus is to be submitted to an economic treatment of its informality (Chakrabarty, 
2000).    
 
2.1.2. Defining the Informal Economy 
In this context, the concept of informal economy is broadly defined as an economic activity that 
is not taxed or regulated by government. In other words, it is approached as an economic condition 
when it is primarily an institutional one. In 1973, the economic anthropologist Keith Hart forged the idea 
of informal economy as a specificity of the developing world from his empirical observations in West 
Africa. The core idea was that the informal economy was mainly characterized by burgeoning and 
dynamic self-employed activities, especially in cities like Accra in Ghana where Hart conducted his 
research. The urban character of the informal activity was preponderant and related to the flow of rural 
migrants to the city (Hart, 1973: 61). Hart’s distinction between the formal and informal sectors was 
based on the types of employment: the self-employed poor belonged to the informal and traditional 
economy when, in opposition, the wage-earning “protected” labor force belonged to the formal 
economy (Roy and Alsayyad, 2004: 10). The urban informal sector was seen as a “popular 
entrepreneurial dynamism” with low entry barriers in terms of skill, capital and organization, usually 
family-based and small scale, and operating in an unregulated and competitive market (Portes and 
Haller, 2005: 404). De Soto redefined this optimistic economic dynamism as the other path in response 
to the rigid and elitist mercantilist state. It comes as no surprise that the international institutions, 
whose mission is to ensure the world’s economic development, considered the informal economy as a 
form of under-employment carrying low levels of productivity and a low capacity for wealth 
accumulation because of the absence of defined property rights.  
This highlights the main paradox of the informal sector: it is simultaneously defined as a very 
efficient market because of the absence of regulations (in the neoliberal sense) and defined as lacking 




efficiency for the same reasons. This paradox basically relies on the level of economic liberalism that one 
follows. De Soto argues that the informal economy is a response to excessive regulations from non-
modern states (De Soto, 1989). And his view, coinciding with the neoliberal turn in the 1980s and 1990s, 
has met a growing interest in the international development community. The economist William 
Maloney from the World Bank demonstrates from his experience in Latin America that urban informality 
is a voluntary economic choice toward a more neoliberal market that exists because of the laxity or the 
weakness of existing state institutions (Maloney, 2004).           
In his landmark book Institutions, Institutional change and Economic Performance, the economic 
Nobel Prize winner Douglass North raises the question whether institutions are formal or informal 
(North, 1990: 4). He exposes the weakness of the main assumption regarding the market economy:  
property rights are perfectly defined and costless to achieve. The historical institutional process that 
took place in order to set property regulations in the Western economy as we know it, he argues, is not 
fully understood. North asserts that formal laws and property rights are in fact the result of a set of 
culturally inherited informal rules (North, 1990: 36-37). In effect, North argues that informal 
arrangements are more “organic” than formal ones and that even formal arrangements still contain 
vestiges of the informal.  
The American sociologists Alejandro Portes and William Haller highlight a functional 
classification of informal activities that illustrate well North’s purpose. They differentiate between 
informality for survival, informality toward dependent exploitation, and informality for growth (Portes 
and Haller, 2005: 406). Informality for survival explicitly marks activities outside the state-regulated 
market that induce direct subsistence production through simple sale, for example, and is typically 
found in the developing world. Informality toward dependent exploitation constitutes a more advanced 
market organization with low labor costs, high levels of flexibility, and tax avoidance and is typical for 
example of a power relationship between an underground immigrant subcontractor and a large firm in 




the U.S. industry. Informality for growth is well-illustrated by the micro-entrepreneurial networks in 
Central Italy for which capital accumulation is secured through solidarity relationships as opposed to 
defined property rights. Portes and Haller thus highlight different types of benefits produced though 
informality and absorbed by the formal economy, and therefore the fogginess between formality and 
informality in the overall economic sphere reinforcing the idea that formality and informality cannot be 
only considered as economic objects. This brings us to the necessity of defining property rights.     
 
2.1.3. Property Rights and Informality 
The economist Hernando de Soto presents a neoliberal option for the “other path” to 
development as the only way to capture economic growth for all, especially the poor. His thesis is 
centered on the notion of property rights as the basis of entrepreneurship. He defines property rights as 
“those rights, personal or real, which confer on their holders inalienable and exclusive entitlement to 
them”(de Soto, 1989: 9). According to de Soto, the problem of developing countries lies in the informal 
ownership of land and goods. Only a clear system of property rights will guarantee the success of 
capitalism. For de Soto, private ownership without intervention of the state is the solution to economic 
development for the poor. In the 1990s, he engaged the Peruvian State in a large land titling project to 
demonstrate his thesis. De Soto’s Institute for Liberty and Democracy claims that the administrative 
reform was successful.   
If de Soto proposes a neoliberal approach to land, his discussion of the role of cities poses a 
political debate on land and property rights and raises the specificity of urban land. De Soto mentioned 
the problem of recurrent migrations from the rural to urban areas. He identifies property rights issues as 
the cause of the agricultural crisis under the modern state (de Soto, 1989:  9). Indeed, for de Soto, 
the1950s agrarian reform reinforced the barriers of entries posed to access agricultural land, forcing 
people out of their traditional living into the uncertainty of rural migrations (de Soto, 9). The Hungarian 




philosopher and economist Karl Polanyi raised similar concerns regarding the relationship between the 
transition of one political structure to another and the emergence of different understandings of urban 
land (Polanyi, 1944).   
De Soto notes that “mercantilism –and not feudalism or the market economy- constituted 
Peru’s economic and social system after the arrival of the Spaniards” (de Soto, 14).  De Soto’s criticism of 
the mercantilist political system is mainly related to the fact that it is a “system of extralegal norms” that 
layers informal customary law and the official legal system and thus blocks the possibility for defined 
property rights (de Soto, 19). De Soto sees the burgeoning of informality as a political response of the 
oppressed class (a form of revolt) to the existing mercantilist elite that blocked the possibility of 
redistribution.   
The political economist Timothy Mitchell critiques de Soto particularly in relation to the Chilean 
land titling project (Mitchell, 2005). He cites a number of studies that have evaluated the effects of 
property rights in urban Chile and the conclusion is a strong critique: “property titles had no significant 
effect on access among the poor to business credit” (Mitchell, 2005: 300). Mitchell explains the success 
of the de Soto thesis in terms of the excitement the Peruvian economist has raised despite the 
unfavorable empirical results. That excitement is based on the strong economic ideology of land as 
property (he refers to Douglas North) and the traditional appeal it has in institutions like the World 
Bank. Mitchell also offers an alternative explanation of the “so-called positive” findings of the land titling 
project:  the neighborhood was considered as a village to the people engaged in this program, thus the 
social networks played a greater role in economic growth than the land-titling program (Mitchell, 2005: 
309). He argues that what the neo-institutionalists assume is wrong: the absence of formal property 
rights should not be understood as anarchy but as a social and economic structure embedded in rural 
social networks (Mitchell, 2005: 310). The assumption that what is informal is lawless is the result of the 
ideological evolution of economics and development. Because informality is defined as lawless by the 




economic bias that characterizes development as economic development, the functioning of the 
informal sector is dismissed without even considering the potential benefit it may carry.   
 
2.2. The Nature of Land: A Moral Puzzle 
2.2.1. Land as a Commodity 
The definition of land as a commodity has opened a problematic debate because of the specific 
nature of land and its relationship to people’s and nations’ identity. Characterizing land as a commodity 
forces it to be considered solely as economic property and bars the possibility for other considerations 
on the nature and value of land (outside monetary and economic purposes) that an informal system 
might carry. Karl Marx famously theorized the relationships between capital, labor and land. Capitalist 
society is based on the principle of accumulation of commodities, defined as “an object outside us […] 
that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another” (Marx, 1867: chapter 1, section 1). 
Marx pointed out the specificity of land as a commodity as follows: “The distinction between capital and 
land, between profit and rent, and between both wages and industry and agriculture is immovable and 
movable private property – this distinction is not rooted in the nature of things, but in a historical 
distinction, a fixed historical moment in the formation and development of the contraction between 
capital and labour” (Marx, 1844: 37). In other words, property is an expression of the relationship 
between labor and capital, and private property is to be understood as a form of capital.  
Karl Polanyi reinvestigated the notion of land as a “commodity” in his book The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Polanyi, 1944). He placed land as well 
as labor and money in the category of “fictitious commodities” because they are part of questions 
“removed from the organization of buying and selling, and subjected to an entirely different set of 
institutional regulations” (Polanyi, 1944: 70). Polanyi saw similarities in the feudal and mercantilist 
systems; both “never attacked the safeguards which protected these two basic elements of production 




 --labor and land-- from becoming the objects of commerce” (Polanyi, 1944: 70). The only difference was 
in the methods of regulation. The feudal system used the force of custom and tradition to reinforce a 
decentralized system of small towns, while the mercantile system “favored stature and ordinance” from 
the central state authority known as nation-state formation (Polanyi, 1944: 70).  
Polanyi identified the commercialization of labor and land as the preconditions of a market 
economy. This change from a regulated social organization to a self-regulated market is what he called 
the great transformation in the structure of society. He argued that even if “labor, land, and money are 
obviously not commodities”, “markets for labor, land, and money are organized” (Polanyi, 1944: 72). 
Labor is another word for human beings and land “another name for nature”, and thus the “commodity 
description of labor, land […] is entirely fictitious” but at the same time this fiction is fundamental to the 
organization of markets for labor and land (Polanyi, 1944: 71, 72).  
Polanyi can be situated in the same line of thought of Marx in the sense that he identified the necessity 
of commodities (that he redefined as fictitious commodities) for a free society, but also warned of a 
“free” market mechanism that “would result in the demolition of society” (Polanyi, 1944: 73). Both 
placed land in an economic debate (land, capital and labor), but Polanyi also added a historical 
component to the representation of land by introducing, because of the feudal and mercantilist 
systems’ historical heritage, the role of land as an institutional tool to structure political authority. The 
Great Transformation is the separation between economics and the society, creating two parallel 
worlds: one according to the market economy which is formalized by institutions, and another that is 
the result of societal arrangements inherited from the history and geography of a place which is 
characterized as informal. Land is thus a political site that can be contested, and often is contested as its 
commodity status (exchange value) and cultural status (use-value) come into conflict. The story of the 
commons presented as an attribute from the ancient time or undeveloped sphere is a convenient 




political construct that reinforced statal power (Krueckeberg, 1999). The following part shows how the 
neoliberal approach of land as property rised and prevailed.   
 
2.2.2. From a Moral Statecraft to the Neoliberal Doctrine 
The debate on the problematic definition of land as a commodity was completely closed with 
the rise of capitalism and the neoliberal doctrine. In The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments 
for Capitalism before Its Triumph, the economist Albert Hirschman gives an insightful thesis on the 
philosophical origins of capitalism (Hirschman, 1977). For Hirschman, the rise of capitalism is a function 
of the activity of merchants and bankers whose labor was originally considered sinful. The issue was to 
make ethically acceptable an enterprise initially seen as morally shameful. The solution was found in the 
moralizing role of the interest as opposed to the passions. Land which used to be acknowledged as a 
passionate expression of the nation, because it was tied to blood, became a subdivision of wealth, an 
immovable property.  
The “tragedy of the commons” described by Garret Hardin, which highlights the inefficiency of 
communal property, reinforces the capitalist thesis regarding the treatment of land as an interest and 
not a passion (Hardin, 1968). Indeed Hardin demonstrated that shared resources could not be well 
managed because individuals would act rationally according to their self-interest which usually was 
contrary to the long-term best interests of the community, depriving everybody in the end. Thus, 
because individuals tend to behave as free riders naturally, the technical solution was to provide 
individual property rights in order to impose self-regulation and responsibility onto the people (Hardin 
had a special interest in demographic questions). This idea has become one of the primary arguments of 
neoliberalism, an economic doctrine which now dominates the field of development.       
The natural rights school theory (private property is natural) defended originally by Aristotle and 
then Locke prevailed in the political economy debate on land. However, the gap between the 




commodity status of land as private property (a fictitious commodity for Marx and Polanyi) and the 
reality of the use-value of land forced to reconsider the status of the commons. Elinor Ostrom contested 
Hardin’s theory on the tragedy of the commons because it concerned only the non-regulated commons, 
when the majority of commons presented some kind of regulation (Ostrom, 1990). Obeng-Odoom notes 
that “only context-specific analysis can determine the viability and vitaliy of the commons” and cites 
studies by Thomas Payne and Henry Georges (Obeng-Odoom, 2016: 16). But this approach was 
considered outside the economics in the neoliberal political context (Krueckeberg, 1999).        
Neoliberalism refers to an approach to economic and social policy characterized by the 
maximization of the role of the private business in the public sector and the diminution of government 
regulations and participation. The social theorist and geographer David Harvey defines neoliberalism as 
“a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 2). The rise of the 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan national administrations in the 1980s in the United Kingdom and 
the United States respectively, is considered as the beginning of the neoliberalist era: it involved a series 
of market-oriented reforms, the most established being that of the Washington Consensus11 (Mirowski 
and Plehwe, 2009).    
This political and economic evolution found part of its roots in the 1920s debate between the 
American philosophers John Dewey and Walter Lippmann regarding the role of experts in democratic 
politics. Lippmann argued in The Phantom Public (1925) that the public opinion could not be genuine 
because of the potential manipulation from the media. He thus advocated for technical issues to be left 
to bodies of experts separated from the democratic procedures of reviews and voting. In his famous 
                                                          
11
 The Washington Consensus was developed by the American economist John Williamson from the Think-tank called “Institute 
for International Economics” based in Washington DC. It advocated for the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
the U.S. Treasury Department to push for massive reforms at the global scale, relying on trade liberalization, deregulation of 
domestic markets, privatization of public services to reduce public expenditures and secured property rights (Mirowski & 
Plehwe, 2009: 348).  




response to Lippmann, Dewey in The Public and Its Problems (1927) pledged that the problem of public 
participation was a problem of education and thus an educated public could genuinely participate in 
technical debates. In 1938, a “Walter Lippmann Colloquium” of intellectuals was organized in Paris; 
among them was Friedrich von Hayek, the famous Austrian-born economist and philosopher, defender 
of the classical liberalism and winner of the 1974 Nobel Prize in Economics. During this meeting, Hayek 
called for an alternative to the Keynesian view of the market. He argued for viewing the market as a 
political technology, a system of information and expertise. The market is thus a device to aggregate 
expert knowledge as opposed to an instrument of equilibrium. Hayek deeply opposed state 
interventionist theories which had taken place in response to the Great Depression. World War II and 
the reconstruction effort required central planning and therefore limited this debate to the academic 
sphere of the Chicago School of Economics where Hayek continued his meetings in the then innovative 
format of the “think-tank” at the Institute of Economic Affairs. The energy crisis of the 1970s presented 
a favorable context for political conservatism that found inspiration in Hayek’s Institute of Economic 
Affairs.          
The nature of the relationship between the state and the market shifted. Hirschman pointed out 
that the primary concern of the Montesquieu and Steuart doctrines was the morality of commerce in 
the context of the state-crafting exercise that was taking place in the 17th-18th century Europe 
(Hirschman, 1977). The moralization of the interests and the rise of a state defined private property as a 
tool toward political stability and peace. The main thesis was that economic progress would bring 
political stability and social peace through the de-passionization of land as a representation of the 
nation. The neoliberal doctrine erases the specific nature of land. The historical and geographical ties of 
land to the nation disappear to become a sole object of economics.      
In this context, land titling projects to resolve problems of poverty and informality in the 
developing world came as an obvious fact. “The economic answer to terrorism”, as de Soto calls it on 




the cover of his book, is a technical fix provided by experts to eradicate poverty. Why then is it not 
working? Why do people continue to live through the informal economy and basically stay poor?  The 
American agricultural economist Philip Raup, a world renowned expert on land reforms and agriculture, 
gives an enlightening analysis on the nature of land and its consequences: 
Land is perceived as an economic variable, responsive to the major forces that guide the 
combination of resources in the production of goods, services and intangible values that satisfy 
human wants. It is produced, in this economic sense, in the laboratory, through the techniques 
by which it is used, by the institutions that are established to regulate its use, and by the 
perceptions of its users. Its supply can be augmented, diminished, and destroyed. It is subject to 
the laws of distribution, of exceptional durability and with a production cycle of invention, 
innovation and the creation and restructuring of social institutions. In this view, economic land 
is a social creation. (Raup, 1982:2)  
 
The social creation that is economic land implies that the institutional settings have been overlooked 
and whereas land has globally become an economic object in Mitchell’s term. Land, as a social creation, 
as a political tool, is also a powerful lens to inquire about rights, power relations and state-building 
processes. The next part takes a look at the role of space in the political construct of societies through 
the lens of the urban theorist Henri Lefebvre.    
 
2.3. Rights and Space 
Henri Lefebvre witnessed 90 years of the 20th century, two World Wars, May 1968 and the rise 
and fall of the Soviet Union. Described as a philosopher and sociologist, he is known as one of the most 
influential theorists of Marxist thought. Born in the rural region of the South-West of France, the region 
of King Henri IV and the “Three Musketeers”12, Lefebvre as a teenager was stained by the destructive 
nationalisms of the Great War but also the hope of the Russian Revolution (Merrifield, 2002). He moved 
to Paris in the 1920s to study at LaSorbonne, where he was introduced to Hegel’s work which influenced 
tremendously his intellectual upbringing. He joined the Communist Party in 1928 which forced him to 
                                                          
12 The “Three Musketeers” refers to the Alexandre Dumas’ novel which has nourished generations of French kids of an idea of the South West 
Region as breeding characters marked by honor values, joie de vivre and courage.    




flee Paris for the South of France when the Vichy Law passed during World War II. He eventually joined 
the Resistance Movement. His critique of Stalin’s regime ousted him from the French Communist Party 
(PCF) in 1958. The rural exodus and the reconstruction effort long following the war offered a 
contemplative case study to Lefebvre in rethinking the spatial dimension of everyday life, the evolution 
of the societal practices as well as the relationship of humans with nature. As his life experience always 
reminded him, the politics were central to his “redefined into space” dialectical thinking.       
 Lefebvre left behind an enormous body of writings as professor of philosophy and sociology, 
researcher at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and as a political activist and 
intellectual. His early work focused on political essays on nationalisms and dialectical Marxism. His 
Hegelian introduction to the dialectical relation of surrealism shaped a democratic approach to socialism 
which made him critical of the Soviet interpretation of Marxism. He saw the urban environment as the 
focal point for the people’s emancipation from doctrines whether it was religion, nationalism or political 
dogmas. His later body of work from the 1960s and 1970s became his most important legacy with The 
Right to the City, The Urban Revolution and The Production of Space published respectively in 1968, 
1970 and 1974. He became a reference for the spatial justice movement carried by urban theorists such 
as David Harvey, Peter Marcuse and Edward Soja. His student, Manuel Castells, was instrumental in 
shaping this movement, even though he later became a strong critic of Lefebvre claiming that Lefebvre 
was closer to structural Marxism which he himself had critiqued.  
 The uniqueness in Lefebvre’s theoretical approach that made him so important and yet which 
has been under-considered in the planning theory –even in the right to the city movement- is the role of 
the physical and spatial relationship in social and political dynamics. There is a ubiquitous and holistic 
appeal in his writing and view of the world. This philosopher, political activist, sociologist, geographer, 
play writer, radio director continuously searched for connectivity and balance in a dialectical 




representation of the world between the urban and the rural, internationalism and nationalism, the 
modern and the traditional.        
 
2.3.1. Internationalism and Nationalism 
In his book Metromarxism, Andy Merrifield dedicates a chapter on Henri Lefebvre entitled “The 
Urban Revolution” (Merrifield, 2002). Merrifield displays the active participation and enthusiasm of 
Lefebvre in the Marxist intellectuals’ groups in the 1920s Paris. The trauma of World War I and the 
violence unleashed by nationalisms were the core problematic of the intellectual movements in this 
post-war period. In reaction, scattered artists and intellectuals whose creative centers –e.g. Paris- were 
shattered by the war, found a voice in an anti-war cultural movement, the Dada movement, which 
developed during the war in Zurich to denounce, through various art and writing forms, bourgeoisie 
guilt in developing nationalisms and wars. The Russian Revolution presented an alternative in the 
constitution of an international movement following the Marxist doctrine, broadly understood as 
socialism. In Paris, Lefebvre met with Andre Breton who exposed him to the surrealist movement, an 
outcome of Dadaism. Breton introduced Lefebvre to Hegel’s work whose doctrine of Surrealism based 
on a dialectical demonstration –relationship of real and surreal- shaped Lefebvre’s entire work 
(Merrifield, 2002: 73). Hegel’s writing became a living element in a symbiotic relationship with 
Lefebvre’s intellectual production.  
The conflictual relationship of the particular and universal particularly resonated in Lefebvre 
approach to the meaning of nations. In his 1936 book La Conscience Mystifiée, he dedicates a chapter on 
“Nations and Culture” where he sketches the notion that the nation is neither fiction nor an historical 
outcome but a theoretical object. A year later he publishes Le Nationalisme Contre Les Nations, his first 
major publication with the French Communist Party (PCF). This book is often presented as a curiosity as 
it takes a theoretical approach, an intellectual engagement that had no pedagogical or propagandist 




intention as opposed to a more common political activist stand. The national enthusiasm toward the 
Popular Front at that time in France did not reach Lefebvre who, after two trips to Nazi Germany in 1935 
and the beginning of the Civil War in Spain, seemed more concerned with the rise of fascism. In line with 
the Soviet cultural movement, he concentrated more in defining the French culture and what its 
heritage meant for the nation. The rehabilitation of National heroes such as Alexander Nevski and Pierre 
the Great in the Soviet Union was an attempt to build a cultural heritage which inevitably would 
highlight the value of the nation.  
Lefebvre starts his book with the tale of Joan of Arc in France and the French Revolution 
extracting the French cultural value in the representation of freedom and democracy. From the birth of 
nations, national values have been mystified creating fetishes where the forms break loose from the 
content. His central argument from Le Nationalisme Contre Les Nations is nicely summarized in La 
Somme et Le Reste (1959)       
The Nation, a real product of history from an activity, which is a community (divided in 
classes) tends to break apart from this same activity, becoming an independent matter […] The 
Nation is a social representation that has become an object, a substance, outside its creative 
force; the Nation becomes autonomous and transcendent. The Nation becomes a fetish. […] 
Nationalism and its ideologies (symbols, fictions, morals, etc) get their strength from the 
national substance; they dry up the national substance, using it as an absolute representation. 
They live out of its resources and damaged it. (Lefebvre, 1959: 582) [translation by J.Touber]     
 
Lefebvre was the first to introduce in France the national idea within the Marxist thoughts. He 
argued that capitalism had created internal rifts between groups within a same nation, e.g. between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Using the terms of Lenin, he explains that within a non-socialist nation, 
there are in fact two conflicting nations. And because historically the proletariat was excluded from the 
national identity by nationalism or patriotism, the unity of the country is put at risk. Fascism presented 
itself as a solution to this threat but Lefebvre points out that it does not represent a real national 
community. Even if fascism introduced itself as the people representation, it is in fact a “mysterious 
interpretation of a statal and national deity” (Lefebvre, 1937: 153). The Marxist solution appeared to 




Lefebvre as a complex one. He sees more internationalism as an action that can introduce changes only 
from the outside which is conflicting with the notion of nation. Lefebvre’s writings on the national 
sentiment relate to his central search to understand alienation. The mystification of nationalisms against 
the nations becomes a dialectical relationship that extends to rationalism against reason, individualism 
against individual, objectivism against objectivity, and humanism against human (Lefebvre, 1937: 12).   
 
2.3.2. Modernism and Tradition 
Lefebvre’s Marxist search toward understanding alienation continued at different scales. The 
period between the two World Wars imposed his focus understanding the formation of the nationalizing 
states in Europe, their maturation in some ways from the 19th century fragmented Europe toward a 
broader European identity. After the Front Populaire’s major social breach and World War II, the French 
society embarked on a new basis and the reorganization of classes associated with technological 
progress imposed a daily modernity whose dialectical nature fascinated Lefebvre. In La Critique de le Vie 
Quotidienne (1947), Lefebvre, the philosopher, becomes a sociologist, opening a fundamental door of 
social science, as Lenin had shown for Marx and its social scientism. In an interview in 1972, Lefebvre 
raised as a main critique that urbanism has never been able to pose itself as a science but rather turned 
into a technique practiced by technocrats and architects to serve capitalist purposes. La Critique de la 
Vie Quotidienne demonstrates alienation’s mechanism of space, the specialization of functions that only 
reproduces the domination of one class –the financial elite- onto the people. Modernity does not 
challenge the established social order of classes. Rather it alienates the lower classes through new 
technologies, resulting in making “the banal look extraordinary and the usual, mystical” (Lefebvre, 1947: 
21). The fascination of everyday’s tools and objects resulting from technological progress makes the 
critique of everyday life real, masking the content of the critique and shifting the attention to its form.    




  A bucolic chapter, “Notes Taken on a Sunday in the French Countryside”, presents a nostalgic 
account of the traditional, rustic life. The space and functions in everyday life constantly overlap and 
complement each over. The village central square is the space for the market, the village festival, the 
leisure and social point. The poetry of the country house, integrated in the “natural” and social 
landscape, carries the order of the first account of human history, agriculture, according to Lefebvre. 
The second and third are respectively industrialization and urbanization. Modernism imposed the 
separation of human activity from nature, and increased the social and spatial fragmentation of human 
activities. This is the core dialectical question that Lefebvre has never been able to reconcile. Originally 
from a small village, Lefebvre was repulsed by the religious fanaticism of his parents, yet his nostalgic 
feel for the traditional village and his disgust for the political order of it create two anchors between 
which he stumbled. Merrifield argues that:   
Lefebvre’s homesickness, in short, isn’t backward looking. His is no Heideggerian 
atavistic model of authenticity and the “good life”. His longing is firmly for the future and he 
uses the past only as a vehicle for pushing forward and onward, toward a higher plane of critical 
thinking and practice. He wants to bring spontaneity back into everyday life. Spontaneity can 
potentially disalienate everyday life. (Merrifield, 2002: 83).  
 
Lefebvre certainly does not make of the traditional village (and city) a museum-like form that should be 
frozen in time and space, but the reconciliation between the modern forms and the traditional use of it 
is not always clear. One way of understanding it is to refer to his formulation of space in terms of use’s 
value, referring to Marx theory of commodity. The use’s value of space has to be understood as a social 
value toward happiness and fulfillment of the people.  
 There is a strong sense of the importance of art, poetry and aesthetic, in Lefebvre’s philosophy. 
The aesthetic of the traditional countryside does not match those of the modern city. But the 
emancipation power of the industrial city is nowhere to be seen in the countryside. Lefebvre is 
extremely critical of the new towns and modern urbanism. For him, the urbanization period that came 




after World War II (and the industrialization period) misses the aesthetic and spontaneity of the 
traditional city and inhibits the emancipation power that the industrial city once had.   
 In some ways, the critic of the monolithic and monotone aesthetic brought by the modern cities 
in the new towns has been extended by Leonie Sandercock who shares with Lefebvre an artistic and 
therapeutic feel of the urban potential. Sandercock’s interest for the “cities of difference” echoes 
Lefebvre’s dilemma regarding the modernist paradigm which while creating homogenous physical 
structures, bred social monsters generating exclusions in seclusions (Sandercock, 2003). Social 
fragmentation opens once again the migration issue for Lefebvre and the immigration issue for 
Sandercock in their relation to identities’ formation.     
 
2.3.3. The Urban and the Rural 
After joining the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in 1949, Lefebvre initially worked 
on rural sociology. The post-war period in France was characterized by the rural exodus and it was only 
in 1960 that for the first time in history the urban population exceeded the rural population. This 
phenomenon happened at the same time that cities were confronted to a massive housing crisis 
produced by the very low volume of housing construction in the 1930s –because of the rental 
legislation, an outcome of World War I-, the massive destruction from the bombings during World War II 
and the migrations from the colonies as they were achieving their independence. New Towns and large-
scale modern neighborhoods –grands ensembles- flourished to respond to the housing crisis. In 1970, 
Lefebvre published Du Rural à l’Urbain, where he analyzed the sociology of the rural and its translation 
in the modern urban environment. The dialectical relationship of the traditional and modern slips into a 
dialectical relationship between the rural and urban. The displacement of the rural population in the 
modern urban environment marked the disappearance of the aesthetical traditional village –with an 
integrated social network- and the disappearance of the emancipation power of the industrial city.  




The same year, 1970, he published one of his most well-known books, The Urban Revolution, 
which is a continuation of Du Rural à l’Urbain. It is one of the first major works theorizing the urban 
phenomenon. Until then, social science had offered a more descriptive account of the urban life. 
Lefebvre only introduced the city as the major social event of the “modern” society, but also introduced 
it as a spatial occurrence.  
We can assume the existence of a virtual object, urban society; that is, a possible object, 
whose growth and development can be analyzed in relation to a process and a praxis (practical 
activity) […] Even though local and regional features from the time when agricultural production 
dominated haven’t entirely disappeared, it has been changed into a form of industrial 
production, having become subordinate to its demands, subject to its constraints […] The 
expression “urban society” meets a theoretical need […] Similarly, by “urban revolution” I refer 
to the transformation that affects contemporary society, ranging from the period when 
questions of growth and industrialization predominate (models, plans, programs) to the period 
when the urban problematic becomes predominant, when the search for solutions and 
modalities unique to urban society are foremost. (Lefebvre, 1970: 3,5)                
 
Few years later, in 1974, he expanded the spatial dimension of the city in The Production of Space in 
relation to Marxist theory. This book became the milestone of the spatial justice movement. He reunited 
the sociologist with the philosopher to offer a social model based on the relationship of the humans 
with space. He differentiated the natural space and the social space, the latter being a social construct in 
which dominant classes reproduce their hegemony, thus corroborating Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. 
Philosopher by training and political scientist by practice, Iris Marion Young expands the argument of 
domination by homogenization into one of justice in the politics of difference (Young, 1990). Cities are 
not an agglomerate of people but a social construct to serve political means. Space is not any more the 
domain of mathematics and geometry but the domain of the social and political representation of the 
humans. Lefebvre developed the spatial triad –representation of space, representational space or lived 
space, and spatial practices- which Edward Soja used for his concept of spatial trialectics.   
Lefebvre grounded his embracing conceptualization of the relations between spatiality, 
society, and history in a fundamental urban problematic, a tension-field and often highly 
contested spatial dynamic and framework for political action that he projected into the more 




social and historical specificities of urban life. Following Lefebvre’s most assertive argument, all 
social relations, whether they are linked to class, family, community, market, or state power, 
remain abstract and ungrounded until they are specifically spatialized, that is, made into 
material and symbolic spatial relations. (Soja, 2000: 8) 
 
Lefebvre’s major criticism of modern urbanism was that it destroyed the social and political purpose of 
the city. It ruralized the urban forms by specializing space into fragmented functions such as home, work 
place, shopping center and eliminating the fundamental spaces such as the market square and city 
center. This anti-urban planning approach is the ultimate form of domination of the assertive class over 
society.  
The strength of Lefebvre’s argument is in his demonstration of the role of space in the political 
construct of society. The implications of this argument have been underdeveloped in attempts to 
theorize path dependency in development for example. Indeed Lefebvre’s argument on the role of the 
cities in the emancipation of the people could resonate in the developing countries where inherited 
institutions have fostered anti-urban policies. African scholars have concentrated their approach on a 
dialectical relationship between the Western and non-Western, attempting a post-modern argument for 
development, but a Marxist argument such as Lefebvre may be able to produce a more workable 
framework. The decolonization process has left in place mechanisms of domination that have been 
utilized by the current African elites. In this case, the Western versus non-Western framework does not 
seem as sufficient to understand the domination process as the Marxist theory.     
  





THE ISSUE AND METHOD 
APPROACHING THE ENDOGENEITY PUZZLE OF INSTITUTIONS AND GROWTH THROUGH A CASE STUDY 
 
The fact that the African continent is by far sustaining such low level of development has 
puzzled a number of economists, pushing part of the economic intelligentsia to choose to place the 
African continent in a geographical debate and not an institutional one. This dissertation intends to 
show that, even if, historically, the organization of human societies has been influenced by its 
geography, the institutional approach to the under-development of Africa is a crucial one. The reason 
for a persistent informality is the core of my research question. I investigate the complexity of the 
inherited layered institutions and challenge the form and content of the dichotomic idea that the 
modern system –formal institutions- manages a clear framework for formal property rights while the 
customary system –informal institutions- manages a fuzzy structure of informal land tenure and that 
they are incompatible with each other.      
 
3.1. The Institutional Debate in the African Context 
3.1.1.   Geography and Institutions 
Over the past decade, a major debate within economists and political scientists have been 
concerned with the endogeneity issue of political institutions and economic growth to explain unequal 
global development. This debate focuses on the truthfulness of causal mechanisms, and thus has been 
obsessed with the sanctity of quantitative analysis, econometrics and game theory approaches. There 
are two main hypotheses underlying this debate to explain the under-development of Africa: the first 
one is the geographical hypothesis and the second one the institutional hypothesis, which tends to be 
closely related to path dependency theory.        




The geographical hypothesis found its roots in the writings of the eighteenth century’s French 
political thinker Montesquieu (1748), whose meteorological climate theory explicates a correlation 
between climate and the “nature of man and his society”. Climate is said to have a direct effect on 
income through its influence on work effort. This hypothesis was also considered earlier by Machiavelli 
(1519) and has found a second breath in recent time under the influence of the American scientist Jared 
Diamond, the American economists Jeffrey Sachs and to a certain extent the American economic 
historian David Landes. Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel (1997) is an award-winning popular science 
book and Diamond was awarded the National Medal of Science in 1999. Using evidence from ecology, 
archaeology, genetics and linguistics, he demonstrates that the unequal development between nations 
is due to environmental fates. He argues that Africa’s geography -- because of its long North-South 
shape-- slowed down the diffusion of agricultural technologies which resulted in a delay of the Neolithic 
revolution. Echoing Diamond’s thesis, Sachs emphasizes the importance of geography through its effect 
on the disease environment, transport costs and technology. In an article with the American economist 
David Bloom, Sachs argues that even if external conditions (colonial heritage), social conditions, internal 
and economic policies, demographic changes can be explanations for Africa’s poverty, “they miss the 
bigger truth”; “at the root of Africa’s poverty lies its extraordinarily disadvantageous geography” as its 
climate, fragile soils and human and plants diseases are the causes of low agricultural productivity, high 
disease burdens, low levels of trades and short life expectancy (Bloom and Sachs, 1998: 211). Sachs 
often uses the example of malaria transmission, prevalent in the South and linked to ecological 
conditions, that directly affects incomes because of the lowered work capacity of the weakened infected 
population (Sachs, 2003). He regrets that most economists neglect the “role of forces of nature in 
shaping economic performance in general, and in Africa in particular” (Bloom and Sachs, 1998: 213). 
In The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and some So Poor (1998), Landes, 
referring to Adam Smith’s book on the wealth of nations, explains the “European miracle” with the 




Weberian cultural thesis, the importance of the science of hydraulics, and the climate thesis. He 
dedicates his first chapter to “nature’s inequalities”: 
I have always felt reinforced and stimulated by the temperate climate. Personal experiences can 
be misleading, if only because of the variance among individuals. One person’s discomfort is 
another’s pleasure. Still, the law of heat exhaustion applies to all, and few manage to work at 
full capacity when hot and wet. (Landes, 1998: 15)       
 
If Landes’ overall work is most known for his emphasis on the importance of culture and religion (and his 
Eurocentrism) to explain  the different levels of development around the world, he takes a strong stand 
on the importance of geography, by opening his book with “Geography has fallen on hard times”  
(Landes, 1998: 3). He continues by showing his admiration of the French school and its obsession with 
geography (inherited from Montesquieu) citing the French pedagogue Edmond Demolins (1852-1907): 
“If the history of mankind were to begin over, without any change in the world’s surface, it would 
broadly repeat itself” (Landes, 1998: 533).      
The technical problem with the geographical hypothesis is that it does not account for the hot 
weather in large parts of the United States, malaria-prone ecological environments such as Washington, 
D.C. or the South of France and land-locked countries like Switzerland which were dealt with by the 
development of infrastructure, made possible because of working institutions. The philosophical 
problem with the geographical hypothesis is that it denies the ultimate quality of human beings; that is 
the capacity of free will. The quote from Demolins is a perfect illustration of that. If the history of 
mankind is solely bonded to the surface of the world, it means that every person is solely bonded to 
what Mother Nature gave him/her, in other words, that we are genetically programmed and we cannot 
deviate from our “genetic path” whether it is to be a good mother or a murderer. History has brought 
some evidence that mankind has the extraordinary capacity through its organization in the form of 
governance to reshape and adapt to its geography, that nature and so geography cannot be the only or 
even the main factor shaping our societies.      




The institutional hypothesis takes this observation of the geographical hypothesis and points out 
that prosperous places have not always been in the temperate areas, highlighting the examples of the 
Mughals in India or the Aztecs and Incas in the Americas. The institutional school argues that if the 
South struggles with its economic development today, it is because of the institutions it inherited from 
the colonization period. The economists and political scientists Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 
referred to as AJR, wrote two landmark articles (2001 and 2002) in this development debate. They 
demonstrated that European mortality rates in the colonies are correlated with the type of institutions 
that have been put in place in these colonies. Thus in colonies where Europeans faced high mortality 
rates, extractive institutions were set up because they could not see themselves settling in the long 
term. They argue that these institutions have persisted today, and have an effect on the current 
economic development of these countries: “Africa is poorer than the rest of the world not because of 
pure geographic or cultural factors, but because of worse institutions” (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001: 1372). For example, in Australia and New Zealand, Europeans adopted a settlers’ 
strategy and thus set up institutions that enforced the rule of law and encouraged investments, while in 
Congo and Gold Coast, extractive institutions were set up with the intention to transfer resources 
rapidly to the metropole (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001: 1395). AJR also “argue that European 
colonialism not only disrupted existing social organizations, but led to the establishment of, or 
continuation of already existing, extractive institutions in previously prosperous areas and to the 
development of institutions of private property in previously poor areas”, resulting in an institutional 
reversal (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002: 1263). In other words, if geography played a role in 
the beginning, it was only one factor that was highly aggravated by the choice of institutional setting 
made during the colonial period.   
 The endogeneity issue of institutions and economic development is of special interest to path 
dependency theory. Path dependency theory implies that history matters and that an event or a 




decision at one point in history has recurrent consequences later on. The American political scientist 
Scott Page describes the idea of sequences in historical events to analyze causality (Page, 2006). He 
establishes a classification of several forms of dependence based on dynamic systems for which 
“[h]istory can matter for outcomes but not for equilibria” and decision theory for which the order of 
events does not necessarily matter (Page, 2006: 93). It is an attractive concept for economists and to a 
certain extent other social scientists because it opens the way to what is the most attractive in hard 
science:  the possibility to predict. But path dependency theory reinforces the endogeneity issue that 
institutionalists face.       
The Polish-American political scientist Adam Przeworski, renowned for his work on capitalism 
and democracy, has taken on this issue of endogeneity so central to the neo-institutionalists who 
praised the importance of institutions over economic growth, following the New Institutional Economics 
led by Douglass North, Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. Przeworski demonstrates that the 
“institutionalist narrative is essentially the same as that provided by writers inspired by Marxism [who 
claim that the forces of production are “primary” in a society] and that both end in the same impasse” 
as the “only motor of history is endogeneity” (Przeworski, 2004: 168). Warning of the unpleasant 
character of endogeneity, he concludes that testing alternative theories of development would be 
difficult. He highlights mechanisms of “blocking” and “reproduction” of institutions depending on 
generic situations. In other words, the response of a set of institutions, once “populated by 
organizations”, to exogenous change is determined by processes of blocking or reproducing depending 
on the special interests of these organizations reinforcing path dependency (Przeworski, 2004: 172). The 
nature of institutions, like a living organism, is primarily set to assure its survival, so once institutions are 
set, they reproduce themselves and block undesirable change. But like any living organism, they also 
have to adapt to certain changes in order to maintain their primacy. In this difficult equilibrium the 




relationship between land and people is a core concern, and a very unique and central question in 
Africa.     
 
3.1.2.    Land and People in Africa 
Echoing the neo-institutional debate and the importance of geography, the British economist 
Paul Collier suggests that “the emphasis upon health has underplayed other features of African 
geography that may be both more important and more amenable to policy” (Collier, 2006: 11). He 
argues for a distinction between Africa’s physical geography and its human geography, demonstrating 
that the interaction between the two creates a dilemma for Africa’s development and pointing out the 
effects of its ethnic diversity (Collier, 2006). Africa’s ethnic diversity is identified by Easterly and Levine 
(1997) as very significant in a growth regression, and this is what Collier mentioned in his response to 
Bloom and Sachs’ paper, even though he adds that the problem is not so much “the high level of ethnic 
diversity, but the low level of political rights in the context of that diversity”, recognizing that the impact 
of geography can be mediated by institutions (Bloom and Sachs, 1998: 277).      
When looking at the history and state of the population in Africa, slavery and colonization, 
because of their massive scale, have had a very unique impact. As AJR point out, “equilibrium 
institutions are likely to have been designed to maximize the rents to European colonists, not to 
maximize long-run growth”, creating forms of legal inequalities between the Europeans and the 
colonized population but also among the local population (AJR, 2002: 1263). This is a very crucial point. 
The American economists Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff have shown in a landmark article that 
inequality could be correlated to adverse development (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). And AJR describe 
how the “elites may want to block investments in new industrial activities, because it may be that these 
outside groups […] will benefit from these activities” and put at risk their elite status (AJR, 2002: 1273). 
Przeworski points out that in these cases, institutions persisted by blocking opportunity that then left 




them behind any potential growth (Przeworski, 2004: 172). For sure, the African continent offers ample 
examples of such inequalities among groups, which may be characterized as ethnic diversity.         
Because land in Africa has been considered as a non-problematic resource by the development 
community due to its large geography, little attention has been drawn to land reforms on this continent 
as opposed to Latin America and Asia. Yet land, even when abundant, has definitely had the property of 
an uneven good that the elite would have secured with some kind of barriers of entry, in the 
institutional “blocking” and “reproducing” model described by Przeworski (2004). In 1975, the World 
Bank, which had previously advocated for non-intervention in land tenure, changed its point of view 
(World Bank, 1975). The 1980s were marked by a growing interest in land reforms as the continent 
experienced several important regime changes in Central African Republic (1979, 1981), Equatorial 
Guinea (1979), Chad (1979, 1982), Uganda (1979-1985), Guinea-Bissau (1980), Liberia (1980), Burkina 
Faso (1980, 1982, 1983 and 1987), Ghana (1981),  Nigeria (1982-3), Burundi (1987), Zimbabwe (1987), 
Sudan (1985-86, 1989) and Liberia (1990). Land tenure in Africa was seen as having a degree of flexibility 
because of customary institutions. These institutions were described as a “socialist” and “traditional 
communal type” of land tenure that posed a problem of efficiency but did not pose social issues unlike 
the “feudal land tenure types” observed earlier in Latin America and Asia (World Bank, 1975: 194). I 
would like to draw attention here to the contradiction of an African continent considered to have, on 
one hand, an important ethnic diversity --to be understood as a puzzle of inequalities (Collier, Easterly 
and Levine, Engerman and Sokoloff) -- and a “socialist” land tenure system on the other hand.    
The Belgium economist Jean-Philippe Platteau points out that land reform in Africa was 
approached as a problem of re-defining the terms of property rights and not as a problem of re-
distribution (Platteau, 1996: 30). If one option was to flush out the customary system, Platteau shows 
more interest in a second option which entailed an autonomous evolution of the customary system 
under the pressure of market forces which he refers to as the evolutionary theory of land rights 




(Platteau, 1996: 30). In a 1979 article, the American economists David Ault and Gilbert Rutman 
concluded with the potential for such a scenario.  
In contrast to a widely held view that a communal land tenure system is an indicator of a 
classless or egalitarian society, communal land tenure systems in tribal Africa were generally 
sets of individual rights that had yet to be defined or exercised. As long as transaction costs 
were positive, the African had little incentive to exercise his rights as long as the supply of 
resources exceeded demand. Once the demand for resources exceeded supply at zero price, 
individual rights to property were exercised. The process of defining individual rights to land was 
accomplished through the disposition of land disputes by the native courts. (Ault and Rutman, 
1979: 181) 
 
The idea that customary land tenure system in Africa could very well follow the economic principles of 
property rights as defined by the American economist Harold Demsetz, a member of the Mont Pelerin 
Society, in the sense that “property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of 
internalization become larger than the costs of internalization” has been largely dismissed by the 
development literature (Demsetz, 1967: 350). Hence the role of the customary institutions may be more 
complex than a simple guarantor of a communal land tenure system.  
Platteau describes what the evolutionary theory of land rights would entail: in short, the 
appreciation of land prices (from obtaining specific land rights) would increase the potential for land 
disputes to which national governments would respond by carrying out administrative reforms to ease 
social tensions and the wasteful use of resource. These reforms would necessarily comprise a formal 
registration of private land rights or land titling and full cadastral surveys (Platteau, 1996: 36). Giving 
numerous examples across the African continent (Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe), Platteau suggests three problems 
arising from this evolutionary theory of land rights. Firstly, “if titling may reduce risk and transaction 
costs to some categories of people, it may simultaneously create new uncertainties for other categories 
which rely on customary or informal practices and rules”, especially when subsidiary or derived rights to 
land are at stake (Platteau, 1996: 40). Secondly, the prevalent “fear that the adjudication/registration 
process will be manipulated by the elite to its advantage” should not be neglected (Platteau, 1996: 43). 




If this fear is reinforced by the low levels of education, it has also an historical ground as the French 
political scientist Jean-François Bayart showed: indeed during the French colonization, land could be 
registered by anyone (which was not the case under the British rule) and some people had taken 
advantage of this legal opportunity to expropriate the land of other groups (Platteau, 1996; Bayart, 
1989). Thirdly, “the transaction cost of establishing and operating the [registration] systems were 
considerable and much higher than the costs of enacting the enabling legislation” (Platteau, 1996: 47 
citing Feeny, 1988: 295).  
The question of the remarkably low levels of development in Africa has become a growing 
source of concern in the development debate among economists and political scientists. This debate 
highlights the unique physical and human geography of the continent, its unique history and its peculiar 
institutional setting in the generic problem of the endogeneity of growth. “Institutions and development 
are mutually endogenous and the most we can hope for is to identify their reciprocal impacts” writes 
Przeworki (2004: 185). I propose then to look at the specificities of a layered institutional system and its 
impact on the development of property rights.  
 
3.2.     Research Design  
3.2.1.   Overview of the Approach and Research Question  
As Przeworski points out, “the motor of history is endogeneity” which means that causality 
cannot be established; in other words one cannot affirm that bad institutions are the primary cause for 
under-development and vice-versa  (Przeworski, 2004: 185,184). But he also points out that: 
Endogeneity cannot mean that, once installed, institutions invariably persist. At most it can 
mean that institutions are a contingent outcome of conflicts that occur under given historical 
conditions and are more or less likely to persist given these conditions. The point of departure 
must be conflicts and, while the potential outcomes of conflicts depend on the conditions and 
institutions under which they occur, these outcomes are not predetermined. (Przeworski, 2004: 
183) 
 




This is of particular interest because it introduces the possibility of observing some kind of variation 
within the relationship between institutions and economic development when confronted by a stress 
factor such as urbanization. There is little question that the economic development of the African 
continent has proved to be very elusive, and the question of the role of its institutions, characterized by 
the prevalence of a two-layer institutional system (formal/modern and informal/customary), a product 
of the colonial history, is of special interest.     
The object of this research is an urban and peri-urban condition defined as informal property 
rights. The research aims to understand land informality in urban Africa and its consequently low level of 
economic performance. Indeed, the process of urbanization has been characterized by a very high rate 
of informal settlements representing more than two thirds of the African urban population; this number 
is below one third in Latin America and Asia (see annex 1). Therefore, the unit of analysis that I have 
chosen is the institutions involved in land management in the regional area of an African city.   
My research question inquiries into the reasons for prolong informality in urban Africa: why 
does informality in property and land allocation persist in the presence of formal institutions? In other 
words, how do formal institutions fail and provoke state weakness13 in the process of land 
management? Is this state weakness to be found in the customary law or in the civil law? Answering 
these questions should inform us as to the functioning of a two-layer institutional system and thus its 
relationship into potential economic growth as it shapes forms of property rights.   
Informality may persist because the benefits to most people from the informal economy are 
more important than in a formal system despite the often highlighted lack in security. Or it may persist 
because it benefits a powerful group who has managed to maintain a status quo. It may also persist 
                                                          
13
 State weakness is defined by Susan E. Rice (U.S. Ambassador at the U.N.) and Stewart Patrick (Director of the International 
Institutions and Global Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations) for the Brookings Institute as “countries that 
lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment 
conductive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and 
accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting 
the basic human needs of their population” (Rice and Patrick, 2008: 3). The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 
places Burkina Faso in the bottom quintile and among the weakest states.    




because formal institutions are weak and the informal sector fills in, as de Soto argues. Informality 
provides an ontological security where certain people identify with their property connecting them to 
others. Informality can also mitigate and control effects from the formal markets. Informality enables 
the use and transfer of property to be embedded in social and cultural relations taking on a different 
value than just an exchange-value. Also, informality provides some flexibility to property rights, creating 
the possibility of management without experts. But the historical context of the African continent and 
the specificity of the urban setting play a central role in the resilience of informality. I argue that in the 
African context, informality is the result of a control mechanism, put in place through history, that 
institutions keep reproducing because it provides a status quo that serves actors at the local and 
international levels.   
In order to understand how the modern (formal) institutions and the customary (informal) 
institutions play their roles in land and property management, I focus on conflict resolution mechanisms 
regarding property rights. When a conflict occurs between several parties for the same piece of land, 
choosing a formal or informal institutional setting for these parties to find an acceptable agreement 
should uncover the legitimacy of the different institutional layers. These variations should reveal or not 
the dominance in terms of legitimacy and/or economic efficiency of the formal system over the informal 
one, as well as the potential blending of options between the formal and informal institutions. My 
research will contribute to the academic knowledge on institutions and economic development for the 
political economic community (in a very broad sense) by offering a detailed account of the functioning 
of informal and formal institutions involved in land management in an African case, which should add to 
our understanding of the role of informality and its institutions in development. In other words, as 
Przeworski points out, it is in these variations that we can grasp the strength of the existing institutional 
sets and their capacity to “block” and “reproduce”, id est their capacity to adapt, respond and shape the 
future socio-economic geography of a state.   




         3.2.2. The Choice of Process Tracing as a Methodological Approach  
I chose to understand the persistence of informality, even in the presence of formal institutions, 
by detailing the process of land conflict resolution and how people use the institutional settings 
available to respond to their problem. The process of land conflict resolution highlights the role of the 
modern and customary institutions and reveals their true nature. Using process tracing, I identified 
mechanisms that uncover the roots of the prevalence of informality in a specific historical and 
geographical context by highlighting the institutional weaknesses and strengths in this current complex 
setting. I also expose the extreme level of formality of the customary institutions.       
Process tracing was first used by the field of cognitive psychology in the late 1960s and early 
1970s to understand decision making processes at the individual level. The term then emerged in social 
sciences in 1979 with the American political scientist Alexander George who used this methodology to 
make inferences about historical explanations within case studies (Bennett and Checkel, 2012: 7; Collier, 
2011a; Collier, 2011b). Process tracing is defined as “the use of histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a 
case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (Bennett and 
Checkel, 2012: 8). In other terms “the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening 
causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005: 206).  
If most causal explanations rely on David Hume’s argument of constant conjuncture, process 
tracing adopts a more pragmatic approach that relies on the idea of causal mechanisms (Bennett and 
Checkel, 2012: 12). It is thus important to set a clear definition of what such causal mechanisms entail. 
George and Bennett define them as follow:  
ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with 
causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, 
information, or matter to other entities. In doing so, the causal agent changes the affected 




entities’’ characteristics, capacities, or propensities in ways that persist until subsequent causal 
mechanisms act upon them.(George and Bennett, 2005: 137) 
 
This methodology embraces a Bayesian approach by choosing to favor the probative value of a little 
evidence as opposed to a larger quantity of evidence. Yet, it cannot be reduced to story-telling, and 
should rather be compared to genealogical methods such as historical reconstruction of discourses in 
the sense that it exposes a different side of a narrative by uncovering hypothesized mechanisms 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2012: 18, 19). However, even if process tracing comprises an inductive (theory 
development) and a deductive (theory testing) side, there are some concerns with the potential 
generalization of the findings as it may apply only to the specific case studied (Bennett and Checkel, 
2012: 10, 16; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994).  
 When social scientists choose to focus on case-centric studies, they imply that the complexity 
and context-specificities of the social world, as opposed to the laboratory conditions where variables 
can be controlled, make it quite impossible to generalize across cases. Because of this impossible 
generalization of the complex social world, making a distinction between systematic and case-specific 
inquiries does not make much sense and, therefore, theories are developed in a more eclectic fashion 
(Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 13). The Danish political scientists Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen 
define three variants of process-tracing: theory-testing process-tracing, theory-building process-tracing 
and explaining-outcome process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). These three approaches share the 
same goal of studying causal mechanisms and the same ontological assumptions about the nature of 
causal relationships that are “the use of deterministic theorization and a mechanistic understanding of 
causation that focuses on the process whereby causal forces are transmitted through a series of 
interlocking parts of a mechanism to produce an outcome” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 13). Following a 
Bayesian logic of inference, they also share the same theoretical understanding of mechanisms as 
invariant (they are either present of absent) (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 13). These three approaches 




differ in whether they are theory-centric or case-centric designs, whether they aim to test or build 
theorized causal mechanisms, whether they understand the generality of causal mechanisms as 
systematic or case-specific, and whether the types of inferences being made are theory-testing, theory 
building or sufficient to the explanation being made (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 13-14).         
I chose to use process tracing to understand why informality persists in the presence of formal 
institutions because it offered an efficient analytical framework to study mechanisms. Indeed, the 
ontological assumptions regarding causality in the different social science methodologies can be divided 
into two main families. The first one is concerned with a probabilistic approach and relies on large-N 
quantitative statistical methods. The second one is concerned with a deterministic approach. The 
deterministic approach can itself be divided in three sub-families. The study of regularity though 
qualitative comparative analysis (medium-n) is one sub-family and is concerned with the investigation of 
patterns of regular association between conditions highlighting (a) necessary and/or sufficient 
condition(s) in a causation (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 28,177).  Comparative cross-case study methods 
(small-n) and case studies are a second sub-family of the deterministic approach using congruence 
methods between cases or within a case “where the similarities between the relative strength and 
duration of the hypothesized causes and observed effects are assessed” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:  28; 
Georges and Bennett, 2005: 181-204). Process-tracing is a third sub-family of the deterministic approach 
and is concerned with the study of causal mechanisms in a single-case (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 28). 
“In process-tracing methods, each part of a mechanism is conceptualized as an individually necessary 
element of a whole” and the chain of these elements explains the observed outcome (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013:  31). It is often understood using a machine analogy where mechanisms link causes and 
outcomes (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:  29).   
As described in the figure 1 below, my research is concerned with the institutional mechanisms 
in place in the former African colonies (customary institutions and modern institutions inherited from 




colonization) and their impact on the low level of development. The institutional mechanism I focus on 
is often considered as a black box made of formal and informal rules. I propose to enter in this black box 
by detailing three parts of this mechanism: the first part of the mechanism is concerned with the 
functioning of the customary institutions, the second part of the mechanism is concerned with the 
functioning of the modern institutions, and the third part of the mechanism is concerned with the 
blending of the customary and modern institutions. By analyzing the historicity of the customary and 
modern institutional blocks, and by detailing their contemporary utilization, I uncover the pre-
determined nature that explains the malfunction of today’s African institutions. I will demonstrate in 
this dissertation that the dynamic between the modern and customary institutions presents a distortive 
perception of a situation and results in weak decision-making processes. The modern and customary 
institutions form one entity and cannot be separated; their decision power is regularly altered by a false 
perception of what the other represents and tends to rely very much on outside aid and influence. The 
delusion that political groups are ethnic identities has been the cause of recurrent violence across the 
continent. This specific African situation is not acknowledged by the political elite that recurrently 
























   Figure by Julie Touber 2014. 
 
I adopt the approach of theory-building process-tracing for the following reasons. The purpose of this 
research is to build a plausible causal mechanism linking X and Y and not to study an established 
correlation between X and Y (theory-testing process-tracing) as it would bring back the endogeneity 
issue that I discussed earlier. The ambitions and understanding of this causal mechanism are theory-
centric and not case-centric (explaining-outcome process-tracing) because, even if I studied only one 
case (Ouagadougou and its surroundings), this study is concerned with a setting that is systematic and 
generalizable to large parts of the African continent (customary institutions and institutions inherited 
from the colonization) and therefore could be tested at a larger scale. Finally, the types of inferences 
made are based on observable manifestations that reflect underlying mechanisms as opposed to the 
presence or absence of a causal mechanism (theory-testing process-tracing) or minimal sufficiency of 
explanation (explaining-outcome process-tracing) (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:  21).   
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3.3. The Case Study 
        3.3.1. The Choice of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso  
To proceed with this research work, I needed to identify an African city in a fairly stable country 
where land conflicts were not primarily driven by religions and/or herder and farmer dynamics so I could 
observe institutions at work with minimal “exceptional” disruptions.  There has been a growing interest 
in understanding land disputes in Africa and most, if not all, studies focus on the endemic conflicts of 
herder/farmer or ethnic and religious groups in rural areas in countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Somalia and Namibia (Bassett, 1998; Hussein et al, 1999; Tonah, 2002). In this 
context, Burkina Faso displays a different picture. Despite its intense poverty, its primary resource-based 
economy, its ethnic and linguistic diversity (see Figure 2) as well as its religious diversity14 --factors cited 
as primary drivers for conflicts-- Burkina Faso does not experience significant conflicts compared to 
other African countries (Kirwin, 2010). This implies strong institutional settings and a stable political 
context15. Indeed, to be able to obtain a robust historical analysis, I needed to have a fairly long period 
of institutional stability for the modern institutions.  
Burkina Faso is a semi-presidential republic (or parliamentary republic) but is not considered as 
a democracy as President, Blaise Compaoré, was in power from 1987 to 2014 without a change in 
power. Yet, it was considered as a fairly stable country, as it had not experienced serious violence 
outbreaks despite a very difficult regional context and the political instabilities in Mali, Niger and Ivory 
Coast which surround the small landlocked country. Burkina Faso is also known to be the center of a 
formerly large regional empire, the Mossi Kingdoms, whose capital has been for centuries 
                                                          
14
 Burkina Faso has a GDP per capita of $1,400; 46,7% of the population lives below poverty line -2009 est.-(CIA Factbook, 
2012). There are seven major ethnic groups: Mossi 40%, Gurunsi, Senufo, Lobi, Bobo, Mande, Fulani (CIA Factbook, 2012) and 
more than ten linguistic groups (Kirwin, 2010: 20). There are three major religious groups: Muslim, Christian, Animists (CIA 
Factbook, 2012).  
 
15
 My research and field work took place more than two years before the 2014 military coup. Before the events of October 
2014, Burkina Faso experienced nearly three decades of political stability in a tense regional context.   




Ouagadougou. Ouagadougou, as the capital of both the state of Burkina Faso and the Mossi kingdoms 
offers a great geographical opportunity to study the two superimposed institutional sets.      
         Figure 4: Map of Burkina Faso and Its Ethnic Groups 
 
 
If the relative stability of the modern institutions and the presence of a strong customary history 
and culture are important for the robustness of my analysis, I also needed to have this institutional 
setting confronted by an important change, but again not an exceptional disruption such as religious 
wars or large-scale herder/farmers conflicts. Urbanization presents such opportunity. Indeed, it is 
substantial enough to confront the institutional setting with a problem of adaptation, but not violent 
enough to provoke a change that would be hard to evaluate in the long term. With a population 





















































































































   
 




which in turn challenges the institutions in place to respond to land pressure (Ministry of Economy, 
2007: 28; City of Ouagadougou website). These factors were strong arguments for choosing 
Ouagadougou as the case study for this dissertation.       
 
         3.3.2. Field Work and Data Collection 
 The data collection process relied on three main undertakings. First I conducted archival work 
based on bibliographical work from Columbia Library, the Bibliothèque National de France in Paris, the 
University of Ouagadougou’s Libraries, documents retrieved from field work, specialized book stores 
such as L’Harmattan in Paris and private collections (a special thanks to Michael Cohen). The goal of this 
archival work was to provide me with enough information to retrace the historicity of the institutional 
situation in Burkina Faso.    
Second, in order to trace today’s functioning of the layered institutions, I conducted a series of 
interviews of various lengths during fieldwork in November 2012. These interviews were concerned with 
both the modern and the customary institutions. Most of these interviews were constructed as a set of 
two or three interviews of the same person or group at different days and times. The idea was to first 
obtain a positive and clear contact --clear on the research intent-- and to build a trusting relationship. 
The follow-up interviews took the time to develop the micro-steps of a process, whether it was 
concerned with land titling administrative procedures, search processes for the rightful land owner, or 
judicial or customary processes for resolving a conflict in a specific context. These interviews were 
completed with physical observations that were transcribed in the form of short videos, photos and 
drawings when cameras were not allowed. I conducted a total of 87 interviews in Burkina Faso. These 
interviews represent a large spectrum of diverse data. Some were conducted in a face-to-face setting 
and others were conducted in a small group setting. One part of these data were professional 
interviews, where I met with administrative representatives and experts involved in the land 




management process: the other part of these interviews was closer to the anthropological endeavor and 
was concerned with the customary system.  I conducted two sets of 5 hours long interviews (not the 
same day) in 3 places (following the local protocol): Ziniaré (30 km North-east to Ouagadougou), Koubri 
(south to Ouagadougou), Taab Tinga (secteur 28 in Ouagadougou, “zone non-lotie”).    
Finally, I spent a significant amount of time retrieving data regarding land related cases from the 
logbooks of the Tribunal of Ouagadougou and the Tribunal of Ziniaré. These data are extremely valuable 
and unique: I spent about 30 hours at the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou to go though 
the registries (entries of all civil and commercial cases) for 1980-81 (1 year), 1990-91 (1 year), 2000-2001 
(1 year) and from 2006 to 2011 (6 years). The conditions I faced to access these data were extremely 
interesting and I will discuss them later. I did the same at the Tribunal de Ziniaré.  
The following table summarizes the data collected in accordance with the process-tracing 

















Table 1: Process Tracing: Descriptive Inference to Understand why Informality Persists in the Presence of Formal  









Rules regarding land management 
Description of the organization of the Mossi Kingdoms and its 
administration 
o Archival Data from Colonial Archives and anthropological 
accounts 
o Bibliographical data 
o Interviews with the King and his ministers 
o Description of the weekly ceremony  (Ministers Council) 
o Interviews with several Chiefs of Lands 
o Interviews with worshiping Mossi  
 
Description of the legal framework of the Civil Code and Laws 
regarding land 
o Archival work regarding the Civil Code and following laws 
related to land management (original texts and preparative 
workshops and texts) 
o Bibliographical work 
o Interviews with experts and magistrates involved in the 
making of the laws    
Functioning of the institutions in resolving land dispute 
Detailed account of the functioning of three chefferies  
o Interviews with the prime chief of Chefferie of Ziniaré, 
Chefferie of Taab Tinga, Chefferie of Koubri 
o Interviews with the Chief of Land of Chefferie of Ziniaré, 
Chefferie of Taab Tinga, Chefferie of Koubri 
o Interviews with plaintiffs in Taab Tinga 
o Interviews with assistants to the Chiefs of Land 
 
Detailed account of the functioning of two tribunals  
o Data from the logbooks from the Tribunals of Ouagadougou 
and Ziniaré 




Interaction between the two institutional systems in land management  
Step-by-step description of the process to identify the owner of a land plot 
o Planning documents (master plans, neighborhoods maps etc.) 
o Examples of property titles applications 
o Interviews with civil servants involved in the identification of owners and plots to deliver property titles 
o Interviews with Chiefs of Lands to explain the identification process for “owners” of a piece of land  
o Interviews regarding the Koubri case   
 
Julie Touber, 2013 
 
I conducted a one month long field trip to Ouagadougou in November 2012. During my field 
work I benefited from an affiliation with the University of Ouagadougou, Department of Law and 
Political Sciences (UFR sciences juridiques et politiques), under the supervision of Professor Kouliga 
Nikiéma. I was chaperoned by former Prime Minister, Tertius Zongo, and his wife Priscille Zongo, a 
renowned magistrate. Mr. Zongo has been Minister of Finance in the 1990s and then Ambassador of 
Burkina Faso in the United States before becoming Prime Minister, from 2007 to 2011. He has a very 
good reputation and is widely respected, which gave me an extraordinary access to the administration 
PART 1 of Causal Mechanism PART 2 of Causal Mechanism 
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and to the customary system. For example thank to the Zongos, I was able to obtain authorizations from 
the Ministry of Justice in a record time and an audience with the Mogho Naba, the King of the Mossi 
People.  
On a more personal note, having grown up in West Africa, in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, and 
having been raised in a family cognizant of the African culture and history, helped me tremendously in 
my fieldwork. I also benefited from valuable feedbacks from world renowned African experts such as 





















THE CASE OF OUAGADOUGOU 















A Snapshot of Burkina Faso  
Burkina Faso is a small landlocked country in West Africa in the South Sahel (see figure 5). With 
its 276,200 sq. km, the country is surrounded by Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin in the South and 
Mali and Niger in the North and East respectively (CIA Factbook, 2013). The country is mostly flat and 
suffers from recurrent droughts due to its Sahelian and Sudanian dominated climate (see figure 5). With 
a GDP per capita of $1,400, Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries of the world, and an estimated 
47% of the population lives below the poverty line (CIA Factbook, 2013). About 90% of the population is 
engaged in subsistence agriculture, and cotton is the main cash crop (CIA Factbook, 2013).         
Figure 5: Maps of Burkina Faso – Geographical Overview.  
 
 
 The Burkinabe population is estimated to be around 18 million people and the life expectancy is 
quite low, at 54 years, because of the poverty level and the endemic HIV/AIDS epidemic (CIA Factbook, 
Mapping by J. Touber, 2013. Sources: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/burkina_faso.html; http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof  
/BurkinaFeng.htm;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Burkina_Faso; http://issianet.free.fr/Burkina_Faso_population.php 




2013). Burkina Faso has the fourth highest birth rate in the world with 42.8 births/1,000 (6 
children/woman), resulting in one of the highest population growth rates at 3% (CIA Factbook, 2013). 
The population is ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse. About 40% of the population is Mossi 
and the rest is divided between Gurunsi, Senufo, Lobi, Bobo, Mande and Fulani (CIA Factbook, 2013). 
The literacy rate is very low, 29.4% for men and 15.2% for women; and unemployment rate is extremely 
high at 77%, which highlights the prevalence of the informal economy (CIA Factbook, 2013).  The 
Burkinabe are known in the region as an immigration population due to the massive workers’ migrations 
to Côte d’Ivoire mainly and Ghana.                     
 Ouagadougou is the capital and largest city of Burkina Faso with a population estimated around 
2 million people (CIA Factbook, 2013). The urbanization rate is very high: over 6% annually (CIA 
Factbook, 2013). The city is sprawled and thus offers a low density (about 470 people/km2 or 181 
people/sq.mi. in Direction de l’urbanisme et des travaux fonciers, 2010: V). It has been the center of the 
Mossi Kingdoms and it is still the locus of the King’s palace, the Mogho Naba’s palace. Ouagadougou has 
been renowned for its very large market, one of the largest of West Africa, but it burned in 2003 and 
was re-opened only recently (2012).  
 Burkina Faso is a parliamentary republic that gained its independence from France in 1960. It 
was called the Upper Volta until 1984. The President, Blaise Compaoré, was in power since 1987 until he 
flew the country in November 2014 after a military coup. Even if the post-Independence period 
experienced a succession of military coups, the country was considered politically stable from 1987 until 
recently (2014). Burkina Faso is an African exception for its relative continuous peaceful environment as 
there have never been massive armed conflicts. Even during military coups, violence has been quite 
contained, which is not the case of the neighboring countries.  





THE CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS: 
THE MOSSI STATES 
 
 
“When memory goes for firewood collection, it brings back the fagot that pleases oneself.” 
Mossi proverb  
(Izard, 2003: 146. Translation J. Touber) 
 
 
This chapter presents an historical and institutional analysis of the Mossi society and the 
customary institutions at stake in Ouagadougou and its region. I recount the complex and ancient state-
building process that has happened since the 15th Century and the solid institutional system that has 
resulted in this process. The centralized Mossi administration developed an efficient land and power 
equilibrium. At the time of colonial enterprises from the German, British and French empires, the 
Moogo (the Mossi Kingdoms) was in a very intense phase of state-building and was acknowledged as a 
major and efficient political structure.  The French military conquest of the Moogo marked a turning 
point in the Mossi institutions as their original form was diverted by the colonial administration giving a 
different nature to the Mossi institutions. The historical adaptation of the Mossi institutions to the 
colonial administration has served the Mossi Kingdom and especially the Kingdom of Ouagadougou. It 
has resulted in a complex and efficient power equilibrium between a formal statal power and a 









4.1. History of the Mossi Kingdoms: An Ancient State-Building Process 
4.1.1. A Society without Text and an Oral Culture: The Challenge of History vs. Historicity  
The Mossi society is a society without text and its culture relies on oral accounts such as tales, 
fables and proverbs as well as historical meanings in the names and designations of people. For 
example, a family name will inform on the warrior’s origin –the true and pure origin of the Mossi- or 
others and the level of power of the family lineage; but, as we will see later, with great capacities to 
evolve and adapt. As opposed to many oral cultures, the Mossi culture does not really offer a form of 
historical poetry and the musical accounts are not very rich with information (Izard, 2003: 15-16). For 
the Mossi, “tradition” conveys a very precise significance in the concept of rogem miki which can be 
translated as “the set of rules that are part of the person at birth”. In other words, tradition is the 
societal guide of a Mossi acting like a soul tattoo that can never be removed. Each person, family, village 
and neighborhood holds a piece of information regarding the Mossi people. But these oral accounts do 
not inform the history of the Mossi state and institutions and have challenged historians.      
Historians had to model an analysis moving from the present to the past, acknowledging that 
the contemporary stories told about the past had been reshaped by the collective memory process. 
Therefore, historians had to work not with descriptions of facts or events but with representations of 
the past filled with layers of interpretations. There are no identified causal mechanisms of historical 
events, but more or less defined symptoms, such as successions and nominations. In this context, the 
functioning of the political life and dynamics of power are very difficult to grasp (Izard, 2003: 20).  To 
this challenging oral culture, the pitfalls of the colonization’s impacts and disruptions have also to be 
taken into consideration. These disruptions have a dual impact on the historical narrative of the Mossi 
Kingdoms: first, because the nature of an oral culture is to represent the past according to what the 
present offers, it is reasonable to suggest that the account of the pre-colonial actors has been adapted 
to the colonial situation by the Mossi themselves to allow some versatility and resilience, and second, 




the colonial accounts of the Mossi culture and institutions, as I discussed in Part 1, are most likely biased 
either for political purposes in the conquest’s context or because the cultural and educational biases of 
the observer or researcher added another layer of interpretation. Moreover, if the rise of Islam in the 
Sahel has been accompanied with the rise of a written culture and the use of Arabic, it seems that the 
Mossi kingdoms has stayed hermetic to it, despite the presence of the Islamic culture long before the 
emergence of the Mossi Kingdoms and despite the presence in the region of one of the greatest Islamic 
cultural centers, Timbuktu, offering as a result very few written accounts of the Mossi. 
The French anthropologist Michel Izard, one of the most renowned experts on the Moogo (the 
Mossi kingdoms) identifies four sets of written sources in regard to the Mossi history (Izard, 2003: 27). 
The first one was composed by two Arabic chronicles from Timbuktu, the Tarikh el-fettach text and the 
Tarikh es-Soudan text. The Tarikh el-fettach or The Researcher’s Chronicle is a collective text dated from 
the beginning of the 16th century and relates a history of the Niger River’s meander. The Tarikh es-
Soudan was written by an intellectual and local public figure from Timbuktu, Abderrahman Es-Sa’di, who 
lived from 1596 to 1653. Both texts reveal the presence of pagan, mysterious and dreadful warriors 
named the Mossi, who conducted wars against the Songhai Empire between 1464 and 1529. But the 
chronology of events in both texts is very problematic (Izard, 2003: 34-39).  
The second set of texts is comprised of European writings from 1799 to 1895 when the French 
troops entered the Mossi territory. It starts with the travel accounts from the Scottish surgeon, Mungo 
Park, Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa (1799), who met a tragic end during his second expedition 
in West Africa. The English traveler Bowdich gave some information related to the Mossi while reporting 
on the Asante people in 1819; the English missionaries Clarke (1849) and Koelle (1854) provided 
descriptions of the Mossi as well. Between 1850 and 1855, the German explorer Heinrich Barth, the only 
survivor of his expedition, was able to gather a fair amount of information related to the Mossi, 
including information from the Tarikh es-Soudan in Timbuktu. Another German, Gottlob Adolf Krause, a 




philologist, first entered Ouagadougou in 1886, but published very little about it. In 1892, the French 
captain Louis Gustave Binger published the main pre-colonial source on the Mossi, Du Niger au Golfe de 
Guinée par le Pays de Kong et le Mossi, from his 1887-1889 expedition.  At this point, the German, 
French and British empires were in full conquest mode for colonies. While the German delegation (led 
by Von François) failed to reach Ouagadougou and the French delegation (led by Crozat and Monteil) 
failed to find an agreement with the Mossi king, Ferguson, the English, succeeded at having the Mossi 
king sign a protectorate ordinance which was backdated by six months (Izard, 2003: 27-29).            
The third set of texts is comprised of writings from “non-specialists”, mostly French, from 1895 
to World War II. In 1895, the French army led by Captain Destenave entered the Yatenga, situated to the 
north-west of Ouagadougou, and two years later took over the administration in Ouagadougou. This 
marked the beginning of a long series of colonial writings from the military personnel and colonial 
administrators (Lieutenant Voulet 1897; Captain Noiré 1904; Lieutenant Langlumé 1905; Captain Pichon 
1905). In 1909, when the Mossi territories were placed under civil administration, the colonial 
administration undertook a series of research monographs brought together in a massive publication 
called Haut-Sénégal-Niger under the direction of Maurice Delafosse. In 1907, Captain Lambert, 
administrator of the Ouagadougou Circle, following his natural curiosity and on his own initiative, 
accumulated a huge amount of information on the Mossi, but never published it as he died early on 
during World War I. Lieutenant Lucien Marc published the first geographical study of the Mossi territory 
in 1909. Louis Tauxier (1917 and 1924) also accumulated information on the Mossi between the two 
wars as well as the administrators Georges Chéron (1924-25) and Antoine Augustin Dimdelobsom 
Kaboré (1933-34). Missionaries like Eugène Mangin took interest in the languages in the region and 
generated compelling data. One exception to this period and set of writing is the German ethnologist 
Leo Frobenius who, before World War I, collected very valuable historical information on the Mossi and 
exposed the political complexity of the Mossi Kingdom (Izard, 2003: 29-33).             




The fourth set of texts is comprised of studies and analysis from researchers and experts starting 
in the 1950s with the French linguist André Prost (1954) who studied the languages from the Upper-
Volta and drew critical conclusions on the origins of the Mossi people. This fourth set encompasses the 
American anthropologists Peter Hammond (Yatenga. Technology in the Culture of A West African 
Kingdom, 1966) and Elliott Skinner (The Mossi of the Upper Volta: The Political Development of a 
Sudanese People, 1964; African Urban Life: The Transformation of Ouagadougou, 1974), the British 
historian John Fage (Reflections on the Early History of the Mossi-Dagomba Group of States, 1964), the 
Mossi dignitary Yamba Tiendrébéogo (Histoire et coutumes royales des Mossi de Ouagadougou, 1964), 
the Canadian historian Myron Echenberg (1966), the Israeli historian Nehemia Levtzion (1966), the 
French anthropologist Michel Izard (many texts from 1970 to 2010), the Japanese Junzo Kawada (1967, 
1979, 1985) and others (Izard, 2003: 33-34).                         
 For this dissertation research work, and this specific part related to the history of the Mossi 
Kingdom, I chose to rely mostly on the fourth set of writings as the purpose of this dissertation is not to 
rework a history of the Moogo but to gather enough background information on the history of the Mossi 
Kingdoms to inform us regarding today’s institutional mechanisms and the customary system.  
 
4.1.2. The Origins of the Mossi Kingdoms: Legend and Linguistic 
There is a true difficulty for historians to date the beginning of the Mossi Kingdom. Its roots are 
anchored in the legend of the marriage between the daughter of the chief of Gambaga16 and a hunter. 
There are several versions of the story; all of them give ample details regarding the daughter, very little 
is said about the hunter himself. The Japanese anthropologist Junzo Kawada compiled the different 
versions and offered a detail account of the legend that I chose to summarized in the next paragraph 
(Kawada, 2002: 259-264).   
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 Gambaga is a town in northern Ghana, in the Maprusi or Maprugu region.  




The legend says that a Gambaga’s chief who had united the Dagomba, Maprusi and Nankara, 
had a daughter, named Princess Yennenga, who was a remarkable warrior and thus considered more 
like a man. Because of her martial talent, he refrained from finding her a husband, thinking that 
motherhood would ruin her talent. But she was not happy about it, and one day after a battle, her horse 
took her far away from her troops, deep in a forest and stopped in front of a hunter’s hut. The hunter 
was the son of a Malinke17 chief or from Gurma18, depending of the versions, who had become lost 
hunting elephants in the forest, after a conflict regarding his father inheritance. She fell in love with him 
and a son was born from their romance. In memory of this equestrian adventure, she named the child 
Wedraogo (Ouidiraogo or Ouedraogo), which in Dagomba and Moré means “stallion”. When the boy 
was older, she informed her father of the presence of the child. The then grandfather, thrilled to see her 
cherished daughter alive, welcomed her back with the boy and the hunter. But this last one did not want 
to stay and they went back to the forest. The grandfather, although saddened, accepted their departure, 
and gave them horses and oxen as well as an army of Dagomba soldiers so his grand-child would be a 
worthy heir of the family. The couple lived many years of happiness in the forest, in love and hunting 
elephants, until the princess died. Her body was brought back to Gambaga, where she was buried. This 
site has been until recently a place of pilgrimage, where horses and one of the wives of the King of 
Ouagadougou, the Mossi King, were sent to be sacrificed for the King’s funeral. With his army, 
Wedraogo invaded the Bissa people (south of Burkina Faso), and established his residence in Tankugdo 
(Tenkodogo). He had three sons who each received the leadership of a province of the emergent 
kingdom: Zoungourana received the Western province (Ouagadougou), Raoua the Northern Province 
(Ouahigouya), and Diaba the Eastern province (Fada N’Gourma). When Wedraogo died, his son 
Zoungourana took over, leaving to his own son, Wubri (Oubri), born from the daughter of a local chief 
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 Also known as Mandinka, Mandinko, Mandingo or Mandinga. They are considered as part of the Mandé group, descendants 
of the Mali Empire.  
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 Gurma or Gulma is a region located to the East of Ouagadougou. 




located near Ouagadougou, the leadership of the Ouagadougou province. Wubri’s reign marked the 
beginning of the Waogdogo dynasty, the dynasty that will lead the Moogo (Kawada, 2002: 259-264). 
The study of local languages –Moré, Dagbani, Gurunsi- has highlighted their cultural 
homogeneity and shared past and overlaps with the legend of the princess and the hunter, and 
therefore gives credible ground and chronological indications into the formation of the Mossi Kingdom. 
It is acknowledged that the White Volta region in today’s Burkina Faso and northern Ghana was invaded 
by warriors from outside who had experienced the political form of a centralized state on the Songhai 
Empire model on the bend of the Niger River (Izard, 2003: 57). The Moré language, a pre-statal 
language, became an administrative language to fulfill a political agenda and marked the shift between 
the Moré entity on one side and the Dagbani and Gurunsi entities on the other side (Izard, 2003: 56; 
Kawada, 2002: 32). This shift is dated around the end of the 15th century and beginning of the 16th 
century when the Songhai Empire started declining and the first Europeans arrived on the Guinean coast 
(Kawada, 2002: 33). This dating exercise has been one of the main focus of historians and 
anthropologists who, using the written accounts as described in the previous pages, and different 
methodologies such as dynastical chronologies based on the “normal probabilistic theory” and 
comparison of dynastical chronologies, have set an agreement on the beginning of the Waogdogo 
Dynasty between 1439 and 1564 (Kawada, 2002: 49-65).  
 
4.1.3. Centralized Administration and Local Powers: the Symbiosis of Kingdom and Chiefdom 
The cultural encounter between the invading warriors (the Moré) and the local population (the 
Dagbani and Gurunsi) was also a political encounter between two different systems. If one system 
favored a political organization based on lineage, concentrating a statal form in a centralized territory, 
the other system favored a political organization based on the community and the village, in a defined 
and small territory that could scale up to the state-city, but stayed a non-statal form (Izard, 2003: 62). 




The confrontation and cohabitation between the two systems is at the heart of the Moogo state-
building process, and is the essence of its functioning. The Moré language became an administrative tool 
to absorb the diversity of groups and languages in the Kingdoms (Izard, 2003: 64-70).  
The social and political system of the Mossi state can be understood as the interlocking of two 
systems. The first system is formed by the “people from the land” (teng demba; tenga  “land”; demba 
“people”) or “children of the land” (teng biise; biise, “children”) who embody the population who lived 
originally on the land, with a great diversity in languages and ethnicities. The second system comprises 
the “people with power”, literally the Mossi, also called the Nakombse, who are considered to originate 
from Wedraogo, the son of the princess and the hunter in the founding legend (Izard, 2003: 76-77). The 
names and toponymy still inform the collective identity toward one or the other system. This symbiotic 
structure took shape because the host (the local, original population) found advantages in the presence 
of the parasite (the warriors from the outside) and these advantages were the capacity to create a 
broader administration that brought stability and security for centuries. But institutional setting did not 
happen without hesitation and anthropologists and historians have identified two options that were 
considered. The first option favored an adaptation from the “people with power” to the local 
specificities and thus gave different power ranks depending on the regions, creating segmentations 
within the overall institutional structure. The second option consisted in reinforcing the opposition 
between the “people from the land” and “the people with power” by giving the exact same rank to all 
the local systems (people from the land) as opposed to the higher power (the Mossi). This political 
realism prevailed in the long run because it limited the institutional segmentation and created greater 
opportunities for replicability in various territories (Izard, 2003: 92-96).         
Starting at the end of the 17th century, the proliferation of small independent political units was 
stopped by the dominant centralizing force of the Mossi Kingdom and the acknowledged advantages of 
a simpler administrative structure (Izard, 2003: 128). During the 18th century, the centralized political 




structure of the Moogo was stabilized and the Waogdogo’s dynasty established its sovereign power over 
the other kingdoms with the figure of the Mogho Naba as a symbolic father to his symbolic sons, the 
heads of the obedient kingdoms (Izard, 2003: 128). The centralizing movement had several 
consequences. It meant that the development of the Mossi administration, based on the King’s figure 
and entourage, could not rely only on the lineage system. The king’s court was not just a palatial and 
ceremonial institution anymore but a fully bloomed administration, with political roles that were not all 
tied to the lineage system. The main consequence of the growing Mossi administration was the growth 
of a Mossi aristocracy. This meant that the royal power and representation was expanding while 
simultaneously the king’s power, as a person, was shrinking as the internal power of balance became 
more delicate (Izard, 2003: 130).   
This process did not happen without push-pull mechanisms. On one side, the interest of the 
local population in being under the Mossi authority was a choice of survival in a hostile environment 
where a food crisis could happen easily. Indeed, even if the multitude of small territories –non-statal 
entities- had diverse ethnic and linguistic identities, they did share a social and cultural knowledge in 
relation to the difficult geographical environment and an economy of survival. In other words, their 
diversity did not mean that they had no economic exchanges and intermingling. Indeed, population 
movements after regular food shortage episodes were common (Izard, 2003: 143). On the other side, 
the Mossi authority developed the capacity to impose its presence and authority locally and the shift to 
a non-statal organization to a statal organization did not happen without violence (Izard, 2003: 145). The 
notion of peace does not exist for the Mossi and there is no word in Moré to conceptualize peace as 
opposed to war. The founding legend gives the leading role to the princess as a warrior, a symbol of the 
state, when the hunter, a secondary character, represents the non-statal condition (Izard, 2003: 161). 
Any pretext could justify a violent intervention by the Mossi toward the local chiefs, and negligence in 
the respect of protocol was taken very seriously (Izard, 2003: 162).   




This highlights an apparent major contradiction of the Mossi Kingdoms but a key concept in 
maintaining its unity: it is seen and presented as a territory of peace, whereas small and larger internal 
conflicts have been continuous. It is precisely this internal state of violence directed at the non-respect 
of the Mossi order, that has been the guarantee of a larger state of peace by sending a message of fear 
to the neighboring regions that in return did not adventure to attack, leaving the Mossi Kingdoms in a 
relative state of peace in the larger region of West Africa (Izard, 2003: 164-165). Starting in the middle of 
the 18th century, the Mossi Kingdoms faced some incursions, by the Tuaregs in the north and later in the 
19th century from the Dagomba in the south to capture slaves. This marked the beginning of broader 
changes in the region but the Moogo kept benefiting from its myth of a military power, a warrior state, 
when in reality its military force was completely obsolete (Izard, 2003: 173-175).            
The state-building process is believed to have been very advanced by the end of the 19th century 
with the existence of a coherent socio-spatial unit based on a social and cultural hierarchy accepted by 
all though an integration process. The following map (figure 6) shows the territories of the Mossi 
Kingdoms at the end of the 19th century, centered on the Kingdom of Ouagadougou (Waogdogo) that 
had absorbed Tankugdo (Tenkodogo) the city of the founding father (Wedraogo), and its adjacent 


















At the end of the 19th century, the population of the Mossi Kingdoms was evaluated to be over a million 
inhabitants, which was unusually high for the region giving the hostile geographical conditions, and had 
been noticed as impressive by the colonial officers. This population density has been explained by the 
political safety net offered by the Mossi Kingdoms, one of the safest and most welcoming places in West 



















































































































































































4.1.4. The “Tenga” and the “Naam”: Land and Power Dualism as a Concept of Unity  
 The Mossi Kingdoms have developed a complex administration of conquered territories and 
imposed an equilibrium that has been accepted for centuries. In order to understand the tacit contract 
that allowed this symbiosis to operate, one needs to explore the relationship between land (tenga) and 
power (naam), the keystone of the Moogo. The characteristic of the Mossi power is its centralism which 
suggests a strong legitimacy as each entity has to be positioned in accordance with this central authority 
(Izard, 2003: 119). This legitimacy can be found in the belief that God is present in the power of men. 
Naaba Wende, this unique God, is considered to be so far from human beings that a cult is useless, 
especially as her power (wennaam) is present everywhere. The power of men (naam) is legitimized by 
the power of Naaba Wende, the wennaam, and its ubiquitousness inhabits the function of chief in 
relation to other men (Izard, 2003: 119-120). 
 Naaba Wende (wende “the sky”) is considered to be a female God and is coupled with Tenga, 
the land, in the universal representation of the sky and the earth. One main implication is that Tenga, 
the land, takes on a sacred or divine dimension, as the divinity that provides food and offers a place to 
stay. If Wende and Tenga are a representation of the divine system, the notion of power and land are a 
representation of the social order. What can be seen as complementary functions –power and land- is in 
fact a continuous disequilibrium resulting in relentless tensions. If the people from the land can exist 
without the people with power, the opposite is not necessary true and the power structure -the Mossi- 
had to develop survival mechanisms based on access to land (Izard, 2003: 121).  
The physical structure of land and territories is the cornerstone of the Mossi power. The dual 
notion of tenga is used to represent political realities: the first one is tenga as the global political space, 
the kingdom and allegiant kingdom such as the Yatenga; the second one is tenga as the local unit, the 
village (Izard, 2003: 83). The superimposition of two realities under the same sacred notion of land is the 
roots of the resilient Mossi institutions. The Mossi through the concept of power (naam) positioned 




themselves as the custodians of order whether it is the natural order of things in the balance of the 
Wende and Tenga or the social order in the spatial organization of the people (Niang, 2012: 75). This 
complementarity is reinforced by a time/space union with the idea that the people of power, carrying 
the naam, ensure the history of people, the continuity from the dead, the ancestors, to the future 
generations, when the people of the land ensure the physical continuity and expression of the naam. 
The concept of naam, power, becomes the seal of balance and order and imposes the presence of the 
Mossi, the people with power, onto the people of the land, as guardians (Izard, 2003: 150; Niang, 2012: 
76).  
The institutional result of the interaction between the naam and the tenga is the 
superimposition of the political representation on the locality. In other words, land is hierarchized 
following the representation of power: the toponymy informs the identity and level of power and the 
institutional pyramid of power matches the geographical units from the neighborhood to the Kingdom. 
For example, a neighborhood can be named after the title of a chief and its function or after the identity 
of a group such as nakombse (original warriors), Yargo (Yarge people) or even the occupation of a group 
such as Benda (bendgo “musicians”) (Izard, 2003: 155). The centralization and standardization of power 
creates categories and classifications of space in order to root control. Thus villages can be classified 
under nine different categories in regard to the nature of their authority (from the highest to lowest 
authority): naa tenga (village of the royal chief), kiims tenga (village of the ancestors), naa yiir tenga 
(village of the chief court), tãsob tenga (village guided by a warrior chief), nakombs tenga (village of an 
original warrior), zem tenga (village village guided by a chief without lineage), maran tenga (village of 
Marãse people), tengsob tenga (village of people from the land guided by a tengsoba), bugub tenga 
(village of people from the land guided by a bugo) (Izard, 2003: 156). The following figure (figure 7) 
illustrates the standardization of the space in the Moogo and the diffusion of the concept of power, the 
naam, into the concept of tenga. The notion of space is not understood geographically but is rather the 




representation of the position of a unit within a broader system. This process of standardization of space 
is in some ways very similar to the one operated by the Roman Empire and its spatial representation: 
the Peutinger Table19 (Tabula Peutingeriana).         
Figure 7: Standardization of the Space by the Mossi Institutions. 
 
 
Unlike the Weberian concept of power as a mean to reach a goal, the Mossi power (through the 
concept of naam) does not take a statal and administrative shape but positions itself as a traditional and 
customary norm (Niang, 2012: 67). The respect of the tradition, the Mossi history, becomes the main 
tool of cohesion and control of the land, when in the beginning the duality between the “people with 
power” and the “people from the land”, between land and power, seemed to be a major weakness for 
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 centuries. Its particularity is to represent 
the Empire as a network of lineary itirinaries punctuated by cities. It is the ancestor of public transit systems’ maps that are 
read as network of itirinaries with stops and not “geographically”.  




4.2. The Mossi Empire: From the Colonial Upper Volta to the Republic of Burkina Faso 
4.2.1. The Submissiveness of the Mossi Kingdoms to the Colonial Powers  
The notion of tradition is a complicated concept in the Mossi context because it served the 
Mossi state-building process during the pre-colonial period. The colonization period in general 
emphasized the opposition between the notion of tradition, as the static representation of the 
indigenous population, and the notion of modernism, as the dynamic representation of Western power. 
The Mossi and the colonial usages of the notion of tradition were both guided by a political motivation 
with similar goals but in two different ways. Indeed, the Mossi used it to legitimize their imposition of 
power onto the invaded local population by presenting a common history and a shared path; when the 
colonial power used it in a similar context to legitimize their imposed power but by offering a chance of 
progress, a change of path from a fixed tradition to a modern, developmental and universal path, but 
not without violence.  
If the German, French and British exploration missions in Africa intensified in the mid-19th 
century, only after 1885 did these missions turned into military enterprises. The Germans were the first 
to enter Ouagadougou in 1886 with the scientific expedition led by Gottlob Adolf Krausse. Two years 
later, a German military mission led by Hermann Karl Bruno Von François with the intent to link Togo to 
Niger failed in crossing hostile territories to reach the Mossi Kingdoms and the envoys to the Mogho 
Naba were denied the right to enter Mossi territories. The British, after their conquest of the Ashanti 
Kingdom (1874), decided to send a diplomatic mission led by Georges Ekem Fergusson in 1892 to 
negotiate a protectorate ordinance with the Mogho Naba. If the first mission failed, the second one was 
successful and a protectorate ordinance was signed in 1894, which aggravated the frustration of the 
French who had tried to build a relationship with the Mogho Naba since 1887. Indeed, from 1887 to 
1892, four missions, led respectively by Captain Louis Binger, Colonel Parfait-Louis Monteil, Lieutenant 
Spitzer and Doctor François Crozat had failed in their effort to charm the Mogho Naba. Binger’s 




encounter with the Mogho Naba did not go well at all and he gave an unflattering description of the 
Mossi King and Ouagadougou. If Crozat successfully, but with great difficulties, reached Ouagadougou, 
he was asked to leave in the night following his arrival without the opportunity to meet with the Mogho 
Naba. Because the British military campaign became more aggressive, taking the Adomey region in 1893 
and securing the Dahomey (Benin) as a British conquest, the French reinforced their efforts in the 
hinterland of the Côte d’Ivoire to secure the passage from the coast to the Sudan. The Mossi territories 
became a key objective for two main reasons: first it was becoming a major geo-strategic piece to link 
the coast with the hinterland (toward Mali and Sudan) for the French (with Côte d’Ivoire and Benin), for 
the British (with Ghana) and for the Germans (with Togo); second, its high population density had 
intrigued the different exploration missions, and the population wealth and potential agriculture 
resources were coveted (Kambou-Ferrand, 2003: 423-430).   
Hearing of a German mission on its way to Ouagadougou, the French became even more 
anxious. Captain Destrenave settled in Bandiagara (situated in current Mali) and intensified his efforts to 
contest the validity of the British treaty20 and negotiate with the Mogho Naba, without success. But 
during the dry season of 1893-94, the Yatenga Naba, the King of Yatenga, an allegiant kingdom to the 
Mogho Naba, asked for French military assistance to repress an internal rebellion. The French 
responded that they could intervene only if they were tied to the Yatenga with a treaty. The Yatenga 
became French territory in 1895, putting the French troops in direct line with the Ouagadougou territory 
(Kambou-Ferrand, 2003: 430-432). Despite this success, Destrenave was not fooled by the weakness of a 
piece of paper in regard to the strength of the Mossi institutions and stressed the importance of 
dismantling and decentralizing the pre-colonial Mossi power (Kawada, 2002: 48). Frustrated by the 
refusal of the Mogho Naba to negotiate, Destrenave advocated for a more violent intervention which 
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 The validity of the treaty was contested by the French and the Germans on the ground that a “Negro”, even king, could not 
be considered as a party in a treaty. This surprising argument, when they were trying to do the same, was more informative of 
the importance that this treaty between the Mossi King and the British held (Kambou-Ferrand, 2003: 429-30).    
 




was left to Lieutenant Voulet and Lieutenant Chanoine. The French easily entered Ouagadougou in 
September 1896, but the Mogho Naba had fled. Weakened by the absence of a treaty or contact with 
the Mossi King, Voulet and Chanoine started a desperate hunt for the Mogho Naba, without success. 
Even if they did not encounter much resistance21, this military campaign was the beginning of one of the 
most violent in Africa, with systematic executions when the doubt of an allegiance to the Mogho Naba 
was perceived, abductions of women and children for forced labor, and politics of starvation by a 
systematic destruction of the crops (Kambou-Ferrand, 2003: 430-452). 
The French and the Mogho Naba were confronted by a crisis of legitimacy in the Mossi 
territories. The Mogho Naba was losing his authority because of his prolong absence from 
Ouagadougou, and the main consequence was the reversal of the allegiant kingdoms which one by one 
signed a treaty and became French territories. But the French could feel that a piece of paper was 
insufficient to impose their legitimacy and the need for the acceptance from the Mogho Naba became a 
pressing matter. Understanding that violence would not be successful, Voulet changed his strategy. He 
searched for a replacement, a new Mogho Naba who would carry the French interests in the Mossi 
territories. After several refusals from other nabas, one of the brothers of the escaped Mogho Naba 
(Bokary Koutou), Mazi, who was carrying an old grudge against his brother, accepted to replace him, but 
died suddenly before becoming king. This reinforced the belief that only when a chief is dead, may he be 
replaced (Kambou-Ferrand, 2003: 456-464). It was only the second time in the entire history of the 
Mossi that the Mhogo Naba was replaced before his death22. At the same time, the long absence of the 
Mogho Naba from Ouagadougou was speaking in his disfavor, as his representation was not only 
political, but also quasi-religious as a guardian of the tradition, in person, in Ouagadougou. The protocol 
imposed that the Mogho Naba could leave Ouagadougou, only with the authorization of the Prime 
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 The technological gap between the French army, equipped with rifles did not leave much chance for the Mossi fighters who 
used bows and arrows mostly (Kambou-Ferrand, 2003: 440-45).  
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 The first time happened during the 18
th
 century: Naba Zombre, lived very old and his son did not want to wait for his death 
and took over the power of his father for 3 years after which Naba Zombre came back on the throne. (Izard, 1979: 165)  




Minister, the Ouidi Naba, and only for short times (Izard, 1979, 188). It was thus inevitable that another 
brother of the escaped Mogho Naba stepped in to replace him. In January 1897, a new Mogho Naba was 
crowned and the Mossi Kingdoms became a French colony in 1904 under the administration of the 
Upper Senegal and Niger in the French West Africa (Kambou-Ferrand, 2003: 460-461).            
   
4.2.2. The Mossi Institutional Adaptation to the French Colonial Power 
The colonial period introduced major changes in the Mossi institutions: the French and British 
battle for territories ended up reshaping the Mossi history by cutting the original land of the Mossi 
Kingdoms in northern Ghana with the rest of the Kingdom in what is today known as Burkina Faso; the 
roles of the local chiefs in the colonial administration introduced new institutional dynamics; finally, the 
economic transformations introduced by the colonial empire had major consequences for the 
organization of land and institutions (Kawada, 2002: 45-47).     
The fallen Mogho Naba took refuge under the British protection in Gambaga, the source of the 
Moogo, in the then Gold Coast (Ghana). Even if he signed another treaty with the British, the latter 
never engaged in a military expedition against de French to take over Ouagadougou, and the fallen king 
died in January 1904 (Salo, 2003: 655-656). This episode marked a deep shift for the Mossi. It signaled 
the end of the Mossi Kingdoms as an independent and sovereign entity. The historicity and the 
institutions from that moment on are of a different nature. The historical roots and cultural unity of the 
Dagomba, Maprusi and Mossi were erased from memories and the separation between the Mossi as a 
French colony and the Dagomba-Maprusi as a British colony took over23. Moreover, the legitimacy of the 
Mogho Naba, even though it seemed that the Kingdom was entering a weaker stage by the end of the 
19th century, was deeply affected by the submissiveness to the French.  
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The French were very familiar with the concept of a centralized administration and royal court 
and saw in preserving the Mossi administration an opportunity to rule the Mossi Kingdoms. They 
emphasized the power of the royal court, the notables, and the ministers, in the restricted and 
controllable space that was Ouagadougou (Kawada, 2002: 48). In some ways the French and the Mossi 
administration shared a common use of territoriality to express power and control. From this shared 
understanding, a francophone version of the Mossi institutions was put in place. If the village, like the 
“commune” in France, was the basic spatial unit in the Mossi administration, the French added another 
spatial unit, the “canton”, a symbol of the Republic inherited from the French Revolution; a unit that 
characterized the democratic scale of space. The “canton” had no equivalence in the Mossi history; it 
was a complete French innovation (Kawada, 2002: 148). Indeed, in the French administration, the 
“canton”, a group of “communes”, represented the area where any citizen could walk a round trip in a 
day to the voting poll. The French also introduced the term “province”. These new administrative units 
allowed placing more notables from Ouagadougou into the “provinces” of the Kingdom, giving power to 
a group that did not have the lineage legitimacy of the “people with power”, the Mossi,  as presented in 
the pre-colonial Mossi administration, thus weakening the foundation of the Mossi power. But there 
was a major difference between the French and Mossi understanding of power and land: the French had 
a notion of territoriality with fixed boundaries, whereas the Mossi, because of the sacred nature of land, 
did not have a notion of fixed boundaries to define land but referred to a number of people and villages 
to position the power of a chief onto a piece of land (Kawada, 2002: 149).    
On March 1, 1919, the Upper Volta colony was created as part of the French West Africa. One 
major administrative consequence was the payment of salaries to the “customary chiefs” defined as the 
province’s chiefs, the canton’s chiefs and sometimes the village’s chiefs (décret du 16 avril 1920; 
Kawada, 2002: 206). They also were given the power to collect taxes and could seize for themselves up 
to ten percent of the amount collected; this power was abolished only in 1984 (Kawada, 2002: 208; 




Ouedraogo, 2003: 843). The chiefs of village or neighborhood in urban areas, and the chiefs of cantons, 
became a kind of colonial administrator in charge of the security, justice, agriculture production 
(attribution of land and work) and sanitation conditions. The colonial administration had the right to 
dismiss a chief when he was considered inefficient or reluctant to abide by the colonial power, and it 
was left to the Mogho Naba to moderate the uprising from the customary institutions, his dedication to 
the colonial power being then tested (Ouedraogo, 2003: 842-847).  
The main objective of the French politics in the Upper Volta was to expand agriculture 
production based on the idea that the main wealth of the Upper Volta was its population, considered as 
dense, and thus potentially a good labor force. It was a dualistic political choice: one of a technological 
improvement of local agriculture that suffered from a difficult environment or one of a control of the 
population and organized migrations to the neighboring colonies, less populated but with more natural 
resources. The colonial administration put in place large demographic studies in order to establish plans 
for a potential future labor force that could be moved to a more favorable environment such as Côte 
d’Ivoire. But food scarcity and crops’ epidemics in 1926 and 1930-31 weakened this reservoir of labor. 
The growing migrations to the Gold Coast (Ghana) and the political tensions between the different 
French colonies was becoming a concern (Gervais, 1990: 1-81). The Upper Volta colony was dissolved in 
September 1932 and administered as part of Côte d’Ivoire, French Sudan and Niger.  
A growing interest in enhancing the economic potential of the Upper Volta region took over and 
a shift to agricultural production on an industrial model was considered: cotton production was seen as 
a promising option. The Mossi land structure had been quite efficient in providing for subsistence 
agriculture, not for an industrial mode of agriculture and, for the French colonial administration, it was 
impossible to conduct a massive land reform because of its potential social consequences and the fear 
of a social outbreak. Two types of innovations were introduced: institutional and technological. The 
Mossi territories, despite their hostile environment and rudimentary agricultural practices, had been 




successful in attracting and keeping a dense population, which was the result of a strong institutional 
structure that guaranteed safe and stable conditions. It is this counterintuitive equilibrium that had 
attracted the colonial expeditions in the first place. After the submissiveness of the Mogho Naba, the 
Mossi institutions were weakened and the population started to migrate to the Gold Coast and the 
agricultural structure suffered from a diminishing labor force. The French colonial administration 
understood that priority had to be given in the reinforcement of the Mossi institutions. Priority was 
given to sustainable subsistence agriculture so the labor force would not suffer from food scarcity. The 
power of local chiefs was reinforced by the colonial power developing what is known as indirect rule. 
This institutional innovation was first developed by the British in their colonies and was found to be 
quite effective. By increasing the power of the local chiefs and their capacity to grow richer, the capacity 
to push the collective work load from subsistence agriculture –which was the traditional system- to 
industrial agriculture, in the cotton fields, relied on the customary institutions. The nature of the Mossi 
institutions was thus changed from a coherent statal structure to an extractive institutional structure.  
But the French colonial enterprise was torn between an extractive model and a developmental 
model. Another institutional innovation was the development of five-year development plans for the 
colonies (1932-36 and 1937-41), with objectives of production but also services to the population 
(Gervais, 1990: 123). These plans introduced institutional tools such as the Indigenous Societies for 
Planning (Sociétés indigènes de Prévoyance) that acted like a development bank offering micro-loans, 
agriculture training and technological support to the farmers. These institutional innovations, as 
opposed to the indirect rule, challenged the authority of the local chiefs and the customary system. The 
introduction of technological innovations was monopolized by the local chiefs as they identified these 
innovations as potential threats of their power and in favor of people’s emancipation, with some 
exceptions (Gervais, 1990: 122-153).  The technological innovations were the development of transport 
infrastructure, and introduction of animal draught cultivation. Renamed the administrative culture, the 




cotton’s culture ended up being a massive failure with the fall of its market value in the 1930s (Gervais, 
1990: 85-121).                 
In September 1947, the Upper Volta was reformed as part of the French Union under a new 
constitution (the French Fourth Republic) which gave new rights to the colonies: local budgets were 
approved by local representatives, who were elected by the local population. These election rights were 
broadened in 1956 to municipal elections. In 1958, as France changed constitution again (French Fifth 
Republic), the Republic of Upper Volta gained its autonomy and two years later on August 5, 1960 its 
independence.     
 
4.2.3. The Colonial Heritage: Ouagadougou, Capital of the Upper Volta and the Mossi Empire 
The Moogo was developed as a complex political structure around one dominant kingdom and 
its allegiant kingdoms, whose floating hierarchy was prone to internal tensions. By the end of the 19th 
century, a state-building process was still going on and the power struggles between the different 
kingdoms such as the Yatenga and Ouagadougou were most likely very vivid. The colonization period 
offered a fantastic window of opportunity for the Ouagadougou kingdom to impose itself as the center 
of a Mossi Empire. This historical image of the Ouagdougou kingdom as the center of the Mossi Empire 
entails a fair amount of historical re-construction, but is representative of the depth of the state-building 
process in regard to the Mossi institutions. The major breaking point in the Mossi history is thus 
colonization, and the continuity between colonization and the independence in the Mossi affairs is 
striking.  
    When the French conquered Ouagadougou in 1896, as the city of the Mogho Naba, supreme 
chief of the Mossi, it was convenient to document and justify the taking of an Empire with a large 
territory in the context of the colonial conquests in relation to the British and the Germans. To this 
effect, Lieutenant Chanoine collected “historical facts” regarding the size and power of the Mossi 




Empire (Beucher, 2010: 29). While the last Mogho Naba had fled and was hunted down by Lieutenant 
Voulet, the vacant throne sparked interests from other chiefs who could see the opportunity for a more 
centralized administration close to the colonial power. The fleeing Mogho Naba became a coward in the 
Mossi history, and his replacement signaled the beginning of a very different Mossi power, even if it was 
presented as a continuity of the Mossi kingdoms. Indeed, the sacrament of new Mogho Naba marked 
the beginning of the Mossi Empire that happened to be under the French protection. Vassalages 
between Ouagadougou and the other Mossi kingdoms were formalized under the French 
administration. But once the territories were secured for the French in regard to the other colonial 
powers, the question of controlling these territories was another challenge. In French Sudan, the 
colonial authorities had chosen to dismantle the customary institutions to rule directly and similar 
temptations were aroused in the Moogo. In 1907, the civil administrator Carrier, disgusted by the royal 
court of the Mogho Naba, showed his intention to bring a republican breath to the Mossi and undertook 
to dismantle the province’s chiefs. A year later, he was faced with a threatening and massive revolt. The 
French power resolved in 1911 to develop the British model of the indirect rule and to favor certain 
functions for the customary institutions (Beucher, 2010: 29-33).  
In 1914, Naaba Koom II (Mogho Naba from 1905-1942) seized the opportunity to position 
himself as a close ally to the colonial power and an honorable and worthy heir of the Mossi power as a 
Chief of War by sending troops to Europe to serve for France in World War 1. After the war, in 1919, 
Ouagadougou became the administrative capital of the Upper Volta colony, reinforcing the Mossi 
institutions in their “imperial nature” with the superimposition of the French central administration in 
the same city. New protocols appeared: the former allegiant kingdoms which had a certain 
independence were reminded of their full vassalage status and the Mogho Naba did not travel anymore 
as all affairs had to go through him in Ouagadougou. The Mossi power in Ouagadougou and the French 
colonial administration shared a common interest in developing a unique and simple customary legal 




system that would apply uniformly in the Mossi territories. In the 1920s, the royal court in Ouagdougou 
was very influential and had a lot of exchanges with the French Catholic mission and the colonial 
administration. But in 1931, when Upper Volta was dissolved among the colonies of Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan 
and Niger, the Mogho Naba and his court were reminded of the supremacy of the colonial 
administration over Mossi territories as well as the priority given to the economic interests of the French 
administration. Ouagadougou was not the center any more of the Mossi Empire, but at the margin of 
the Colony of Côte d’Ivoire where economic interests were centralized. The city lost its colonial civil 
servants and city’s modernization projects were stopped (Beucher, 2010: 33-37).  
However, during the 1930s, Robert Arnaud, inspector for the administrative affairs, was 
convinced of the importance to understand and extend knowledge on the Mossi Empire and ordered a 
massive study of their history that was conducted by Dim Delobsom. This study played a central role in 
the creation of a specific administrative status in 1937 to preserve the Mossi interests in the three 
different colonies. The new Mogho Naba, Naaba Saaga II (1942-1957), supported the France Libre (as 
opposed to the Vichy Government) with the firm intent to see the reestablishment of the colony of the 
Upper Volta at the end of the war (Beucher, 2010: 37-39). The end of World War 2 enabled the 
emergence of African political movements, such as the African Democratic Rally24 (Rassemblement 
démocratique africain), led by Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the emblematic Ivorian figure who later became 
the President of Côte d’Ivoire until his death in 1993. This particular movement appeared to alarm the 
colonial administration and the Mogho Naba as a support of the colonial power. In 1947, the colony of 
the Upper Volta was re-established to counterbalance the nascent political movements and Naaba 
Saaga II was celebrated as a national hero (Englebert, 1986: 25; Beucher, 2010: 40). But the political and 
colonial situation was changing and the French General Councilor for the Upper Volta from 1947 to 
1957, Michel Dorange, showed great interest in the new African political movements as he looked 
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 The African Democratic Rally emerged from the 1946 conference in Bamako. If initially it advocated for a pan-African party 
for an African federalism, it turned into an important motor toward independence movements in the region.  




(favorably) on them a the potential political power for an emancipation from the customary chiefs in the 
region (Beucher, 2010: 39-41).  
When the new Mogho Naba, Naaba Kougri (1957-1982) took power, the tensions between the 
emergent political elites, ready to take over the colonial administration, and the royal power were very 
high (Beucher, 2010: 40). In September 1958, the president of the governmental council, Ouezzin 
Coulibaly, who had been sick for months, died and a month later the young king tried to impose a 
constitutional monarchy in the Upper Volta, but failed (Englebert, 1986: 29-30; Beucher, 2010: 40). The 
Minister of Interior of the first government of the autonomous Republic of Upper Volta, Maurice 
Yaméogo, made sure to neutralize the power of the “Mossi Emperor”. Yaméogo became the first 
president of the independent Republic of Upper Volta in 1960. Pondering the political ambition of the 
Mogho Naba, he ended the power of the Mossi, the customary institutions, by suppressing financial 
support to the local chiefs. But the modern white collar worker in Ouagadougou had underestimated 
how deeply rooted the traditional institutions were in the countryside, and in 1966, he was removed by 
a military coup, instigated by the unions that had grown strong and led by the former major of 
Ouagadougou, assisted by the customary institutions (Beucher, 2010: 40-41; Englebert, 1986: 35). From 
1966 to 1983, the Republic of Upper Volta experienced a succession of military regimes. The status-quo 
between the different regimes and the Mossi institutions was favored as it was seen as a dangerous 
political matter to tackle. In fact, salaries for the local chiefs were re-established and the Mogho Naba 
was associated to the big political events in the country’s life. The different regimes could not ignore the 
efficiency of the customary institutions to raise taxes and maintain order in the whole territories. The 
institutional system developed by the colonial administration was used in its full capacity and recognized 
as a very efficient model. Ouagadougou was still the capital of the Republic of Upper Volta and the seat 
of the Mossi Emperor whose institutions really ran the country (Beucher, 2010: 41-43).                     
  




4.2.4. The 1984 Revolution: The Birth of Burkina Faso  
 In August 1984, Captain Thomas Sankara, president of the National Council for the Revolution 
(Conseil National de la Révolution), signed the Ordinance that ended the Upper Volta’s era and 
proclaimed the birth of the Burkina Faso25 as follow: 
Article 2: The Burkina is a People’s Democratic Republic. It is one and indivisible. 
Article 3: The Faso is a judiciary and political entity, the unquenchable hearth where the bracing 
wind of freedom and dignity blows, giving back to the people their greatness and becoming the 
natural ally to the people of the world who share the same ideals of freedom and dignity. The 
Faso is the homeland of the revolutionary people of Burkina. (Englebert, 1986:15; traduction J. 
Touber) 
 
The Revolution had started a year before with the military coup led by Sankara whose project for the 
country was a real revolution in the sense that he truly believed in a new society freed from what he 
called the customary archaism. The Mossi institutions and the chiefdom systems were not part of his 
modernist enterprise, on the contrary, it represented precisely what needed to be destroyed in order to 
generate societal progress. In the Burkinabè society, the chiefs became simple notables or comrades, 
matching the divided new social order that opposed the commoners to the nobles. Committees for the 
Revolution’s Defense (Comités de défense de la Révolution) were created at the different administrative 
levels of the customary system with the intent to thwart the latter. Also created were the People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunals (Tribunaux populaires de la Révolution) which stripped the customary 
institutions’ prerogatives that were their judiciary and fiscal powers. The Mogho Naba and his ministers 
were ignored, absent from the newspapers and state affairs. Insults toward the Mogho Naba were even 
common and the respect to the Mossi emperor seemed completely obsolete when power in his palace 
was cut for unpaid electricity bills (Beucher, 2010: 43-44).  
 The challenge of the revolution and development of a participative democracy quickly arose in 
the difficult relationship between the capital city and the countryside, a bond being the sole territory of 
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the customary institutions reinforced by the colonial policies. And like Yaméogo earlier, Sankara had 
underestimated the power of the ancient institutions and the efficiency of their colonial evolution. The 
massive land reform touched on the very nature of the Mossi institutions. When Sankara embarked on a 
nationalization program of land, he wrongly assumed that the revolutionary institutions had been 
enough to obstruct a tradition which surely had been twisted by the colonial power, but was seen and 
lived as a five century old tradition. Societal and land issues, the most common disputes, were efficiently 
dealt with by the customary institutions and legitimized by their historical and symbolic powers when 
the revolutionary novel institutions felt short in their legitimacy. The use of mass media such as the TV 
or the radio did not sap the image of the Mossi tradition and legitimacy (Beucher, 2010: 44-45).  
 In October 1987, Blaise Compaoré, who had foreseen the limitation of the revolution, 
conducted a coup against his friend and close associate Thomas Sankara during which Sankara was 
killed. Compaoré instigated a corrective policy in the name of national unity under the “Front 
Populaire”. Compaoré’s pragmatism pushed him to re-introduce gradually the Mossi institutions in the 
state’s affairs. He subtlety reframed the relationship between the state and the Mogho Naba as two 
parallel systems that should not affect each other. When the IVth Republic’s Constitution was discussed, 
the customary institutions were involved in its making, and in June 1991, the Mogho Naba publicly 
supported the new constitution. The support of the Mossi chiefs was determinant in the election of 
Compaoré as President of the Faso in the same year.  The Mogho Naba became a moral authority 
supporting the President and his party knowing his place, and in return the Burkinabè state entrusted 
the Mossi heritage (Beucher, 2010: 45-49). The superimposition of “modern” state, the “traditional” 
institutions” and the media in the same place, Ouagadougou, has proven to be most efficient in 
managing peacefully the Burkinabè territories until recently.             
         
  





THE CUSTOMARY LAW  
ORGANIZATION, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES 
 
 
“Let your welfare be the welfare of the nation.” 
Zulu proverb 




 Chapter 5 presents the institutional setting of the Mossi institutions and the philosophy of the 
customary law theorized by African scholars. I will show the level of resiliency of the Mossi institutions 
and their modern adaptation that pushes a representation of tradition at very different levels in the 
Burkinabe society.  I will also highlight the importance of certain beliefs that are essential to understand 
the usage of the customary institutions on a daily basis. The consideration and exercise of the customary 
institutions, the Mossi tradition, have major consequences for social equilibrium, and thus inform us 
regarding the specific nature of land and its management. I close this chapter by underlying the impact 
of the Mossi tradition on conflict resolution mechanisms.    
 
5.1. Mossi Institutions and the Customary Law: Politicizing the Customary   
5.1.1. Today’s State of the Mossi Institutions: Politics of Survival  
 In this part, I choose to present the Mossi central power, the Mossi Empire’s heart, and its 
functioning, detailing the protocols and processes that I had to go through to access information as it is 
illustrative of their daily role in the political sphere. I had the chance to be supported in my work by the 




former Prime Minister (2007-2011), Tertius Zongo, who is unanimously highly respected. His support 
indisputably offered me a much easier access to the customary institutions.  
 During my field work in Ouagadougou, my first encounter with the central Mossi power was the 
Friday’s ceremony. Every Friday morning around seven o’clock, the Mogho Naba appears to the public 
outside the palace. The bodyguards of former Prime Minister Tertius Zongo took me to the Mogho 
Naba’s palace area. One of the bodyguards knew personally the person responsible for the palace’s 
security because they had spent some time together in the army. My presence, as a guest of former 
Prime Minister, was thus announced to the protocol which allowed me to be placed a little bit closer to 
the ceremonial area with other guests of honor who that day were the American Ambassador and his 
guests. The Mogho Naba’s palace is surrounded by a big wall, and even if it is located in the city, there is 
a perimeter of bush around this wall, like a buffer zone hiding the palace. This area, although it seems to 
be an open space, is not open to the public and is controlled. No cameras are allowed, and it is strictly 
respected. The area inside the walls is closed to the public and even forbidden to foreigners unless a 
specific appointment is made. The Friday’s ceremony takes place in the buffer zone on the right side of 
the palace, so outside the walls but in the bush area. On this side of the palace, there is a traditional hut 
embedded in the tall wall allowing a passage. In front of this hut, there is a large dusty clearing area 
surrounded by trees. The ministers and local chiefs arrive from the entire region by car, motorcycle or 
bike to take their place. They form three strips of two rows in front of the hut at a fairly long distance 
(around 200 feet), while another group is positioned on the right side of the hut, much closer. The 
position of each chief is related to their power level. They all wear their traditional outfits, and most 
importantly their chief’s hat, whose colors and patterns are all unique, carrying the identity of their 
chiefdom. All the chiefs take a seat of a mat on the ground after numerous salutations. The guests of 
honor, including myself, were standing behind the last strip of chiefs at a fair distance, around 90 feet. 
Tourists are contained by the royal guards under the trees, even further away.  




      This ceremony is named the “false start”. The story says that during the 17th century, the 
Mogho Naba called all the chiefs to go to war against his brother, but at the last minute decided to avoid 
a fratricide war. It is quite representative of one of the many contradictions of the Mossi institutions: an 
impressive show from the Chief of War, a demonstration of his military power, to exert a peaceful 
political setting. Symbolically, it reasserts the notion of power, naam, onto the people from the land. 
When everybody is set, the horse, symbol from the Mossi legend, is prepared for the king to go to war. 
A first cannon shot is fired, the Mogho Naba comes out of the hut, he supposedly sits near the horse, 
but by that time with the smoke from the cannon shot, and the distance, it is hard to really see what is 
going on. The ceremonial protocol says that after some exchanges with his ministers, he gives up the 
idea of war, the horse’s trapping is taken away as well as the horse. A second cannon shot is fired, much 
louder, the visibility is non-existent, and the Mogho Naba goes back into the palace by the small hole in 
the wall. By eight o’clock in the morning, the ceremony is over. The ministers and chiefs then meet, and 
the rest of the day is dedicated to the address of general and specific issues regarding the Mossi 
territories. It is also the moment to make specific requests and have an audience with the Mogho Naba.  
 I filed a request for an audience with the Mogho Naba. The request had to be written and the 
adequate paper was passed to me by the guards. There is a format and spelling to respect, so the letter 
was written by the former Prime Minister’s bodyguard, with the help of the royal chief of security, and 
the audience was asked under my name but as a special guest of the former Prime Minsiter Tertius 
Zongo (see annex 2). I had to stay at the gate of the palace’s wall in the bush zone. There were no areas 
to welcome visitors. During the week-end I received a call from Isidore, the personal secretary of His 
Majesty the Mogho Naba for an audience on Monday morning. Escorted by the bodyguard of the former 
Prime Minister, I arrived at the gate of the palace. Our car was allowed in, on the parking area. The 
palace did not exhibit specific architectural signs, it looked like a large African administrative building. I 
had to follow a specific path outside the car, as my presence seemed to create a problem inside the 




walls. I could not be seen in front of the palace but the parking lot is located in front of the palace. I was 
not sure whether the issue was that I was an unaccompanied woman or whether it was because of my 
skin color. In front of the palace, there was a two-step elevated esplanade with rudimentary benches. 
Some people were waiting there. I was put on the side, and soon, Isidore came to get me. I was 
introduced to the Kansonaba, a chief of Province, and the Samannaba, the Chief of the Court. We were 
standing in front of the door of the palace. They asked me what I was interested in and what I wanted to 
ask to the Mogho Naba. I explained my research and interest in understanding the functioning of the 
customary institutions in today’s land management. The Kansonaba, a big man, was very imposing and 
took to responding to me most of the time whereas the Samannaba was much more poised and seemed 
like he would have more nuanced responses to give me. The Kansonaba explained to me that the chiefs 
of land are the owners of the land but that they do not make decisions anymore about it, that they are 
the guardians of a tradition, a heritage that they want to protect, the guardians of an identity or a way 
of life that is the essence of the tradition in opposition to the modern state that was inherited from 
colonization.  
The Kansonaba described the institutional structure of the Mossi administration that I laid down 
in Figure 8 (Kansonaba and Samannaba, personal communication, November 19, 2012).  It is interesting 
to notice the resilience of the colonial print in the Mossi administration, in the administrative levels of 
the “canton” for example. The Kansonaba then explained to me that during the council of the Ministers 
on Fridays, they dealt mostly with social conflicts. He also mentioned that the state (the modern state) 
was approaching them more and more to include them in large programs such as campaigns against 
HIV/AIDS or large water programs. He proudly told me that they had been included in the consultations 
for the land reforms and that the modern state was including them in the legal dispositions as “they” 
(the bureaucrats) realized that the customary representatives had much more legitimacy than the 
modern state (Kansonaba and Samannaba, personal communication, November 19, 2012). This 




prompted a question on my side regarding the legitimacy of the customary institutions that turned out 
to be a breaking point in our exchange. I wondered, as the customary chiefs were getting involved into 
local politics (participating to local elections for mayor for example), if they (the guardians of the 
customary institutions) were not worried that it would tarnish the legitimacy of these institutions. The 
tone of the Kansonaba, who is a local elected official himself to the parliament, changed and he told me 
that he did not have more time and that I had to fill another request to meet with the Mogho Naba. One 
can also wonder if the participation of the local chiefs, under their identity of the customary chief, in a 
democratic system was not posing a problem for the democratic process itself, but I did not ask that.      
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 I succeeded having another audience scheduled after the Friday’s ceremony of the same week. 
Because of the short notice, I decided to go by myself to the palace for my meeting. I was very poorly 
welcomed by the same guard that I had seen several times already. As I was standing at the gate to get 
his attention, he did not believe that I had a meeting and did not want to interact with me. I had to call 
Isidore, the personal secretary, to let him know that I was at the gate. I was then placed behind a 
container in the garden on the left side of the palace to wait and physically intimidated by the guard in 
chief who explained to me that at another time I would have been killed under his bludgeons’ blows 
because as a white woman I was not allowed to talk to him and to be here. That was the most 
unpleasant experience I had in Burkina Faso. Eventually, Isidore came to get me from my hidden corner. 
I saw the Kansonaba again, in front of the door of the palace. He asked for my manuscript (my 
dissertation draft) so he could go through it and decide if it could be approved or not by the customary 
authority. I told him that I was an independent researcher in the research process so such manuscript 
was not available yet and that even when available neither the customary authority nor the Burkinabe 
state could decide the content of my dissertation. After debating, he asked that I draft one question for 
the Mogho Naba, that he would approve or not. I drafted the following question: ”Giving the fact that 
the land reforms and the land parceling for property titling are extending in the country, the role of the 
local land chiefs is decreasing: in this context how do you envision the role of the customary institutions 
at the local and national scales?”. My question was approved, and I was allowed to finally pass the door 










Figure 9: His Majesty the Mhogo Naba and myself in Ouagadougou 
 
The protocol prohibits that I talk to the Mogho Naba directly. I had to ask my question to the Kansonaba 
who asked the question in Moré to the Mogho Naba. He responded to the Kansonaba who translated 
the response as followed: “Indeed, the modern state owns the land and conducts parceling projects, I 
have sent people to check on these projects and understand the reforms, but it seems that the 
customary institutions are not involved enough in the reforms and thus more reforming needs to be 
done” (Mhogo Naba, personal communication, November 23, 2012). Then I was asked to stand next to 
him to take a picture (figure 9), but I could not have more exchange with him and I was sent out of the 
palace.  
 This experience at the heart of the Mossi institutions informed me of several important points. 
First, the customary institutions that have completely adopted the colonial bias, by defining themselves 
as “customary”, by keeping an administration shaped partly under the colonial power, is reframing its 
history as the traditional opponent of the colonial power. The Mossi institutions do not present 
themselves as the Mossi Empire, but as the “customary institutions”, which allow them to represent 
equally the whole Burkinabè territories, in opposition to the modern state that is the continuation of the 





folklore that the Friday’s ceremony may seem to show. It does function like an active power, and it 
keeps a very protective and opaque functioning. And these institutions find their active power in their 
participation into the modern state institutions. This brings me to my last point and the most important 
one. The question of the participation of the representatives of the customary system in the modern 
political life, even if it had become quite common, is a very controversial issue. This tension is really the 
core of the complexity of land management in Burkina Faso, especially at the local scale.  
 
5.1.2. Defining “Indinalism”: Social Organization and Principles 
The political adaptation of the Mossi Empire into a customary authority relies on a set of social 
principles that are important to apprehend not only the gap between the customary law (which I will 
discuss in 5.1.3.) and the modern world but also how the customary authority itself manipulated the 
Mossi heritage. The renowned Ghanaian economist George Ayittey has written extensively on the 
indigenous African institutions and their economic organization. He names this indigenous system as 
“indinalism”, a combination of individualism and communalism. “In traditional Africa, primary duty is 
owned to the community” and “persons exist only in relation to one another”, thus “individual rights are 
secondary, while the interests of the community are supreme” (Ayittey, 2006: 43). Yet if the rights of the 
community are predominant, the “notion that individuals are free-born is universal” (Ayittey, 2006: 49). 
Ayittey notes that ‘the indigenous philosophy is not one of complete individualism, nor is it total 
communism or socialism” (Ayittey, 2006: 66). This is the core axiom of the African philosophy in 
organizing societal principles.        
 The notion of community is understood in Western societies as the collection of self-interested 
people with their private independent circle who get together around a specific agenda; it is in other 
words an additive approach to gain strength or power to negotiate a particular issue (Ayittey, 2006: 43). 





different parts of one body. The individual can’t exist outside the group and the group survival is 
threatened when losing one individual. As Ayittey states: “if the individual is to survive within the group, 
a collective effort is needed for group survival” (Ayittey, 2006: 42).  
 The African notion of the community has tremendous consequences for the organization of the 
society. The boundary between the family and the group is not fixed. The terms “brother” and “sister” 
are broadly used to define other members or the group and even the extended group because the 
group is seen as playing the same function as the family. The Zulus say: “a human being is a human 
being because of other human beings” (Ayittey, 2006: 42). One individual’s existence is not solely due to 
the parents but to the continuous care of the group, from birth to death. It also implies a notion of 
continuous re-distribution, not through tax and redistribution in services, but through daily practices of 
gifts, sharing food, visiting, talking, assisting with labor etc. (Ayittey, 2006: 41).   
 In this context, differences are difficult to include in the social pattern. An individual with 
greater abilities will be considered a normal person who is benefiting from an advantage given by 
magical forces. Greater abilities are not individual gifts but an advantage for the group; the person with 
greater abilities does not benefit from it personally but is to share them with the group. A power does 
not belong to the person; it belongs to the group (Ayittey, 2006: 41).  
However, wealth and inequalities are acknowledged in the African culture. There are numerous 
proverbs resulting from the observation of inequality: the Masai in Kenya say “the fingers of people are 
not all the same length”, the Fanti in Ghana say “all mushrooms grow in the same place but some are 
eaten and others are not”, in Mauritania it is said that “not all the flowers of a tree produce fruit”, the 
Ashanti in Ghana say that “the poor man and the rich man do not play together” (Ayittey, 2006: 53). The 
idea of wealth and inequality is not related to a monetary concept; it may be related to possessions such 
as cattle that “produces in return something of value”, but it is mainly seen as the result of fate (Ayittey, 





control. This idea reinforces the principle that it is important to share with the community as a good fate 
can easily change into a bad fate for which the support of the community would be welcomed. It is thus 
common to participate to a “family pot” based upon financial abilities; if this participation is not an 
obligation, not participating is understood as self-exclusion from the family and the groups (Ayittey, 
2010: 51).  In Burkina Faso, surplus is rapidly redistributed through different forms.  
The concept of wealth accumulation is very foreign in the sense that wealth may be 
accumulated for the community but does not make sense for an individual. Consequently, there is no 
need to secure accumulation with set of private rights as it belongs by definition to the group. The 
notion of private rights is very unfamiliar to the African culture.  
 
5.1.3. Customary Law: a Tool of Social Control 
The African notion of community is largely explained by the tough environmental conditions 
across the continent. Group effort and cooperation were instrumental in surviving and societies have 
developed a set of rules among these lines. However, the notion of customary law is different. The 
notion of indinalism is by definition a notion easy to pervert. There is indeed a very thin line between 
group effort and cooperation and individual power and wealth grabbing in the name of the community, 
especially in a social context where a notion of fate is dominant.  
The South Sudanese politician and diplomat, Francis Deng, a Doctor of Juridical Science from 
Yale University, has written extensively on customary law and its role in the modern politics in the 
Sudanese context. He demonstrated how in Sudan customary law was considered as a fundamental 
source of legislation and constitutionalism (Deng, 2010: 3). Although there are no written texts, the 
African customary societal organization can be turned into a set of constitutional principles. Ayittey also 
exposes this notion as basic human rights established by the customary law and tradition and that can 





originally compiled by the African-American sociologist and historian Chancellor Williams in the second 
edition of his famous book The Destruction of Black Civilization (1987): 
   
Table 2: Basic Human Rights under the Customary Law  
1 The right to equal protection of the law. 
2 The right to a home. 
3 The right to land sufficient for earning livelihood for oneself and family. 
4 The right to aid in times of trouble. 
5 The right to petition for redress of grievances. 
6 The right to criticize and condemn any acts by the authorities or proposed new laws 
(opposition groups in some areas are called “the Youngman” are recognized by law). 
7 The right to reject the community’s final decision on any matter and to withdraw 
from the community unmolested. 
8 The right to a fair trial. 
9 The rights to indemnity for injuries or loss caused by others. 
10 The right to family or community care in cases of sickness or accidents. 
11 The right to special aid from the Chief in circumstances beyond a family’s ability. 
12 The right to a general education covering the morals and good manners, family rights 
and responsibilities, kinship groups and social organization, neighborhoods and 
boundaries, farming and marketing, rapid mental calculation, and family, clan, tribal 
and state stories. 
13 The right to apprentice training for a useful vocation. 
14 The right to an inheritance as defined by custom. 
15 The right to develop one’s ability and exercise and developed skills. 
16 The right to protect one’s family and kinsmen, even by violent means if such becomes 
necessary and can be justified. 
17 The right to the protection of moral law in respect to wife and children – right which 
not even the king can violate. 
18 The right of a man, even a slave, to rise to occupy the highest positions of the state if 
he has the requisite ability and character. 
19 The right to protection and treatment as a guest in enemy territory once one is within 
the gates of the enemy’s village, town or city. 
20 The right to an equal share in all benefits from common community undertakings if 
one has contributed to the fullest extent of his ability, no matter who or how many 
were able to contribute more. 
 Source: Ayittey, 2006: 50 
 
Deng warns of the presence of a large gap between the “positive rhetoric and practical measures for 
making effective [the] use of customary law” (Deng, 2010: 3). He insists on the meaning of making 
customary practices into customary law: 
Law is not an abstract concept neutrally poised above political, social, and cultural realities of a 
given community but is, to the contrary, a normative framework that regulates the society’s 
constitutive processes. These processes themselves are guided by overriding postulates that 





procedurally. Law is thus an instrument of power for regulating relations between people, 
promoting values, and managing resources. (Deng, 2012: 14)   
 
The problem with the customary law in the Burkinabe situation is that it was developed to serve the 
political agenda of the centralized Mossi power as well as the interests of the colonial administration. If 
the customary law claimed its inspiration from the notion of indinalism, the political adaptation that 
came out of this legal set is one of social control in order to be able to keep claiming a political 
legitimacy within the modern institutions. However, the customary practices and beliefs hold relics of 
the Mossi culture and have evolved with time. The following part highlights some of these practices and 
beliefs and their relevance when approaching the notion of land and property.                  
 
5.2. The Importance of Practices and Beliefs: The Modern Shadows of Tenga and the Naam 
5.2.1. Tenga: Where the Dead Are Buried 
It was a Sunday around noon, when everybody starts to get inside or look for shade to escape 
the heat for the next three to four hours. I was supposed to meet with the chief of staff of the mayor of 
Ziniaré, a town located about 20 miles North-East to Ouagadougou to get an informal point of view on 
the state of land conflicts in Ziniaré and how these conflicts are managed. André Dimsingré Ouedraogo 
did not want to meet in town, fearing that my presence with him could be misinterpreted as the word 
was most likely out that Nassara, the white woman in Moré, was investigating land issues. Francis 
Soudré, the librarian at the Department of Economics in the University of Ouagadougou, had set up the 
meeting for me and was escorting me. We were waiting for instructions in a local bar, under the 
corrugated iron’s terrace, fighting the well over 100 Fahrenheit temperatures with a coke. It was much 
too hot to wait in his old Peugeot minivan. An old Mercedes stopped twenty feet down and we were 
asked to follow the car. I could not see the driver, but I could see there were two people in the car. We 
started driving away from the town, more to the North-East. The landscape was getting dryer and 





and it was mostly grey rocks and red dust, and sometimes dry plants of sesame (figure 10). Francis 
seemed to have no idea where we were going and I could feel that he was getting nervous with the bad 
condition of the road. I was starting to get a little bit nervous too: we were far into the dry bush and 
going north, which, giving the political instability of the Sahel region in regard to AQMI’s growing 
presence (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and the upcoming French military intervention in 
neighboring Mali, had been in the back of my head all along.  
Figure 10: Driving North-East to Ziniaré (photos: Julie Touber, 2012) 
 
 
It was very hot. The car finally stopped under a tree, in an area that seemed a little bit less dry. 





Albert Ouedraogo, who were both former teachers. We sat on benches in the shade (figure 11). They 
wanted to explain to me what land meant here, what land conflicts entitled and thus we could only talk 
about it far from the city.  
 
They told me that in the ancient time, land was owned by families so most conflicts were a 
family matter and dealt with as such. But in Ziniaré, there have been conflicts of a different matter 
because people who came from Forgui26 had become more numerous than the people originally from 
Ziniaré. These people from Forgui were of a specific nature. According to my hosts, they were what is 
called “masks”, a specific group in the society who is in charge of conducting ceremonies wearing masks 
for family events and specific events related to the weather or other village’s matters (Les Amitiés 
Franco-Burkinabè, 2007: 28-31). If in the beginning they were welcomed and land was offered to them, 
as they became more numerous they started grabbing land without permission. “When the neck is 
protected, the mouth says what it wants” says a Mossi proverb. My hosts kept telling this proverb. The 
masks were protected by a family member, a civil servant, who was closed to ministers and who had 
been able to reach out to the chief of Zniaré to justify their land grabbing. If there were some judicial 
initiatives to get back the land, the disappointment in the justice system was high. Defeated by the 
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customary system with a corrupted chief, defeated by the modern state system with a corrupted judge, 
my hosts explained me that they kept their faith in justice and balance.  
Land is sacred; it is dangerous to play with this matter. It is where the dead are buried, where 
everybody comes home one day or another, it is the sanctuary of the ancestors and the history. “You 
can ask for forgiveness when it concerns religion, but if you have offended the dead, they will take you” 
said my hosts. The masks lost 52 people from unexplained deaths. The influential civil servant who had 
corrupted the chief and the judge lost his father and his brother. His malediction was even greater 
because he had not followed the cycle of life, forbidding him to take matters in hand as long as his 
father was alive. He was punished, and his fear prohibited him from pushing the matter any longer. The 
land was restituted.  
Then, André told me about his neighbor who had planted millet on his land. André warned him 
that he had encroached upon his land, his ancestors’ land. When the millet became red, ready to be 
harvested, the neighbor passed away suddenly. As they were telling me these stories, in the middle of 
nowhere, in a great silence and in the crushing heat, I thought to myself, that it did not matter if all 
these deaths could be rationally explained, I believed them. When the environment feels and most likely 
is hostile resulting in high death rates, beliefs and legends come alive, they make sense and their 
presence imposes some respect. This is how I felt that day. For the first time in my dissertation work, I 
saw something else in the land matter: it was not economics, it was not social, it was not political or 
institutional, it was mystical. If I could sense this fear on a Sunday afternoon with my Cartesian and 
European education, it must be very present for most people who had grown up here. Land matters are 
fearful and that is a key concept to understand the institutional functioning of the customary system 
and the modern system. If the customary system institutionalized the beliefs and fear related to land as 





related to land in the practice of its agents. In other words, the modern institutions are still dependent 
of people, who carry or are aware of the mystical and sacred nature of land.     
 
5.2.2. The Wak: A Modern Continuation of the Naam 
The term wak refers to the sacred and traditional beliefs and practices regarding the village, 
inheritance, harvests, family matters and its propitiatory rituals attached to it. It does not seem to exist 
in the Moré or Gurunsi languages, and it is believed to originate from Côte d’Ivoire. In Baoulé language, 
it means the “people made of wood” (“waka scran”), referring to the representations of spirits in the 
shape of wood statuettes (Bieri and Froidevaux, 2010: 69). As we saw earlier, the relationship between 
Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire is highly related to the colonial workers’ immigration policies in the 1930s 
and 1940s, and the administration of a third of the burkinabè territories under the colony of Côte 
d’Ivoire from 1933 to 1947. This bond has been perpetuated by the prosperous economic situation of 
Côte d’Ivoire after Independence and the growing poverty of Burkina Faso, resulting in a continuous 
immigration tie between the two countries. Thus the term wak27, widely used in Burkina and considered 
as burkinabè, can be considered as a contemporary phenomenon (Bieri and Froidevaux, 2010: 69).  
The wak is widely used at very different levels and in the modern as well as the traditional 
contexts. It is used by athletes and students to protect and help them in competitions and exams. It is 
used to regain the favors of a father. Its practice, although close to witchcraft, is not considered as 
witchcraft28 and is performed by a wakman or a marabout. “Being waked”, meaning that someone has 
the power of the wak with him/her, is an important matter and, not surprisingly, it is said to be very 
present in the political sphere (Bieri and Froidevaux, 2010: 70-74). A Burkinabè newspaper, Journal du 
Jeudi, reported that 60% of the members of parliament had visited a wakman in the previous two weeks 
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of the survey (Bieri and Froidevaux, 2010: 75).  The President, Blaise Compaoré, is said to surround 
himself with an army of wakmen explaining his longevity in power. The traditional feel attached to the 
notion of wak, but which is really modern in its making, intertwines the Moogo history and the modern 
state history. For example, it is said that the squared tomb of Naba Kango29 in Waiguya (Ouahigouya) 
cannot be circled by a chief, or this last one would lose his power and his life. Thomas Sankara refuted 
the saying and ended up losing the power and his life in a coup led by Compaoré in 1987 (Bieri and 
Froidevaux, 2010: 74-76).  
The modern use of the notion of wak echoes the use of the naam in the pre-colonial Moogo. 
The legitimacy of the naam was rooted in the lineage system, which was jeopardized during the 
colonization period by the intervention from the central power --the colonial administration-- to place 
more favorable chiefs, and this, as I explained earlier,  at all levels, as it concerned the Mogho Naba as 
well. Because of these disruptions, the conflicts regarding the inheritance of the chief’s power kept 
rising in the colonial aftermath and the independence’s political instability. It became easy to resolve 
these conflicts with the help of the wak, which can go as far as unexplained and sudden death of a 
protagonist. The method could be used in the customary context as well as in the modern political 
context. The wak thus became a part of the notion of power, for both institutional systems --customary 
and modern-- and replaced the naam (Bieri and Froidevaux, 2010: 76-78).   
This brings us back to the controversial interbreeding of the political actors of the modern state 
and the representatives of the Mossi administration. The displayed respect by President Compaoré 
toward the Mossi institutions, and the open support of Mossi institutions to the President in the name 
of important characters such as the Larlé Naba, are considered as a positive synergy of the wak. The 
counter-example would be the distrust of Sankara toward tradition that brought death on him. But if the 
status-quo seems accepted for now, there is a room for change again in this relationship. If you bring 
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this topic to a Burkinabe, he or she will have a clear opinion on whether or not the traditional chiefs 
should get involved in politics or not, and it is quite split. The current Mogho Naba has been cautious in 
staying away from the state affairs as much as possible. It is said that he believes that his father died 
from shame because of his involvement in politics.   
This curious hybridation of the modern and customary powers is very well summarized in a 
calendar-poster that was showed to me by several customary chiefs but that I also saw on the walls of 
different administrations. The poster represents President Compaoré in the top left side and the 
representatives of the Mossi Kingdoms. I took pictures of the poster: Figure 12 presents the poster as a 
whole in the middle and I enlarged the different parts of the posters that represent Compaoré and the 










 Figure 12:  
Calendar-Poster Exhibiting the President  





 The wak, unlike the naam in the pre-colonial period, plays an ambiguous role in the state-
building process. If it seems to support massively the modern state institutions in encouraging the 
population to participate in the more or less democratic system, it is also seen as a potential symbolic 
power of opposition, or a continuous threat, regarding the attitude of the modern state toward the 
customary institutions. It reinforces the artificial dualism of tradition and modernity that found its roots 
during the colonial administration.    
 
5.2.3. What Does it Means for Conflict Resolutions  
 Far from the representation of a static traditional society, the Burkinabè society cannot be 
understood without acknowledging the massive population movements and the evolution of the notions 
of modernity and tradition as a contemporary dualism. If in the modern state system the separations of 
powers --legislative, executive and judicial-- are the cornerstone of its functioning, by maintaining 
counter-powers mechanisms, similar processes can be observed in the contemporary customary system. 
The resilience and evolution of these processes have been key to maintain the importance of the 
customary institutions, their legitimacy and their efficiency in resolving disputes. Indeed, as I mentioned 
previously, Burkina Faso does not experience significant conflicts, compared to other African countries 
and this despite its religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity. The Belgium anthropologist Pierre-Joseph 
Laurent gives a compelling description of the counter-powers at stake in the Mossi customary 
institutions, explaining the observed relative peaceful environment.  
 Laurent identified three main actors of counter-powers to the Mossi institutions. The first one is 
the elderly villagers, or what is known as the “justice of the ancestors”. The oldest men of the village 
carry the memory of the previous generations in regard to family matters and property uses. When a 
conflict arises, the different parties will have to respond to the memory of their ancestors in front of the 




memory. Thus this judgment is perceived as the most legitimate; especially since a lie regarding an 
ancestor’s land will be punished by the recall to the ground by this ancestor of the liar, in other words 
punished by death (Laurent, 2010: 89). The second counter-power is the poêsé, the one who can 
uncover secrets in Moré. This particular lineage in the Mossi society is considered as the guardians of 
the communal life, and their role, passed from a generation to another one, is mainly to monitor the 
chiefs’ actions, their practice of the naam, and thus their capacity to be chief. Using fetishes, the poêsé 
will regularly check that the people with power have behaved properly, and if not, the chiefs in question 
usually choose to commit suicide in order to avoid public disgrace (Laurent, 2010: 89-90). The third 
counter-powers are the baga and kinkirbaaga, the augurs or soothsayers, who can penetrate the 
invisible world. The Mossi society gives a high priority to the notion of societal harmony, which implies 
that disputes, resentments and jealousies are not expressed in the living and political world but have to 
be released in the invisible world, which play a balancing role. Thus witchcraft plays a stabilizing role by 
promoting and securing a certain concord. One main consequence of the guaranteed social peace pact is 
that no major economic disparities exist, and as soon as someone starts to accumulate more wealth 
than the others, redistribution has to occur in order to avoid being accused of occult malpractices 
(Laurent, 2010: 90). It is worth noticing that Pierre-Joseph Laurent, when he settled in a Mossi village to 
study land issues, was poisoned and had to be evacuated, most likely because of the potential discord 
he had brought in by conducting his study (Laurent, 2010: 85).    
 The ultimate goal of a “social entente” has major consequences for the economic and political 
functioning of the Mossi society. Silence regarding existing or potential conflicts is a priority and will be 
addressed only in the confidence of the invisible world. The notion of private property, because it favors 
disparities, entails a large spectrum of interpretation and practices. It is acknowledged that what one 
owns is potentially owned by his neighbor, and vice versa, as the situation may change at any moment. 




not give the priority to the individual, it is not concerned with what is right or wrong, but what is good 
for the “social entente”, in other words, what should be done to keep the communal group happy even 
if it has to be unfair to one person. So when it comes to consider private property, it cannot be 
understood in the western sense, it has to be understood as more a communal good under the care of 
one person for each plot (Laurent, 2010: 92-93). 
 The efficiency of the Mossi institutions in providing a type of social security, despite the 
limitation of what could be considered individual rights, has been the major challenge for the modern 
Burkinabe state because of its inability to provide such level of social security. To envisage emancipation 
from the customary system, one has to be really sure of his/her independence from the social support 
and network to provide for him/herself the adequate social security in the long run. This unsecured 
modernity may have been mitigated by the rise of religion, which can provide a safety net as well 
(Laurent, 2010:96-98). The capacity of the traditional authorities to shape their modernity in a false 
opposition with the modern state is the key to their predominance and survival. The next chapter 
analyzes in micro-details the practice of the naam, the Mossi power, at the smallest scale, as a 













THE LAWFUL LAND AND THE TRUE LAND30:  
THREE CASES  
 
 




This chapter presents the lawful land --administrative setting for land management in 
Ouagadougou and its surroundings-- and its complex practice, as well as the true land -- the functioning 
of the customary institutions in three Mossi chiefdoms. The goal is to demonstrate how the two sets of 
institutions work together in land management. The first part of this chapter gives an understanding of 
the administrative complexity that civil servants and citizens face. It also highlights the role of the 
customary authorities within the administrative organization both in their actions using the 
administrative setting and in the beliefs of the civil servants present in the administration.   
Then I detail today’s functioning of the customary institutions in three Mossi chiefdoms in 
Ouagadougou and its surroundings: the Chiefdom of Ziniaré, the Chiefdom of Taab Tinga, the Chiefdom 
of Koubri. The Chiefdom of Ziniaré is located about 20 miles (30km) to the north-east of Ouagadougou, 
the Chiefdom of Taab-Tinga is located in sector 28 in Ouagadougou, and the Chiefdom of Koubri is 
located in the southern outskirts of Ouagadougou (see Figure 13). I chose these three chiefdoms 
because each of them represents a typical case. The Chiefdom of Ziniaré is outside the planning area of 
Ouagadougou and is considered a rural municipality with an important Mossi chief. It is thus a good 
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“control” case of how it works in the rural setting. Yet, it is close enough that in the near future Ziniaré 
will be part of the greater Ouagadougou’s region, and could be interesting to investigate again for 
further studies. The Chiefdom of Taab Tinga is located in the city of Ouagadougou in an informal 
settlement; it thus offers a good example of the resilient role of the customary authorities inside the city 
boundaries. Finally, Koubri is a rural setting but very close to the most demanded neighborhoods of 
Ouagadougou; it thus faces very high land pressure and has been across the local news as its mayor was 
convicted for corruption over a land deal and sentenced to jail time (from 2012 to this date in late 2015).  
Figure 13: Location Map of the Chiefdoms of Ziniaré, Taab Tinga and Koubri. 
 
Mapping by J. Touber, 2013. Sources: Google Map 2013 
 
I conducted my field work during the month of November 2012.  For each chiefdom, I met with 
the main chief --the highest ranked representative of the chiefdom-- and, when possible31 with the chief 
of land –a minister of the main chief in charge of land matters. The following descriptions are the results 
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of usually two interviews per case of 4 to 6 hours each32. For each case, I present the proceedings of the 
interviews’ set-ups and interviews themselves as it is part of the functioning of the institutions and 
highlight formal patterns. The goal of these interviews was to grasp the involvement of customary 
institutions in resolving and managing land issues and to have a detailed account of the institutional 
procedures in place to address them.     
 
6.1. Ouagadougou: A Complex Administration under Influence 
 6.1.1. Defining the Urban: Floating Boundaries on the Customary Model  
 Pierre-Aimé Ouedraogo, a sociologist and executive secretary for the GRAF (Groupe de 
Recherche et d’Action sur le Foncier), an outstanding research institute and think-tank, welcomed me 
very warmly in his office. My visit was highly expected as the word of my presence in town had spread 
and I had met with pretty much all the members of this think-tank, financed by their memberships and 
grants from NGOs and foreign embassies such as the Danish, Canadian and French. Pierre-Aimé had 
focused his work on defining urban and rural land in Burkina Faso. Indeed, the 1983 Law had set a 
difference between the urban land and the rural land but never defined them33. This definition gap had 
favored big cities like Ouagadougou in grabbing land in the neighboring rural municipalities that lacked 
expertise to defend themselves (Interview with Pierre-Aimé Ouedraogo in Ouagadougou on November 
12, 2012). The administrative boundaries of Ouagadougou even today are not considered as set and it is 
understood by the population that Ouagadougou’s mayor has the political power to grab land all around 
the city.  
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administrative management the colon’s neighborhoods (national management) and the indigenous neighborhoods (municipal 




 According to Pierre-Aimé, this power relationship echoes the customary notion of territoriality. 
A village can claim a territory if this village administers the land in question. Then, it is acknowledged 
that the land is under this village’s authority. Thus it happens that some villages are without territory (or 
land) as it has passed onto another village’s territoriality. Still according to Pierre-Aimé, the municipality 
of Ouagadougou uses similar techniques, placing land outside its administrative boundaries under the 
administrative management of the city (services domanials, national services) when it should be 
administered by the Rural Land Services (Service Foncier Rural). A physical example of this phenomenon 
is the city’s tolls. Ouagadougou is authorized to raise financial resources with toll booths on the roads 
going in and out of the city, but the location of these tolls is quite surprising. Thus when I was going to 
Ziniaré, the toll booth was situated far into the rural land of Loumbila, and on the road to Koubri, only an 
abandoned toll booth was there, positioning from an administrative point of view, a part of the rural 
town of Koubri within the city of Ouagadougou. Tolls are clearly perceived by the population as land 
grabbing by Ouagadougou’s political power. 
 In order to understand the implication of such perception, one has to go back to the history of 
the city. Traoré Yakouba, the director of the Urban Planning Department for the City of Ouagadougou, 
welcomed me in his dark office, filled with accumulated work, as he was just coming back from his Hajj 
(pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam). Despite all the work to catch up on, he took the 
time to tell me the story of Ouagadougou. At the beginning of the 20th century, when the colons settled 
in Ouagadougou, they developed the residential quarters (today’s ministerial quarter), administered by 
the national state, while the indigenous quarters (today’s ZACA) called lotissements were managed by 
the municipalities (Interview with Traoré Yakouba in Ouagadougou on November 15, 2012). With the 
development of the colonial administration in Ouagadougou, the need of labor and soldiers increased, 
broadening indigenous settlements in the city. In 1914, the noticeable participation of indigenous 




But in 1934, the development of the rail line from Abidjan to Bobo Dioulasso relegated Ouagadougou to 
a secondary city. When in 1947 Ouagadougou regained its capital status, the population doubled in 3 
years (Haskoning, 1983; SDAGO, 1990). The city became a well-connected hub in the region with the 
railways to Abidjan and roads to Lomé, Cotonou and on the route between Bamako and Niamey.  
 The lotissements, planned areas for the indigenous, were extended. In 1960, Ouagadougou’s 
counted 60,000 inhabitants with good infrastructure and accommodations for everybody (Haskoning, 
1983; SDAGO, 1990). But after 1960, the customary chiefs asked to be involved in the planning process 
of the lotissements, which meant according to Traoré Yakouba that they were asking for a lot of money 
as compensation for the land (Interview with Traoré Yakouba in Ouagadougou on November 15, 2012). 
The back and forth game between the administration and the customary chiefs slowed down the 
development projects while, at the same time, the population was growing rapidly, especially after the 
droughts in 1973-74. In 1983, two third of the population in Ouagadougou lived in informal settlements 
which sparked a revolution. Thus 1983 marked a new urban planning era.  
 The Dutch consulting firm Haskoning developed a master plan for Ouagadougou in 1986. The 
goal of master planning was to tackle the housing informality crisis. The revolution was successful in 
delivering land through an emergency plan but a sustained effort was needed, and infrastructure was 
badly lacking. In 1990, a master plan for Ouagadougou and its region was developed: the SDAGO, 
Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement du Grand Ouaga. Léon-Paul Toé, the director for the urban planning 
department at the Ministry for Housing and Urban Planning, explained to me that regional planning had 
the advantage of overcoming the problem of definition of the city’s boundaries and the institutional gap 
in urban and rural land management (Interview with Léon-Paul Toé in Ouagadougou on November 12, 
2012). His department was very dynamic, a lot of young qualified people working passionately and I was 
able to obtain easily good maps and high-quality documents of the region. The SDAGO was revised in 




highlights the limitations of such planning documents, as it is difficult to link the planning exercise to the 
administrative and institutional reality. The area considered in the Grand Ouaga includes in the Région 
Centre, six rural municipalities and an urban one (Ouagadougou), and in the Région Plateau Central, one 
rural municipality (SDAGO, 2010: 156-157).  
 
Figure 14 shows the administrative map of the Région Centre and the different provinces within the 
region. The next two tables, 3 and 4, show the administrative units inside the Province of Kadiogo and 
within Ouagadougou. These very small and numerous administrative units are the result of the inherited 
French administration and compromises to share power with the customary authorities. Because 
everybody benefits from a kind of power and financial rent from these administrative positions, it is not 
in their interest to move toward a regional planning effort. Indeed, every administrative unit has to 
Figure 14: Map of the Région Centre of Burkina Faso and its Seven Provinces.  





prove their utility and political influence in order to enforce their utility at the risk of disappearing. It is 
classic institutional survival behavior carried by its agents.     
Table 3: Municipalities in the Kadiogo Province and their Villages. 
Municipalities Land Type
34
 Number of Villages 
Komki-Ipala  Rural 9 
Tanghin-Dassouri  Rural 26 
Komsilga  Rural 33 
Pabré  Rural 17 
Koubri Rural 17 
Saaba Rural 26 
Ouagadougou Urban 17 
Source: SDAGO, 2010: 157 









1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12 
12 0 0 
Bogodogo 13, 14, 15, 28, 29, 30 6 Balkuy, Yamtenga 2 
Boulmiougou 16, 17, 18, 19 4 
Boassa, Sandogo, Zagtouli, 
Zongo 
4 
Nongremassom 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 5 
Nioko II, Doumtenga, Sakoula, 
Sogodin, Polesgo 
5 





Total   30  17 
Source: Ouagadougou City and SDAGO, 2010: 156. 
         
Dr. Sidiki Guiré, a former civil servant at the Ministry for Territorial Administration, 
Decentralization and Security (MATDS) who had become an independent expert on institutional 
transparency in Burkina Faso had warned me that I would encounter mismatching administrative 
boundaries (Interview with Dr. Sidiki Guiré in Ouagadougou on November 13, 2012). Koubri is a good 
example: in the map from Figure 14, Koubri is another province in the South-East of Kadiogo Province, 
yet in Table 3, Koubri is included as a municipality within the Kadiogo Province. The map in Figure 14 is 
the official map from the Geographical Institute of Burkina Faso (IGB), while the table is the 
administrative consideration for the Grand Ouaga. The administrative conflicts are the result of a 
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political compromise to share power over land and that have made a large planning exercise quite 
impossible. 
 6.1.2. Understanding the Political Outcome of the Lotissement 
In order to understand why there is such a high imbrication between the modern institutions 
and the customary institutions for land management, it is important to comprehend the political and 
financial implications of the notion of lotissement, and thus the power struggle over these planned 
areas. As Yacouba Traoré explained to me, the notion of lotissement comes from the colonization period 
and designated a planned area for the indigenous people. The picture below (Figure 15) from the Swiss 
pilot Walter Mittleholzer shows the planned area for indigenous people or zone lotie in Ouagadougou in 
1930.  
           Figure 15: Aerial View of Ouagadougou in 1930. 
 




The population increase in the 1960s and 1970s opposed these planned areas to the unplanned areas, 
zone non-loties35. The zones non-loties were and are still considered as informal settlements but do not 
qualify as slums, as the quality of housing is very similar to the one in the zones loties, the formal 
settlements (République de Haute Volta, 1973: 31). Indeed, both have followed a traditional 
construction. In her PhD dissertation, Marie-Thérèse Manchotte gives a very detailed description of the 
housing structures and conditions in several informal neighborhoods in Ouagadougou in the beginning 
of the 1970s (Manchotte, 1974). She described in Baoghin, in the center of Ouagadougou, plots of 
informal settlements that go from 200 sq.m. (about 2,153 sq.f.) to over 600 sq.m. (about 6,459 sq.f.); if 
the majority of the plots are between 200 to 400 sq.m. (about 4,305 sq.f.), they remained very large 
housing areas with a very low density that can be explained by the housing form as described in her 
drawing in Figure 16 below (Manchotte, 1974: 60).          
Figure 16: Floorplan of an Informal Plot in the Center of Ouagadougou. Drawing by M-T. Manchotte (1974) 
 
Source: Machotte, 1974: 67. 
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 The much sprawled form of housing in the informal settlements was confirmed by another 
report from the SCET International36 for the Ministry of Construction, Transport and Urban Planning in 
1976. The following figure, Figure 17, shows the steps of construction of such informal plots in 
Ouagadougou.   
           Figure 17: Building Steps of the Informal Settlements in Ouagadougou. 
 
The zones loties represented 920 hectares (about 2,273 acres) in 1960 and 530 hectares (about 1,310 
acres) were added in the1960s and 510 more (about 1,260 acres) in the 1970s (SDAGO, 1990). In 1960 
there was almost no zone non-lotie in Ouagadougou, but between 1960 and 1970, the informal 
settlements grew by 1,400 hectares (about 3,460 acres) and reached 4,900 hectares (about 12,108 
acres) in 1980 (SDAGO, 1990). The informal settlements spread very rapidly with the same low density 
of the formal settlements. For a visitor today, it is impossible to tell what a zone lotie is and what is a 
zone non-lotie, yet residents can say if they live in a zone lotie or a zone non-lotie. If physically they are 
the same, there is a big difference between the two: the financial value.   
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was financed by the French Development Bank, then the World Bank and the European Fund for Development. SCET 



























Traoré Yakouba told me that residing in an unplanned area or zone non-lotie, a form of informal 
settlement, had become a common practice to access property. Indeed, the 1984 Revolution had 
guaranteed a planned plot of land for all families and, when a planning program was happening, the 
inhabitants of the concerned area were accounted for and given a plot of land, even in a different area if 
it was not possible locally. These plots had great monetary value as they came with a land title. The 
200,000 emergency plots from the Revolution have almost all been sold or rented by the owners who 
now live outside the city (Interview with Traoré Yakouba in Ouagadougou on November 15, 2012). This 
has created a phenomenon known as the “maison entrée-couché”, which literally means a house 
“entrance-lying”, in other words, it designates a small single-room home with an entrance and where 
one has only room to lie down.  These unfinished constructions are not occupied. They have been 
flourishing along the roads all around Ouagadougou. They allowed the “self-designated owner”37 of such 
house to be registered as a resident for the upcoming planning programs and access a lotissement. The 
land around the built Ouagadougou has become a large card game, where people positioned several 
maisons entrée-couché in order to maximize their chance of obtaining a plot in a planned area, or a 
lotissement. Figure 18 below shows the maisons entrée-couché along the road to Koubri.  
Figure 18: The Maisons Entrée-Couché on the Road to Koubri from Ouagadougou. 
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 This “self-designated owner” has usually paid a rent to the local chiefs to “secure” his/her investment.  
Photos by J.Touber, 2012 
House is registered: owner will be attributed 




The betting game relies on guessing which area will benefit first from a planning program and some 
people are of course more informed than others. The introduction of municipal elections in 1995 had a 
tremendous impact on the informal settlements. Indeed, mayors would consult informally the 
customary chiefs to evaluate the possibility of developing a planned area in a certain location. Once the 
word was out of the possibility of a planning project, people would buy at higher prices a piece of land 
from the local chiefs who in turn would ask later for some compensation for financial damages from the 
municipality turning the customary authorities into wealthy developers and cashing out twice (Interview 
with Traoré Yakouba in Ouagadougou on November 15, 2012). This game is quite uncertain because as 
long as the plot is not registered with its owner, the validity of the sale is very weak, relying on the 
customary system that has turned then into a developer’s role. Moreover, the process of land titling can 
be quite challenging, as I discuss next.    
  
 6.1.3. The Administrative Procedure for a Land Title  
 The key institution for the land title procedure is the Tax Department (Direction Générale des 
Impôts). I met with the very sharp director of the Department (Inspecteur des Impôts) Boukary 
Savadogo. It actually took me quite a long time to understand that this was the key place for a land 
titling application, as the administration has proven to be extremely complex in Ouagadougou. Boukary 
was very welcoming and recognized that the administration was quite complex and that most of the civil 
servants did not know about its organization and thus were not able to explain how the system works 
(Interview with Boukary Savadogo in Ouagadougou on November 16, 2012). He continued by saying that 
he did not know if there was a solution to this problem, but one thing was sure, it was made more and 
more complicated with the accumulation of rules and laws, especially with the latest law (2012) which I 
discuss in the next chapter. Hébié Sibiri was put in charge to show me the procedure. He brought me 




Figure 19: Pictures of the Commission d’Attribution des Parcelles where Land Titling Procedures are Done.  
      
 
An application for a land title is called a dossier du titre foncier, older applications are named dossier du 
livret foncier. There are 7 steps, and examples of all these documents are available in annex 5:  
Step 1: 
 
o Request for full property rights of a piece of land of the National Land Domain 
(Demande d’acquisition en plein propriété des terres du domaine foncier national) 
o Original of the Sale Contract if applicable    
(Attestation d’attribution de parcelle) 
 
Step  2 : o Seisin from the Cadastral Services for the boundary marking 
(Saisine du service du cadastre pour le bornage du terrain) 
 
Step 3 :  o Plan of the plot  
o Official report of the boundary marking 
o Copy of the land title if in zone lotie 




Step 4: o Registration (Bordereau analytique) 
 
Step 5:  o Official Report of the land value 
 
Step 6: o Official order of property sale (Arrêté de cession définitive) 
 
Step 7:  o Registration of the property sale 
 
Each of these documents has a cost attached to it (which can vary): fiscal stamps and the services of an 
expert such as a surveyor or a notary. These experts are in a very small number across the country, 
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but its legal status is now uncertain with the 2012 Law. I discuss this in the next chapter.  
 




making the procedure quite long as their agendas are completely full. Moreover, it is reasonable to 
consider that a large part of the population does not understand well enough the French language to 
follow this procedure. There are thus numerous obstacles to the completion of such applications. These 
obstacles were more or less addressed by the administration by putting in place the “guichet unique du 
foncier” (One Land Counter), an office in charge of assisting with the relations with the different 
administrations involved. Moussa Sawadogo from the Cadastral Department mentioned to me that the 
One Land Counter had improved the time necessary to process an application that was down to 35 days 
instead of several months (Interview with Moussa Sawadogo in Ouagadougou on November 7, 2012). 
While it has helped to speed up the procedure within the administration, it is still perceived as a 
complicated procedure that is difficult to access.   
Boukary Savadogo pointed out that the customary system was very organized and accessible, 
and was accepted as a just system; but the customary authorities have been losing their legitimacy as 
they participated more and more in the modern institutions (Interview with Boukary Savadogo in 
Ouagadougou on November 16, 2012). The next section analyzes the customary organization in three 
chiefdoms. I also discuss the administrative situations in these chiefdoms and critique them.      
 
6.2. The Chiefdom of Ziniaré in the Municipality of Ziniaré 
6.2.1. Presentation of Ziniaré and its Administration   
Ziniaré is a small town with an estimated population of 19,00039 in the heart of the Mossi 
Kingdom, in the administrative Region of Plateau Central. It is the urban center of the Province of 
Oubritenga, but it can be considered a rural environment. According to the Burkinabe Institute for 
Statistics and Demography, only 4.8% of the population had access to electricity in the region in 2007, 
and the literacy rate was 21.1% against 28.3% for Burkina Faso (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances 
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INSD, 2010:2-4). Oubritenga presents the highest rate of malnourished children in the region of Plateau 
Central with a rate of 3.6% (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances INSD, 2010:6). Ziniaré is located on 
the main road to Kaya and Dori in the north near the borders of Mali and Niger (Figure 21). This main 
road and two cross-roads are paved, but the rest of the roads in the urban center are dust paths (Figures 
20 and 23). Ziniaré is known to be the native town of the former Burkinabè President, Blaise Compaoré, 
and the charismatic former mayor of Ouagadougou, Simon Compaoré40, is a week-end resident of 
Ziniaré, giving to the town a certain closeness to the modern power.  
Figure 20: The Main Road of Ziniaré. 
           
 
Figure 21: Regional Bus Stop in Ziniaré.                                    Figure 22: Market of Ziniaré. 
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Figure 23: Unpaved Roads in Ziniaré. 
 
 
 Ziniaré is a typical African town41 that is quickly becoming a peri-urban area, creating massive 
social and market disruptions. Ziniaré is becoming a labor reserve of Ouagadougou, as part of the 
population --usually men-- work during the week in Ouagadougou and come back for the week-end to 
their family. As the native town of the President, the small town gets a lot of political attention. Party’s 
offices and major media companies’ buildings have been springing up. Moreover, the project of the new 
international airport in Loumbila, mid-way between Ouagadougou and Ziniaré, should increase the land 
pressure in Ziniaré and bring it even closer to the metropolitan area. It is a very good case study to test 
the resilience of the customary and modern institutions in light of this new situation (increased land 
pressure) characterized by the absence of a possible status quo and the necessity to adapt and question 
the land management system.       
 At Ziniaré’s City Hall, I was welcomed by the general secretary, Florence Sawadogo, who put me 
in the care of Félicitée Somé Kana, the woman in charge of the national land service (service domanial) 
to answer my questions regarding land management. In her small dusty office, she showed me the 
cadastral map that had been done by a surveyor from the cadastral services. The maps were only 
                                                          
41






















available in paper; actually the maps on the pictures below (Figure 25) were the only one she had 
(Interview with Florence Sawadogo and Félicitée Somé Kana in Ziniaré on November, 21, 2012).  
   Figure 24: Indication Board from the Main Road to the Ziniaré City Hall and Unpaved Road to the City Hall. 
      
 
Figure 25: The Cadastral Map of Ziniaré in the National Land Service.  
   
 
Regarding the planning documents, Félicitée told me that a comprehensive development plan was in the 
making at the Department of Urban Planning in the Ministry. As for the land titles, she had a list of land 
plots and the authorized person to use it/them for housing: registre des attributions des parcelles à 




Photos by Julie Touber, 2012 




Figure 26: List of Land Plots and their Registered Owners. 
      
 
When a sale occurs between two parties, they have to come to the city hall to check that the person 
selling the plot is indeed on the list; then the original sale contract is signed by the mayor and sent to 
the tax division in Ouagadougou. The registration of the property sale is finalized by the tax division and 
signed by the mayor after having filed all the criteria and documents described previously. Félicitée 
warned me that the procedure was very long and would usually take between 3 to 6 months. But to her 
there were no property rights in the end: “if people want a piece of paper they do a palaver report and 
otherwise the state is the land owner and will take the land when needed” (Interview with Félicitée 
Somé Kana in Ziniaré on November 21, 2012). I left her office a little puzzled as some information were 
not totally matching what I had learned in Ouagadougou regarding the competent authority to manage 
Ziniaré’s land (national vs. municipal) and the land titling process seemed much longer than described to 























6.2.2. The State of the Mossi Institutions  
If walking in Ziniaré City Hall and ask for a meeting was rather easy, the process had to be very 
different to access the Mossi institutions of Ziniaré. Former Prime Minister Tertius Zongo had arranged 
that I have a special access to the University of Ouagadougou during my field work in 2012 and 
Professor Kouliga Nikiéma from the Department of Political and Judicial Sciences (UFR Sciences 
Juridiques et Politiques) took me under his care. He arranged that I have easier access to information 
and the libraries of the University. He put me in touch with a lot of people; one of them was the Head of 
the Department of Economics (UFR en Sciences Economiques et Gestion), Professor Idrissa Ouedraogo 
who happened to be in a meeting with former Minister Jacques Guéda Ouedraogo when I met with him. 
The two economists, interested by my topic, thought that Ziniaré could be a very interesting case, but if 
they had great access to the customary institutions’ representatives there, they thought that they would 
not be the good entry point for me, because of different conflicts of interests, mostly personal. They 
asked the librarian of the Department of Economics, Francis Soudré, who lives in Ziniaré, to arrange a 
meeting for me with the Chief of Ziniaré. This is how I ended up under the care of Francis Soudré, the 
librarian of the Department of Economics at the University of Ouagadougou, who became my most 
precious guide in the customary institutions of the Ouagadougou’s region.  
At dawn on a Sunday morning, Francis and his brother-in-law, Edmond Tiendrebeogo, picked me 
up at my hotel in the center of the city to go meet with the Chief of Ziniaré. Edmond, besides his young 
age (around 20), was in charge of the protocol for our meeting. The 20 miles distance to the small town, 
in an old Peugeot van, represented about an hour and half drive, even though the road is quite straight, 
paved and flat, mainly because the road was shared between pedestrians, bicycles, donkeys, 
motorcycles, old over-loaded trucks and regional buses. The city of Ouagadougou is surrounded by tolls 
and going through the toll can be long as vendors maximize their potential sales in the waiting line of 




the chief who arranges things in Moré), Bruno Tiendrebeogo, who welcomed me in his home and 
introduced me to his family (Figure 27). After a presentation of my intentions toward the Chief of 
Ziniaré, the Malegrenaba, accompanied us to the local market to get some dolo, the local beer made 
from fermented millet, and kola nuts, a caffeine-containing nut that is traditionally chewed (Figure 28). 
An intense discussion started on how much we should get. The protocol requires that one presents 
him/herself with a present proportionated to what is asked to the chief and the financial means of the 
person. My case was a difficult one.   
Figure 27: In the Malegrenaba’s Home with his Family in Ziniaré. 
       
 
Figure 28: Fermentation of the Dolo and Kola Nuts on the far right picture. 
       
 
Armed with dolo and kola nuts for which I was just paying but had little to say, mostly because I was a 
woman I sensed, our team was on the way to meet with the Chief of Ziniaré in the warm Peugeot van as 



























































drove to the back of the building. I was told that it was because he was in the middle of a political 
meeting for the upcoming municipal elections and that the city hall site was at use for all candidates.  
 I was introduced to the Chief of Ziniaré, Roger Kaboré (Figure 29). As the protocol required, I 
could not talk to him directly, thus, although he spoke really good French, my questions were translated 
in Moré by Francis and Edmond and his responses translated back to me, making the exchange slow, 
pompous and difficult. I could feel that he was an important character and that my hosts were taking all 
precautions not to offend him. He explained that he was taking care mostly of the conflicts related to 
family matters and that since he was chief in 1993, there was only one conflict related to land that he 
had not been able to resolve and for which the parties had to go to court. For him, the role of the 
customary institutions was complementary to the one of the modern administration, and the urban 
plans from the 1984 Revolution had resolved a lot of land issues and thus were not, anymore, his 
responsibilities. He also mentioned that the customary institutions were involved in the land reforms 
and that it was a great help to maintain the important respect of land in the Mossi tradition. He added 
that urbanization was not creating a problem regarding land, but was creating a problem of 
unemployment. Our interview was cut short, and I was given the authorization to see the Chief of Land 
who could assist me further with my research.  





















It was obvious that the Chief of Ziniaré was highly involved politically and as the Chief of a town 
politically important had a lot of influence on modern and customary politics. As an influent political 
figure, he was also detached from the daily problems of the local population.   
This short interview highlighted three important points. The first and most important one is that 
he still considered that land was under the commons regime instigated by the 1984 Revolution, despite 
the reforms toward the introduction of private property rights in the 1990s. This idea, I found later on, is 
present in most people’s minds, because it is the only way to reconcile the customary nature of land 
with the modern state as it makes land an object of negotiation between politicians from the modern 
and customary authorities and thus does not involve the people. It is quite ironic, that the political 
regime that had been the most hostile to the customary institutions ended up being the one that gave 
the key to reconcile the customary institutions with the modern state in the form of the commons. The 
second point is that urbanization is viewed in terms of migration, which is very much in line with the 
Mossi tradition. Thus, urbanization is not viewed as a land problem, even though the increasing 
population pressures the land use patterns, but as an employment issue, because land is considered an 
agricultural tool. In other words, the increased density induced by urbanization creates unemployment 
because it consumes land for housing and changes the nature of land from an agricultural usage (a 
productive use) into a non-socially recognized usage (i.e. a non-productive use) that is housing or 
office/administrative buildings. The third point is that the Chiefdom of Ziniaré is an important and big 
chiefdom and thus that the Chief was not involved much in daily matters, but that from a protocol point 
of view I needed his approval to conduct my research in Ziniaré.  
 On a note related to the protocol, added to the dolo and kola nuts, some cash (from my wallet) 
was given to the Chiefs. For a meeting, the Chief of Ziniaré was given 10,000 CFA (about U.S. 20 dollars), 
the Chief of Land 5,000 CFA (about 10 U.S. dollars), the Kamnaba and the Tansoba were given 2,000 CFA 




Chiefs would turn to me to thank me. I was told that this was a common practice, so a meeting with a 
representative of the customary institutions was always charged at a rate that the person could afford, 
and the gifts were redistributed. On another note related to the protocol, according to the Mossi 
tradition, when in function, a chief has to be named by his function, and his name should never be 
pronounced. So Francis would whisper the names of the chiefs to me when we would be away from 
them.   
 As we did not meet the Chief of Ziniaré in his home, I asked that we drive to his home which is 
also the royal court of Ziniaré so I could see the physical representation of the Mossi power. The royal 
court is isolated in the country side quite far from the center of the city of Ziniaré. Behind the main gate, 
there is a court opened to everybody where the traditional hut sits for the ceremonies and other events, 
such as a conflict resolution. In this court, there is a traditional canopy, where the parties would convey 
during the meeting related to the resolution of a dispute (Figure 30).  
Figure 30: The Royal Court of Ziniaré: Main Gate on the left picture and the First Inside Court on the right 
                           picture. 
    
 
6.2.3. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
With the approval of the Chief of Ziniaré, we were then on the way to meet with the Tinsoaba, 
the Chief of Land of Ziniaré, Justin Zongo (Figure 31). He welcomed us in his home with his two 























and the Tansoba who is in charge of the defense (the order). I had two long interviews with him and his 
assistants. The first one focused mainly on the general practice of his function and the general state of 
things regarding the land situation, the second one focused on the mechanisms in place to resolve a 
conflict related to land.  
   
Every interview had the same set up: first Francis and Edmond would pick me up in 
Ouagadougou at my hotel, then we would drive to Ziniaré to the Malegrenaba’s home to pick him up, 
then with the Malegrenaba, we would go to the market to get some dolo and kola nuts, then we would 
go to the Tinsoaba’s home. Once we arrived to his home, we were welcomed. I was not allowed to 
address directly the chief. The Malegrenaba would introduce me, and then Francis would translate in 
Moré what I said and translate back the Chief’s responses. Eye contact was very rarely if not at all 
established with me and it was not possible for me to say if it was because of my foreigner or my 
woman’s status or even if it was a respectful posture. Before starting the formal interview, a bowl of 
dolo was passed to all the participants, including myself, to share a sip. Once the bowl had finished the 
tour of all participants, we could start the interview.  
The first time, the Tinsoaba told me that he dealt with about ten cases related to land in a year, 




































































































understanding of time and numbers, or if it was because, it is acknowledged by the community that 
these issues are not discussed. When I asked about an example of a conflict where his intervention was 
very important, he mentioned the case of the market. The market place, owned by the city, was 
previously located behind the church. But the city decided to make a garden out of this space and move 
the market. During one year, the youngsters were very opposed to the move of the market and the 
Chief even received death threats if the move was finalized. The city threatened in return to send the 
police to resolve the conflict which aggravated the situation as the police, I was told, had very little 
legitimacy in the community and, was not respected. I did notice that the police station was not in the 
center of the city but rather on the outskirts. The Chief of Land called for a big meeting and reminded 
the youngsters of the respect of the ancestors, the customary institutions and the repercussions of 
bringing shame onto the community. The final argument seemed to be the most important one. The 
intervention of the modern state institutions such as the police seemed to represent the worst situation 
that could have happened. To have the police intervening in the community’s matters, and related in 
the media, was perceived as a humiliation for the community. This argument seemed to be enough to 
allow the market to be moved peacefully. I also understood that a financial compensation to the 
youngsters was negotiated by the Chief of Land to facilitate the move.      
The major issue mentioned to me was that the state was grabbing land, thus that the customary 
authorities were losing their land and they felt powerless. When I asked if they had envisaged going to 
the administrative tribunal to fight these cases, everybody laughed. It was then explained that it was 
better to lose land with pride than to have to face the humiliation of the tribunal. For them, it seemed 
impossible to win a case as customary institutions’ representatives in the formalized state institutions 
such as the tribunal.  
During my second interview, the Tinsoaba had called a larger committee, his court, so he could 




plaintiffs to come and talk to me but this option was quickly dismissed in fear that it could revive the 
conflict.         
Figure 32: The Tinsoaba of Ziniaré on the right picture with the Kamnaba on his right and his Court in his Home.    
     
 
I asked for a detailed account of the steps to follow when a conflict occurs. The following steps were 
described to me by the Chief of Land, the Tinsoaba. It is important to notice that the Tinsoaba can 
resolve conflicts other than those related to land.  
 Step 1: When a plaintiff wants to reach out to the Tinsoaba to resolve a conflict, he will contact the First 
Representative (usually by going to his place) who will take the information to the Tinsoaba.   
Step 2: The Tinsoaba will summon the plaintiff first to hear him, then he will summon separately the 
defendant to hear him. If it is a small problem, they can come alone, if the problem is more important, 
they should present themselves with witnesses.  
Step 3: The Tinsoaba sets a date for the plaintiff and the defendant to present themselves in front of 
himself and his court to find a solution. This date has to be convenient for everybody. The Tinsoaba’s 
court is composed with the Kamnaba (in charge of the population’s information), the Tansoba (in charge 
of defense or security) and a jury of wise men.   
Step 4: The Tinsoaba and his court meet in the Tinsoaba’s home to hear the case and find a solution: 
 The plaintiff and defendant arrive and give some dolo and kola nuts or other gifts.  























 The Chief explains why everybody is there, what the problem is and that the goal of the 
meeting is to find a solution. His words are always repeated by an assistant so 
everybody can hear.  
 Each party explains their problem and position. Only the person concerned can address 
the court. No representation can be used. When I asked about the possibility of a 
representation, everybody laughed, it seemed to be completely incongruous for them 
not to explain in person your own problem. 
 After listening to both parties, the Tinsoaba makes a decision in regard to what was 
told to him.        
 The Tinsoaba addresses directly the person who is found guilty to be sure he 
understands why he is wrong, because everybody has to live together and no 
resentment should be held. For example, the Tinsoaba told me, if a man accuses 
another man of flirting with his wife because he goes to her shop often, but the wife is 
a vendor in this shop, the argument does not hold and no flirting will be recognized. 
The jealous husband has to recognize that he is wrong and accept it.   
If no solution can be found and the decision of the Tinsoaba is not accepted by the parties, they can 
bring their case to the Chief of Ziniaré following the same process. A conflict should be resolved at the 
smallest administrative level possible: the chief of family should resolve conflicts related to his family, 
the chief of neighborhood should resolve conflicts related to his neighborhood and so on. Every time a 
conflict is taken to a higher administrative level, it is considered a failure and brings shame on the entire 
community. The pressure to accept the decision of the chief is high as the person who does not accept it 
will carry the responsibility for the shame. 
Regarding the specificity of land cases, I asked about cases related to boundary’s disputes on a 




the French “nés-trouvés”), meaning that they were born knowing the land of their parents, grand-
parents and so on. But the Tinsoaba was very clear on the difference between a piece of land used for 
agriculture purposes and a piece of land used for housing. In fact, if the right to use a piece of land to 
grow food immediately will always be granted, the right to use a piece of land to live on will not 
automatically be granted. There is a process to follow. The new migrant will have to formally ask the 
Tinsoaba for a piece of land, and an inquiry regarding this person will be conducted. For example, if he 
has come to this new place because he was previously kicked out from another community because he 
is a thief, a warlock or a lover-boy, he will not be accepted in the new community. The new migrant will 
have to pass an interview with the Tinsoaba and his assistants regarding his origins, the reasons of his 
presence and his intentions in the community. If the person comes from a distant village and no inquiry 
is possible, a period of observation of the new migrant’s behavior is required, and no immediate 
decision will be made. The formal process to be granted a piece of land should follow the same steps as 
those described for a conflict resolution except that there is only one party present, the land-seeker. On 
his very modest house, the Tinsoaba has painted in big blue numbers his cell phone number thereby 
making himself available to all at any time.   
However, the Tinsoaba mentioned to me that now in Ziniaré all the land has been formally 
divided into plots by the government. According to the Chief of Land, this phenomenon had started in 
1954, but until 1999, the Chief of Land could officially still allocate pieces of land to land seekers. He 
added that because very few people hold a formal land title, people still rely on the services of the 
customary institutions to manage the land attribution. But in an effort to comply with the formal state 
administration, even when they make a decision, they consult with the city hall, and in return they are 
often called to participate in the decision making-process at the municipal level. He mentioned the 




light of the difficulties of carrying on the project, the customary institutions’ representatives were called 
to the City Hall to find a peaceful solution.  
I then wondered how they foresaw the future for their sons who were supposed to carry on the 
tradition after their death. I asked if they were teaching them all they should know, the way their fathers 
did, to be able to carry properly their function when the day comes. They responded that they were 
teaching them about the Mossi tradition, but that, for them, the most important thing was that they 
find a job, because the land was disappearing, agriculture was dying, and that used to be the only 
activity they knew. As we sat there, it seemed to me that I was witnessing the last generation of local 
chiefs, in a rural area, but so close to the city that in ten or twenty years, or even sooner, it would be 
absorbed by the metropolitan area, the “modernity”.                      
 
6.3. The Chiefdom of Taab Tinga and the Municipality of Bogodogo in Ouagadougou 
6.3.1. Presentation of Taab Tinga and its Administration 
 Taab Tinga used to be a small village, not far from Ouagadougou on the East side. It was 
progressively absorbed by Ouagadougou and is now part of the “arrondissement” of Bogodogo that 
counts six sectors (13, 14, 15, 28, 28, 30) and two villages (Balkuy and Yamtenga). The population of 
Bogodogo was estimated around 96,500 in 1985, 207,400 in 1996, 374,500 in 2006 and is projected to 
be over 1,2 million people in 2025 (Ministère de l’habitat et de l’urbanisme, 2010). Taab Tinga is part of 
Sector 28. It was never a planned zone, so it usually appears like an empty zone on maps and no data 
are available on this zone. The reality is that Taab Tinga’s density has increased progressively and 
resembles a slum today. The roads are unpaved and the village is difficult to access (Figure 33). There is 
no electricity, but a few water points have been built on the main dust paths, financed by the former 
Libyan leader Gaddafi, I was told (Figure 36). Children seemed to suffer from malnourishment and the 




Figure 33: Getting to Taab Tinga in Sector 28 of Ouagadougou.  
 
Figure 34: The Poor Sanitation Conditions in Taab Tinga. 
   
Figure 35: The Market of Taab Tinga after the Morning Activity on the left and Crops Processing on the Right.  
   
Figure 36: A Water Point on the Main Road to Taab Tinga and Transport of the Water in Taab Tinga. 
















































































Figure 37: The Children of Taab Tinga and the Textile Industry in Taab Tinga.  
 
 Taab Tinga is an interesting case because it is located within the city of Ouagadougou and yet 
has maintained the social structure of a village with its customary inheritance. The land pressure is 
certainly high and represents the advanced stage of what Ziniaré will eventually experience in a decade 
or two. The absorbed village changed into a slum and had maintained its customary institutions and it 
was very interesting for me to get a sense of the extent of the role of the customary authorities, and 
how they have adapted to the massive inflow of migrant population.    
 The City Hall of Bogodogo was a busy, unfriendly building. I had a very hard time finding 
someone who would be willing to talk to me as the municipal election campaign was in full-blown. It 
took many phone calls and knocks on doors to finally have an appointment. I met with Lassané Tapsoba, 
a municipal council member who had served three terms in a row (1995-2001; 2001-2006 and 2006-
2012) and was not running anymore. The old engineer was kind, sharp and passionate about his service 
to the community. He told me that the first municipal elections in 1995 had been a game changer in 
land management, especially regarding the lotissements situation as land fell into the responsibility of 
the municipalities. According to Lassané, before the Revolution the World Bank had financed the 
infrastructure development in the lottissements in Ouagadougou, but these investments had to come 























role of the municipal council members was thus to relay the population needs to the mayor who was to 
relay them to the Ministry for Planning, Decentralization and Security to push for a lotissement project.  
    When a lotissement project is decided for an area, it could take about one year of discussions 
to reach a decision, explained Lassané. These discussions are held in the form of a general assembly; the 
information related to such meeting is passed on through the customary and religious authorities, public 
criers at commuting time (between 8:30-9am and 6:30-7pm) and in markets.The goal is to inform the 
population about the positive and negative impacts of the project. The first step is to account for the 
people living in the project area; but because these projects are not financed anymore by the World 
Bank, each registered person has to pay 1,000 CFA (about 2 U.S. dollars) to have a registration number 
on their house. The second step is the launch of a bidding process for the making of the planning maps 
which need to be certified later by the Ministry for Housing and Urban Planning. The third step consists 
in installing the boundary bollards for each land plot; these two last steps are fully financed by the 
beneficiaries, the municipality is only a relay between the people and the central administration 
(Interview with Lassané Tapsoba in Ouagadougou on November 23, 2012).    
 When the population is accounted for in the context of a lotisssement project in the zones non-
loties, older men exclusively are registered, and in the villages the family chief and the 18 year old and 
older men are registered. It is their responsibility to distribute the plots later on. For the registered men 
who don’t live in the concerned neighborhood (maisons entrée-couché) they are counted as non-
residents and thus won’t be given priority. From Monday to Thursday, up to 150 land plots are 
distributed and on Friday, conflicts are addressed (Interview with Lassané Tapsoba in Ouagadougou on 
November 23, 2012).   
For the sector 28, where Taab Tinga is located, the Revolutionaries wanted to demolish the 
entire neighborhood to rebuild in a “more proper way”, said Lassané. But, Lassané added, it is not in the 




28-30, 53,000 people were counted for a lotissement program in 2003 (this number does not include the 
autochthones), and only 18,000 land plots were available. He wanted me to note that 40% of the people 
who own a land plot in Sector 28 (Taab Tinga) live somewhere else and rent their property (which is the 
case of my guide Francis). 
 Until 2011, there were commissions, inherited from the RAF, that were working together with 
the population to attribute the land plots. These commissions included the mayor, 2 municipal council 
members, 1 person from the cadastral service, 1 person from the tax department, 1 person from the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning and several representatives of the population, usually local 
customary chiefs. Every Friday they would meet and discuss land issues, including conflicts (Interview 
with Lassané Tapsoba in Ouagadougou on November 23, 2012). Lassamé seemed to think that they 
were quite effective and fair. These commissions were tagged by the MCC program as a legal problem in 
their land securization project. In April 2011, the commissions were dissolved and all lotissements 
projects have been suspended leaving a lot of people in expectancy. Lassamé told me there was a rumor 
about moving some people from Bogodogo in Koubri, that the construction firm BTM had invested in 
Koubri for this reason. Lassamé the engineer ended his fascinating exposé by telling me: “if only we 
were building higher… but it’s not African”.       
 
6.3.2. The State of the Mossi Institutions 
 The university librarian who had become my guide during part of my field work, Francis Soudré, 
had been, when he moved to Ouagadougou, confronted to the problem of finding a good and affordable 
housing solution. He had invested in Ziniaré but he needed housing for the week to avoid the very long 
and costly commute during the week between Ouagadougou and Ziniaré. He found just what he needed 
in Taab Tinga. So as he was getting more and more involved in my work, he thought that I should go see 




weekly pied-à-terre in the city. As his economic situation had changed, he had moved to another 
neighborhood, and his young brother took over his property in Taab Tinga. The Soudré had a good 
reputation in the “village” and Francis arranged a meeting with the Chief.  
 I met Francis at the University of Ouagadougou and we embarked in his old Peugeot van to Taab 
Tinga. The road to access the “village” was particularly bad and difficult so it took us a while to get in the 
heart of the “village” where the streets were becoming narrower in what seemed to be a labyrinth of 
one-story small houses with walls around them. We stopped to pick up the Chief of Protocol, Jean-
Baptiste Dakouré. As we were late, he did not offer that we come in and asked that we go directly to the 
meeting as everybody was waiting for us. It was in the middle of the week, in the middle of the day, and 
it was very hot. The market was deserted and we parked there. We started walking toward a canopy, 
where a lot of people were waiting in the relieving shade. As we walk toward the canopy, we passed the 
wall of the Royal Court of Taab Tinga (Figure 38). The entire court was waiting for us (Figure 39). The 
Chief of Protocol introduced me and someone was sent to get some dolo and kola nuts for everybody. I 
provided financially. Everybody was chatting; the Chief was not there yet. When the dolo and kola nuts 
arrived, the Chief of Taab Tinga, Naba Kiba, was informed that we could start and exited the Royal Court 
to join us under the canopy.  
Figure 38: The Royal Court of Taab Tinga. 
























When Naba Kiba arrived, silence took over. The dolo was poured in a bowl and the bowl toured the 
audience still in silence (Figure 40). Once everybody had taken a sip, the Chief of Protocol started to talk 
in Moré. I had no idea what was going on, and what was being said. When Francis made a sign that I 
should talk, I introduced myself, the purpose of my research and thanked them for taking the time for 
this. My words were translated by Francis. I asked about the chiefdom. Naba Kiba took over after his 
father seven years ago, but had been enthroned only in August 2012 because there were some technical 
issues related to his father’s status. Indeed, his father lost his wife just before being enthroned himself 
which prevented the ceremony happening as a death before this ceremony meant that it should not 
occur. He was thus forced to act as a Chief for nearly sixty years without being officially enthroned. The 
tomb of his father was pointed out to me, and I then realized that the sepulcher was standing right in 
the middle of the open space we had crossed, in front of the Royal Court’s wall.  
 
Figure 39: The Court of Taab Tinga under the Canopy in Front of the Royal Court of Taab Tinga, the Home of 
Naba Kiba. 

























Figure 40: Naba Kiba in the Silence While the Bowl of dolo Goes Around. The Tomb of his Father on the left of 
the picture.  
     
 
Regarding the population in the chiefdom, Naba Kiba explained that a large part of it today was not 
originally from Taab Tinga, but that they all went to him to ask for the right to use a piece of land, and 
he added that in the Mossi tradition, a piece of land cannot be refused if someone needs it. He admitted 
that, unfortunately, land was used to build a house and not to cultivate, because people who worked in 
the city needed a place to live. Thus now there was no more available land. In return, Naba Kiba asked 
for a financial compensation. When I asked about the challenge of providing infrastructure and services 
when the density is increasing to these levels, Naba Kiba told me that they had turned to the elected 
municipal council of Bogodogo for these issues, especially for water. He added that even some chiefs 
were elected municipal councilors so they were very aware of the problems faced in the “village”. I thus 
asked if, in his opinion, it was compatible to be a chief and a mayor or elected councilor. Everybody 
laughed. Naba Kiba said that for him, it was not compatible, and that he has never and will never be 
involved in politics, but that some chiefs would become mayors or even members of Parliament.  
 Following the same interview framework that I used with the Chief of Ziniaré, I wanted to know 
if they had been involved in the different land reforms that the Government of Burkina Faso had 
conducted, the most recent one being dated from 2012. Naba Kiba said that they heard about the 























he will raise with the King, the Mogho Naba. The question for him regarding land reform was to 
understand if the reform was adapting a traditional practice or if it was all new practices. In his view, 
practices should be continuous within the Mossi tradition and should not represent a societal break.  
 I was then told that the Chief of Land could not join us because he was very old and could not 
move much. I knew then that in the audience present that day, in the court, the next Chief of Land was 
present, and that he was certainly already taking care of land issues in the community. But the Mossi 
tradition imposed that the name of the next chief is not exposed, or pronounced aloud, especially to a 
foreigner. It was thus impossible for me to know who was in charge of the current land issues, but Naba 
Kiba offered to respond to all my questions regarding land issues, after I greeted the Chief of Land in his 
home.  
 Still accompanied by the Chief of Protocol and Francis, we went to visit the Chief of Land who 
was expecting us (Figure 41). The old man was under a tree and a small canopy, listening to the radio. 
His daughter and grand-children were around him, providing care and attention. When we arrived, he 
asked to be “dressed up”: his shoes were put back on and his chief’s stick was handled to him. He could 
not stand, and had obviously lost his sight. I was introduced to him. He apologized for not being able to 
take care of me and respond to my inquiries. I noticed the presence of traditional graves all around the 
site, in the middle of the built environment. The dead were truly around, present among the living, 
ready to call back to the land the offenders.  
         Figure 41: The Chief of Land of Taab Tinga, the Chief of Protocol and Francis. Tombs in Taab Tiga on the  
                            right picture.  






















 We then drove the Chief of Protocol back to his home, where we were introduced to his family. 
His daughter, like most women I saw in Taab Tinga, was working on the traditional Burkinabè weaving 
looms, despite the fact that it was the hottest hour in the day and that most people were napping in the 
shade. The grave of the parents of the Chief of Protocol was adjacent to his home (Figure 42).  
Figure 42: At the Chief of Protocol’s Home in Taab Tinga. The Grave of his Parents on the Right Picture. 
    
 
On a note related to the protocol, following the same patterns than in Ziniaré, I provided 
financially for the dolo and kola nuts but an assistant would buy them so we didn’t have to go to the 
market, where I am not sure my security could be insured. Compensation in cash was submitted on the 
same model than in Ziniaré, but the rates were much lower: 5,000 CFA (about 10 U.S. dollars) for Naba 
Kiba, 2,000 CFA (about 4 U.S. dollars) for the Chief of Protocol and the Chief of Land.   
 
6.3.3. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
  Naba Kiba told me that he and his court were often involved in resolving tensions and conflicts 
in the community. But as in Ziniaré, it was quite impossible to get a sense of the volume of conflicts that 
they experienced; the responses would change all the time, and as in Ziniaré, I could not say if it was 
because of a different relationship to the notion of time and numbers or a taboo regarding the notion of 
conflict within the community. Naba Kiba mentioned an on-going conflict in the community that he and 
























the growing Wahhabi movement within the neighborhood with what he called the “simple Muslims”, 
the traditional Sufi Muslims. Conflicts regarding how Islam should be practiced, and how family matters 
should be resolved, are brought to Naba Kiba more and more. It is interesting to note that Naba Kiba in 
this situation, in his Chief status, is not associated with a religion, and that the customary institutions are 
seen as more legitimate and more powerful that the religious institutions for now at least. Naba Kiba 
may be Muslim or Christian, I could not say. But according to the first names of the people from his 
court, it seemed that a majority was Christian, which does not necessarily mean that their children are 
Christians (Figure 43).   
Figure 43: Naba Kiba and his Court in Taab Tinga, Ouagadougou. From Right to Left: François Dakouré, El Adj 
Dakouré Lassané, Jean-Baptiste Dakouré, Jean-Baptiste Dakouré, Emile Dakouré, André Dakouré, Paul Dakouré, 
Hamadou Dakouré, Abel Dakouré, Joseph Dakouré, François Dakouré, Saidou Dakouré, Antoine Dakouré, 
Prosper Dakouré, André Dakouré, Jean-Baptiste Dakouré, Léopold Dakouré, Hervé Dakouré, Jean-Baptiste 
Dakouré. 
    
 
                                      
When I met a second time with Naba Kiba and his court, they had called two brothers to the 
meeting who were involved in a conflict that was resolved by Naba Kiba. The youngest brother’s wife 
had passed away, and the community was informed of the sad news; but somebody in the community 























words, a fight started. In the next days the tensions would not ease, so, after the funeral, the brothers 
came to see the Chief to pose their complaint. They came to Naba Kiba’s court without appointment and 
accompanied with the other party, who had insulted the deceased. Naba Kiba mentioned that usually 
the defendants would come without difficulties otherwise the Chief would convoke them and if they 
refuse again, their family would be called. Because the two parties were part of the original community, 
it was not a problem for all of them to enter the court of Naba Kiba, which I could never do42 and this is 
also why we were meeting outside the court of his home. The plaintiffs, the two brothers, had brought 
kola nuts and dolo to the chief and explained their problem. The defendant watched the offering and 
listened. When his turn came, he was allowed to respond to the accusation and Naba Kiba asked him 
some questions. Naba Kiba, assisted by his court made a decision.  
If the conflict is not seen as major, only a short version of the court is called, that is usually 
comprised of the same people, few older uncles of Naba Kiba, who he calls “dads”, Paul Dakouré is one 
of them. If the conflict is considered a major one, then the entire court has to be called. In the case of 
the two brothers and the insult on the deceased wife, Naba Kiba asked that the defendant apologize and 
asked for forgiveness. The two parties had to say if they were satisfied with the Chief’s decision and that 
they understood the decision. Naba Kiba usually asks them to come back few days later to check that 
they still accept the decision and are at peace with the matter. He asks that they come back together so 
that he can trust that the reconciliation process is maturing. For this specific case, of the two brothers, 
Naba Kiba called  his three older uncles right away so the matter could be put at peace in a timely 
manner, as he thought that it was important to bury the grief as soon as possible.   
 Naba Kiba mentioned that in older days, he had much less conflict and that with the population 
growing, more problems were arising. Moreover, religious problems did not exist before and they had 
become more important and violent. He also noted that conflicts related to thefts were usually dealt 
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with by the police. The customary institutions dealt more with conflicts affiliated to family matters and 
land issues. For the conflicts regarding land and the more intense utilization of the plots, Naba Kiba told 
me that the “migrant” usually finds an agreement with the “host” or landlord, and if there is a problem 
they can’t resolve, then they come to see the Chief. As the landlords are from the original community, 
conflicts related to land are usually dealt with internally though the customary institutions. The conflicts 
related to land follow the same patterns as the one described for the case of the two brothers. But as a 
land conflict these days will very often involve a person from outside of the community, the judgments 
happen outside the Chief’s court, where we were actually meeting. It would happen very early in the 
morning or very late at night. The protocol requires that Naba Kiba sits next to his court’s wall with an 
assistant on his left. The court would sit in front of the Chief, at midway between the Chief and the 
parties. The parties would be under the canopy where we were meeting. The Chief talks to his assistant 
and his assistant proclaims what the Chief has said (Figure 44).   
Figure 44: Configuration of a Customary Judgment in Taab Tinga. 




























 When I asked about the future and how they foresaw the role of the customary institutions for 
the next generation, Naba Kiba said that some children were interested in perpetuating the tradition, 
while others were not. If twenty years ago there was absolute respect for the customs and tradition, it 
was not the case anymore. For Naba Kiba, this resulted more from the rise of religions than the modern 
state. His local battle seemed to promote tradition as a factor of peace as opposed to the religious 
divisions, the development of a certain Islam being specifically targeted. As the Chief should not tell his 
religion, for Naba Kiba it was counter-nature to be involved in politics, because a political engagement 
meant to uncover his name and build an identity in which religion may be an important factor. He 
admitted that some chiefs would do so. For him, staying as far as possible from politics was the only 
mean to guarantee the peaceful nature of the chiefdom.    
 
6.4. The Chiefdom of Koubri and the Municipality of Koubri 
6.4.1. Presentation of Koubri and its Administration 
Koubri is a rural “department” in the Southern outskirt of Ouagadougou. It is part of the 
administrative “Grand Ouaga”, the Region Center. Koubri has 17 villages and is located on the road to 
Kombissiri (Figure 45). It is also in the administrative region of South-Center, where Kombissiri is the 
urban center of the Province of Bazèga. According to the Burkinabe Institute for Statistics and 
Demography, only 2.1% of the population in the region had access to electricity in 2007 and the literacy 
rate was 15.9%, which represented an improvement from the 2003 rate of 8.6% (Ministère de 
l’Economie et des Finances INSD, 2011: 2). On the road to Koubri was an abandoned toll booth of the 
City of Ouagadougou as the new toll had been pushed back far behind the indication board that we had 
entered Koubri. The village for this research is Guiguemtenga located in Koubri, but before the current 





Figure 45: Along the Main Road in Koubri.  
    
Guiguemtenga, and the South of Ouagadougou in general, are less dry than Ziniaré. The 
vegetation is more important and traces of water bodies following the rain are very visible. These dry 
water bodies are considered with reason to be extremely dangerous. Indeed when it rains, 
Guiguemtenga is cut by a violent water body for a few hours, and I was told that every time someone is 
swallowed by the waters (Figure 46). Guiguemtenga starts at the main paved road to Kombissiri and 
goes into the bush with only dusty paths. It is still agriculture land, and offers a very rural environment 
quite close from the city (Figure 46).     
Figure 46: The Rural Environment of Guiguemtenga. 














































Figure 46 (continuation): The Rural Environment of Guiguemtenga. 
   
   
It was actually very surprising to find such rural environment at only two kilometers (1.2 miles) 
from the neighborhood known as Ouaga 2000, which is the wealthiest and more modern part of 
Ouagadougou, and where the presidential palace had been re-located recently. The more hospitable 
climate and vegetation as well as the proximity with the nicest parts of the city make of Guiguemtenga a 
very attractive place for construction. Thus the increasing land pressure in this very rural population 
presents an interesting case.   
 Moreover, Koubri has been at the center of the media attention with the judicial setbacks of its 
mayor. On April 10, 2010, the municipality of Koubri took an official order of property sale of 475 
hectares (1,174 acres) of land in Guiguemtenga (Arrêté n°2009-E- - 007/MATD/PKAD/CRKBR). The land 
was sold to the private construction firm BTM (Bâtiments-Travaux Publics – Maintenance), which was 
supposed to build within 5 years a lotissement on this land. On September 1, 2010, a violent rain 
provoked a massive flooding in Koubri, and the customary chief of Guiguimtenga offered some land for 
people who had suffered damages from the flood43. In December 2010, people, who had settled on the 
land offered by the customary authorities, were counted for to be included in the lotissement project as 
                                                          
43
 Extrait des minutes du greffe du tribunal administrative de Ouagadougou – Audience publique du 21 février 2012 au Tribunal 
























they were settling on the land concerned by the upcoming BTM project44. This came as a great surprise 
to the customary authorities who launched a legal procedure with the Administrative Tribunal of 
Ouagadougou. The Mayor of Koubri had been convicted and was in jail when I conducted my field work 
in November 2012, but the legal matter was not closed as he still had the right to appeal the decision. 
Giving this situation and because I had access to the plaintiff’s lawyer, I decided, following Me Oumarou 
Ouedraogo’s advice that I would not go to the City Hall of Koubri.         
 
6.4.2. The State of the Mossi Institutions 
 The case of Koubri came as an interesting case study and was introduced to me by a different 
source than for Ziniaré and Taab Tinga. Professor Kouliga Nikiéma from the University of Ouagadougou 
recommended that I meet with Oumarou Ouedraogo, who is an attorney specializing in land rights and 
real estate, and who teaches at the University of Ouagadougou in the Department of Political and 
Judicial Sciences (UFR Sciences Juridiques et Politiques). Oumarou Ouedraogo welcomed me many times 
in his practice, despite his very busy schedule, and spent a lot of time with me discussing the land issues 
in Burkina Faso. When I explained my research, he thought that I should meet with Benjamin Compaoré 
from Koubri. Benjamin Compaoré is one of the sons of the Chief of Guiguemtenga in Koubri. He is also a 
municipal councilor of Koubri’s town and a client of Oumarou Ouedraogo. Benjamin came to see the 
lawyer because the land of his father’s chiefdom had been sold illegally by the mayor of Koubri to a 
developer. But Oumarou preferred that I see Benjamin, as it was an on-going case, and he first wanted 
to be sure that his client felt comfortable talking to me.  
 Thus I called Benjamin to set up a meeting and told him that I was interested in meeting his 
father as well to get his point of view. I did not know much about the situation at this point. As the 
communication via telephone was difficult despite the three cell phone numbers that I had for 
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Benjamin, I was not really sure how the meeting would go, and I did not have a precise meeting point. 
When I got to Koubri, I called Benjamin but was not able to reach him. I waited with my driver François 
in a “maquis”, a very small local restaurant on the side of the main road in Koubri where I could follow 
the steps of the making of the unique lunch menu and witness the mid-day activities of a small town and 
the passage of the regional buses to the South. After an hour, I heard back from Benjamin who said he 
would join me, but he did not tell me he was far away and it took him another good hour to find me. I 
finally met Benjamin. He seemed to have had a long day already and was overwhelmed by his schedule. 
He explained to me that one of his brothers had had a motorcycle accident and was in the hospital in 
Ouagadougou, and so was his father. Benjamin’s politeness had prevented him from postponing a 
meeting that he could not honor and we decided then it was better to meet on a different day when 
things were going better, and when his brother’s health was better.   
 Luckily, the injured Chief’s son got better quickly, and a week later I heard back from Benjamin 
and we set up another meeting. This time, the meeting point was a little bit more precise in the sense 
that I had to stop in Guiguemtenga, before Koubri and before the city toll. It was much closer to the city 
than what I had imagined. We waited in the shade with François, and a motorcyclist came to us and 
asked that we followed him. I did not know this man, but the cell phone coverage was very poor and it 
was difficult to reach Benjamin. We followed the motorcycle in the bush and eventually found Benjamin 
at the barber shop who then got in the car with us (Figure 47). We started driving far into the bush on a 
dust path. The road was not good and François was getting worried that his car was falling apart; I had 
stopped counting the number of times we had to go to a repair shop, to fix the clutch among other 
things, as we almost did not make it back from Koubri the previous week. We crossed a bridge made of 
soil that was taken away by the violent water body every time it rained. Benjamin told us that the village 
was cut in half for a few hours every time it rained. The landscape was much more hospitable than 




shops and kept driving into the bush far from the main paved road that we had left behind long ago. The 
distances were not long, but the road conditions were really bad. We finally reached a farm, a small 
settlement where the entire Chief’s family was living (Figure 48).  
            Figure 47: Meeting Benjamin Compaoré in Guiguemtenga. 
 
Figure 48: The Chief of Guiguemtenga’s Settlement in Koubri.  
   
 When we arrived in the settlement, we were welcomed by another brother. The young man 
seemed very sharp and excited to see a foreigner. I later on learned that he was most likely the one who 
would take over the chiefdom when his dad passed. This chiefdom seemed to be much smaller than the 
one in Ziniaré and the one in Taab Tinga. I was told that there were no neighborhoods here, only one 
village, from the paved road to here, and that it was part of the Kingdom of Koubri. I could not say if it 
was because of the size of the chiefdom or because my entry point was different than for the previous 
chiefdoms, but the protocol did not seem as strict. I felt more like a guest than someone who had 









































asked to Benjamin earlier about it, he ignored my question. It was also the first time that a Chief would 
make eye contact with me. It was just the four of us, outside the court of course, under the canopy, in 
the very warm weather. The younger brother was translating the questions and the responses. He spoke 
really good French, Benjamin was not always very articulate, and the father, the Chief, spoke only Moré 
(Figure 49).   
         
 The Chief of Guiguemtenga told me that he and his ministers usually dealt with all the land 
issues. The town of Koubri was not involved in land issues. If someone needed a piece of land, he would 
have to come see him and ask. Only when this person would get the approval from the Chief, could he 
look for a piece of land, and would have to respect the oral rules of the Chiefdom. From his experience 
the recent evolution of the relation between the land and the people, was that some people would 
receive a property title and then could sell the land to someone from the outside of the chiefdom 
without the chiefdom’s approval. For him, property titles were not so much a problem, on the contrary, 
maybe it was fairer as it allowed some redistribution that may have been overlooked by the chiefdom, 
but it was the responsibility of each person from the chiefdom not to sell to someone from the outside. 
He seemed very clear on the idea that once the land of the chiefdom was divided into plots with 




















Figure 49: Benjamin Compaoré 
and his Brother on the left 
picture, and their Father, the 





plot as part of the chiefdom, the chiefdom would disappear. And this for him will inevitably happen one 
day.  
 When I asked about the future of the customary institutions in light of this problem, the Chief of 
Guiguemtenga told me that he was meeting with other chiefs in the region to raise the issue, but would 
not tell me more about what was discussed and considered. He also mentioned that he had ties with the 
Kansonaba in Ouagadougou who was very concerned with the future of the Chiefdoms. I thus asked him 
if getting involved in politics could be an option to perpetuate the customary institutions weaving them 
into the modern one. His answer surprised me and I am not sure I understood completely what he 
meant, but did not succeed in obtaining a clearer answer. For him, chiefs could get involved in politics, 
but not all, it was depending of the status of the chief. For example, if a chief was “given” by the Mogho 
Naba, then this chief should not get involved in politics, and that was his case. If the chief was “given” by 
the village, then the chief could get involved in politics.           
 
6.4.3. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
When asked specifically about land conflicts, the Chief of Guiguemtenga told me that he usually was 
consulted twice a month to respond to land matters, often regarding field boundaries and crops. When 
a land conflict occurred, the plaintiff would come to the Chief with the defendant. Then the Chief would 
give an appointment and on the day of the appointment both parties would present themselves with 
witnesses: the ministers, about 10 people close to the Chief, would be present for the judgment. The 
plaintiff would explain his problem and then the defendant would have a chance to respond. As seen in 
the previous cases, the chief would sit near the hut in the wall against this same wall, with an assistant 
proclaiming his words, the parties would be under the canopy, and midway between them and the 
Chief, the ministers would sit in front of the Chief, turning their backs from the parties (Figure 50). Once 




accepts the decision for the sake of a continuous harmony in the community. The Chief stressed that 
even if someone loses land, the legitimacy and honor of this person should not be tarnished.       
Figure 50: Configuration of a Customary Judgment in Guiguemtenga. 
   
 For each chiefdom I was given the exact same step by step process and that these mechanisms 
were presented as efficient and did not seem to pose any problems. They also seemed to be used 
especially in Taab Tinga and Koubri. But the case of Guiguemtenga in Koubri presented the limit of the 
system: what to do when one party is an outsider who will not play the game. The Chief of 
Guiguemtenga, Benjamin and his brother were eager to talk about the case that they had taken against 
the developer named BTM. They started by saying that if BTM had taken 4 to 5 hectares it would not 
have been a problem, they would have allowed it, but BTM was taking 475 hectares which threatened 
the future of the entire community. They were not informed of the project, but started asking questions 
when the bulldozers and construction materials appeared in their fields. Benjamin, who was the most 
linked to the city hall as a councilor, figured out that BTM had a property title for their land, which was 
not possible as they had never been consulted. The only solution they then could see was to take the 
case into the modern institutions’ system. A customary chiefdom thus became a plaintiff party against 
the mayor of Koubri who had sold a fake property title to a developer. The mayor of Koubri, when I was 
conducting this field work, was in jail. The case got quite a lot of media coverage (locally through 


























political chiefdom choose to take on the solution of the tribunal in this case. It highlights the ambiguity 
of the institutional dualism --customary and modern-- in the context of high land pressure.        
 
6.5. Summary and Conclusion 
 First, I was surprised by the extremely fixed organization of the customary institutions. The 
three cases expose a highly detailed and developed institutional setting. Second, if I expected to find the 
customary institutions structure in the surroundings of Ouagadougou, I was quite surprised by the 
Chiefdom of Taab Tinga and its active role in this neighborhood, sector 28 of Ouagadougou. Indeed, it 
seems that the Chiefdom of Taab Tinga represents a very interesting case in the sense that when the 
state --the “modern” institutions-- fails to provide a structure, the customary institutions are very much 
alive. I was also surprised to see that in Ziniaré, where I would have expected an active chiefdom, the 
chiefdom has evolved into the modern institutions through politics, and thus its functioning is certainly 
close to a potential future of the customary institutions and their absorption into modern politics. On 
another hand, the Chiefdom of Koubri exposes the recent evolution of the customary institutions 
confronted to urbanization, a pattern that I thought I would see more frequently. But the Chiefdom of 
Koubri has also a very interesting twist, as it chose to fight back using the modern institutions’ 
mechanisms.  
The three chiefdoms chosen for this dissertation have three different sizes, and one can wonder 
if the size of the chiefdom has an impact on their political involvement. Interestingly when the chiefdom 
is politically active, it seems to be less involved in the management of daily matters, especially land 
issues. The “traditional mode” of land management presented seems to be quite obsolete or limited to 
few families in Ziniaré where the Chief is very active politically. On the contrary, in Taab Tinga, the 
Chiefdom, that is not politically active, seems to be very efficient in managing the land patterns and 




margins of a modern institutions’ structure: a non-planned neighborhood of Ouagadougou for Taab 
Tinga and the disputed boundaries of South Ouagadougou and Koubri for Guiguemtenga. The following 
table, Table 5, summarizes the situation of the three cases presented in this chapter.        
Table 5: Summary of the Three Chiefdoms and the Functioning of the Customary Institutions. 
















Rural to peri-urban  
environment  
 
Land pressure from the 




Plots are officially 
divided (land registered 
under the modern 
administration system) 
 
LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL CHIEFDOM 
 
 Chief of Ziniaré 
 The Malegrenaba   
(Chief of Protocol) 
 The Tinsoaba  
(Chief of Land) 
 
His assistants: 
 The Kamnaba  
(in charge of the 
population 
information/data/history) 
 The Tansoba 
 (in charge of order) 
 
Chief involved in politics 
 
The Chiefdom seems very 
involved in local politics. 
 
The customary institutions 
manage general major 
conflicts in coordination 




















Land pressure from the 





parcelled out zone, 
plots are not officially 
divided by the state) 
 
 
MEDIUM SIZE CHIEFDOM 
 
 Chief of Taab Tinga,  
(Naba Kiba) 
 The Malegrenaba   
(Chief of Protocol) 
 The Court 
 
 
Chief not involved in 
politics 
 
The Chiefdom seems very 
active and offers a 
structure in an 
environment that has been 































Land pressure from the 
attractive  natural 
environment very close to 









 Chief of Guiguemtenga 
 His sons 
 His Ministers 
 
 
Chief not involved in 
politics 
 
The Chiefdom seems to 
operate on a “traditional” 
mode but is caught by the 
increasing value of its land, 
forcing the chiefdom to 
claim its land rights in the 
“modern” institutions 
system. 
Source: Julie Touber, 2013 
The description in great details of the customary institutions’ functioning is an essential step in 
process-tracing and demonstrates the high level of organization of its law and order structure which is a 




what is often a black box named “informal institutions”, I find that the high level of formalization of 
these institutions has not only to be considered as such --highly formalized-- but also be considered in 
their relationship with the modern institutions, the formal institutions. While there is a distinction for 
the Burkinabe population between the modern state and the customary or traditional institutions, these 
two institutional sets are not perceived as formal and informal by the same population. This latter 
distinction appears to really be an economic one from a modern state point of view and a problem in 
regard to its loss in financial resources from taxes and control of economic flows. This issue is an issue 
for the state solely, as most of the population found their social safety net in the traditional or 
customary setting.    
Following the framework I proposed in Figure 1 (p24) exposing the use of theory-building 
process-tracing to understand the under-development of Africa, I find that the institutional mechanisms 
involved in managing land are rather strong for the customary institutions when concerned with local 
matters while the modern institutions are rather weak with the exception of unusual cases or cases 
outside the traditional setting. Indeed, the case of the Chiefdom of Koubri (Guiguemtenga) shows the 
cross boundaries (institutional and organizational) value of the modern setting: the conflict opposing the 
Chief of Guiguemtenga with the Mayor of Koubri who induced a real-estate maneuver on the land of 
Guigremtenga can only be settled by the modern institutions as it falls outside the traditional setting.  
I also find that the prevalence of informality does not equate to a low level of secured property 
rights for the local population. However, this security is valid only for the original population. This is 
really the core of the problem: the politically built dichotomy between the modern and customary 
institutions is so deeply rooted that it still favors a static model favoring the non-migrating population, 
i.e. the population considered as original to the land in question which is a false interpretation of the 
Mossi history as I discussed earlier. The case of the Chiefdom of Taab Tinga is particularly interesting in 




Chiefdom in extraordinary conditions and in the total absence of the modern institutions; in this 
context, the rights for the migrants in this community are solely dependent on their relationship with 
the Chiefdom and its interpretation of hosting.   
Finally, I find that the modern institutions may guarantee secured land rights in certain context 
but does not guarantee to be free from the Chiefdom that seems to prevail in any condition. The case of 
the Chiefdom of Ziniaré brings a good example of a municipality that has managed to a have a land 
policy and cadastral maps but for which the Chiefdom has kept a powerful presence. Interestingly 
enough, the Chief of Ziniaré is also involved in politics but it is difficult to know if he got involved 
because the modern institutions may have been stronger in this town from its administrative position 
(capital city of the Oubritenga Province) and gain even more power in the decentralization context. In 
this context, getting involved in local politics may have been a survival strategy from the Chief of Ziniaré.  
The customary institutions are a fundamental instrument in managing land and are informal 
only from the modern state point of view and from a modern economic point of view. While the 
dichotomy between the customary and modern institutions is lived and understood as such by the 
population, this dichotomy has been politically shaped from both the modern and customary 
institutions to serve different agendas. Both institutional sets keep reinventing their relationship to fulfill 
their needs. In the next chapter, I analyze the functioning of the modern institutions and their 











THE MODERN INSTITUTIONS: 
PRINCIPLES, INFLUENCES AND PRACTICES 
 
“If you want to dance to the Osaka drum, dance to it; if you want to dance to the Osoko drum, dance to 
it; to dance to both drums at the same time does not benefit a human person.” 
Yoruba proverb (Benin and Nigeria)  
 
 
This chapter presents the historical foundations of the modern legal framework involved in land 
management and conflict resolution in Burkina Faso, the influences that have shaped this legal 
framework and at last the state of its practice. In the previous chapters, I described the historical roots 
and structures of the customary institutions (the Mossi Kingdoms) and developed the absence of the 
notion of private property ownership of land in the African culture and in this specific case of Burkina 
Faso while the foundation of the modern economic thought is based on a legal definition of property 
rights. The context of colonization has thus created a unique cultural and institutional puzzle where the 
philosophical foundations of two systems are fundamentally different and yet function at the same time 
in the same place. Moreover, one should keep in mind that the evolution of the Mossi institutions in 
their definition of customary is the result of inside power struggles for survival and power opportunities 
as well as outside struggles from the colonial administration for purpose of control.   
The notion of justice is a key element in any institutional structure that informs us on the 
working state of this institutional structure.  In this chapter, I look at the spirit of the law and the forms 
chosen to apply it from the modern state point of view. I will develop the economic and legal principles 
and concepts inherited from the outside influence: the Civil Code from the French colonization, the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology in the 1984 Law, and the obligations and trade-offs tied to the financial aid by 




Then I will present the two major recent reforms related to land that happened in 2009 and 
2012. These two laws represent a turning point in the development aid in West Africa and thus on its 
modern institutions. Indeed, if the French have kept a high degree of influence in West Africa though 
their diplomacy and the French Development Agency, 2009 marks the end of an era. It also marks the 
entry of another major international player: the United States of America. Finally the last part of this 
chapter takes a rare look at whether people have been using the modern institutions framework to 
resolve dispute by analyzing a rare and unique set of data that I collected at the Tribunals de Grande 
Instance of Ouagadougou and Ziniaré. This final analysis triangulates trends that I have described earlier 
in this dissertation.  
 
I choose to open this chapter with a cyclical interpretation of the institutions involved in land 
management from the 16th century to 2014, a figurative representation of the dynamics between the 
modern and customary institutions that this dissertation demonstrates. The goal of the following 
figurative representation is to give a comprehensive analytical support to the investigation that I have 
conducted. This final chapter reveals the complex links of the modern institutions with the local and 
international political economy contexts.    
The following figure (figure 51) is a representation of the strengths of institutions at stake in the 
management of land in Burkina Faso from 16th century to 2014. The pink curve shows the authentic 
Mossi institutions, discussed in chapter 4, and their rise as a state-building process was shaping up. The 
fall of the Mhogo Naba in 1896-97 marked the end of these authentic Mossi institutions and, a few years 
later, the beginning of the colonial Mossi institutions or customary institutions (purple curve). If the 
customary institutions were weak in the beginning, they kept growing in strength with the 
establishment of the indirect rule to such an extent that in the end of the 1970s they were irritating the 







Figure 51: Representations of the Institutions at Stake in Burkina Faso and their Strength from the 16
th
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customary institutions. These customary institutions rise again with the acknowledgement of their 
efficient role in land management in the 1996 and 2009 laws. But the 2012 Law put an end to their 
resurgence that occurred in the 1990s and 2000s.  
The blue line represents the French colonial institutions or modern institutions. When the 
French colonial empire extended to today’s Burkina Faso at the end of the 19th century, it relied on very 
strong institutions that were also accompanied by a military endeavor. The French colonial empire was 
then a super power in terms of its institutional influence (diplomatic and cultural) and its army. It is 
important to note that a strong army can only prevail if strong institutions are backing it up, not only 
diplomatically but also logistically. World War I marked the beginning of the decline of the European 
colonial empires as the human (and financial) toll of the European conflict was enormous. It was 
followed --10 to 15 years later-- by a direct impact on the colonies as the management of land had to 
rely more and more on the local population because of the lack of European manpower. The indirect 
ruling system was developed, increasing the power of the customary institutions.  
 World War II accentuated the institutional decline of the French colonial empire as the 
metrople was occupied by the Nazis and the European economies deeply shook up. The impact of World 
War II --10 to 15 years later-- was the colonies’ independence movement. Today’s Burkina Faso (then 
Upper Volta) kept the same institutional framework for land management. The Independence did not 
mark a rupture of the modern institutions but the blue line is now represented in dash in figure 51 as 
these modern institutions were named Voltaic and not French (but they are the same in terms of land 
management). In 1984, with the Revolution, the modern institutions changed in nature (state 
dominated system inspired by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine) and in name, they became Burkinabe. The 
blue line is represented in dots. The 1984 Revolution represents a rupture for the customary institutions 




system that is in fact an institutional making of the colonization and thus a same and unique entity45. But 
the experiment turned short and in the beginning of the 1990s, another dynamic took place.  
The Burkinabe modern institutions went back to the liberal economy but France was not any 
more the only outside influence through bilateral aid onto its national policies (and land related 
policies). Indeed, the IMF and World Bank, whose aid was required by the Burkinabe Government, 
imposed a series of institutional reforms that impacted land management. Private property was re-
introduced following the original French Civil Code and most importantly, decentralization policies were 
pushed onto the Burkinabe government by the international institutions weakening the modern 
institutions’ structure. The customary institutions had proved their efficiency and control in managing 
land (which was the purpose of their design) and they were re-introduced gradually within the land 
management institutions. The 1990s marked the beginning of the sharp decline of the French aid policy 
toward Africa and the rise of the international institutions and different forms of multilateral aid such as 
NGOs, weakening a centralized administrative structure. In some ways, the 1990s have initiated a very 
new form of foreign aid and intervention contributing to the biggest institutional paradigm shift since 
the colonization.  
This institutional paradigm shift weakened the modern institutions and favored the arrival of a 
new dominant power, changing the inherited power balance from the French colonization into a new 
type of colonization. If the competition of primary resources is still central in the new colonial war 
between Americans and Chinese in Africa, the U.S. also brings a modernist philosophy, like the European 
colonial powers over a century ago,, an idea of what development is: freedom, democracy and 
entrepreneurship. When President Compaoré was evacuated out of Burkina Faso by the French army 
with his wife, Chantal Terrasson de Fougères, a Franco-Ivorian citizen and daughter of Jean Terrasson 
Kourouma, the extramarital son of the French colonial administrator Jean Henri Terrasson de Fougères 
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who served as Governor in French Sudan, it is truly a long page of history that was turned. I will now 
substantiate this cyclic analysis through in-depth historical accounts of the evolution of the modern 
institutions (in their making of the law) and their interactions with the customary institutions, as well as 
through field evidences from the Tribunals of Grande Instance in Ouagadougou and Ziniaré.          
 
7.1. Alien Principles and Concepts 
7.1.1. The Universalist Doctrine: The Civil Code 
The Civil code, also known as the Napoleon Code, was established in 1804 by Napoléon 
Bonaparte in France. It was and remains a fundamental legal text that has marked the definitive 
accomplishment of the French societies and territories into a Nation. It united the French citizens under 
the same set of rules in one written document when previously a set of different inherited feudal rules 
and customs was more or less heterogeneously practiced. Inspired by the Roman law46, the Civil Code 
originally divided the law in (1) law of persons, (2) law of property, (3) acquisition of property and (4) 
civil procedure; this later one was removed in a separate book in 1806 (Code Civil, 1804). These original 
Roman roots of the law in the French context introduced two interesting outcomes worth considering in 
the Burkinabe context. First because of the complexity of the texts, in their physical form (in terms of 
transport and reproduction) and Latin content (a language not accessible to all), priority was given to 
the gloss, in other words, the capacity to transmit the spirit of the law rather than the text itself. Second 
there has been a long struggle during the Middle Ages between the Roman law and regional practices. If 
in the end the canonic and Roman laws have supplanted the customary practices in the form of the Civil 
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 The Theodosian Code (Codex Theodosianus) was promulgated in Western Europe by Valentinian III between 429 and 439. It 
was divided in 16 books, written by civil servants (who compiled existing codes) and is considered as the roots of private law, 
penal law, public law and religious law. It was transmitted to the modern jurists by Breviary of Alaric, a Visigoth king. It then was 
completed by the Justinian Code (529-534) in the Orient which added 12 tables, containing administrative law and fiscal law. 
These codes form the Corpus Juris Civilis. Toward the end of the 12
th
 century in Western Europe, the Justinian Code, in light of 
the economic evolution of the Middle Age’s societies, was rediscovered. In the 16
th
 century in France, the Roman Law became 
the ratio scripta, the written reason, that the judge could use to complete or correct the customary practice (Thiam, 2011: 57-




Code, it is the result of a long period of time where the written laws and the customary practices 
coexisted. The domain of family law was usually the last piece to be given up by the customary practices, 
when the commercial and economic domains were usually the first ones to benefit from the universal 
written texts (Thiam, 2011: 76-78). This historical account of the Roman Law in the European Middle 
Age’s context most certainly was in the mind of the colonial authorities when confronted with the 
difficulty of securing legal matters in the African context.            
The Civil Code lays on paper a definition of property and property rights. Hence, a good, 
everything bringing some kind of benefit to one person, may be privatized for his/her own and exclusive 
convenience with the exception of common goods, res communes, such as the air, the sunlight or a large 
river for example. Under the Civil Code, land is not considered as a common good as opposed to the 
customary understanding of land that I discussed in chapters 3 and 4. There is de facto a fundamental 
divide between the legal basis of the Civil Code and the Mossi definition of the land (Nikiéma, 2012: 8-
10).  
In 1830, the Civil Code was promulgated in Senegal and extended to the French West Africa 
territories in 1901 (Guinea, Dahomey and Ivory Coast); the Upper Volta colony (today’s Burkina Faso) 
was established in 1919. In a first place, the application of the Civil Code to the colonies implicitly 
abolished the customary law and practices and thus recognized the “indigenous” properties in a 
universalist philosophy. The official decree promulgating the Civil Code in Senegal in 1830 stipulated 
that the colonies’ territories were an integrated part of the French territories, implying in theory equal 
rights for all (Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986). But in Burkina Faso, the legal reality is a blurry one from the 
beginning because the protectorate’s treaties between the French authorities and the Mogho Naba 
have always vouched for the respect of the traditional uses and customs especially when it came to 
family and land matters. The recognition and upholding of the customary or “indigenous” institutions in 




192447. And in late 1924, a third decree (November 15, 1924) reorganized the judicial framework for the 
French West Africa colonies and declared the applicability of the Civil Code onto French citizens only 
(Ouedraogo, H.M.G., 1986: 99-100).   
From the very beginning in 1830, the problem of land insecurity in the colonies was an obvious 
one. If the 1855 Law relative to the transcription of property changes and advertisement (publicité 
foncière) was made to improve the security of the legal system, it did not resolve the main problem: 
how do we know for sure who really owns a certain plot of land in the colonial context? The question 
had proven to be a one too complex to be resolved and the French administration, imprinted by a 
universalist philosophy at first, had to take a more pragmatic approach of the problem (Ouedraogo, 
H.M.G., 1986: 103). The question for the Law to answer then became: how to best protect the economic 
interests of the métropole, France, in the colonies? The experts in this matter were without a doubt, the 
British.  
The Torrens Act in Australia48 had proven to be promising (Ouedraogo, H.M.G., 1986: 104). The 
Torrens Act was a statal system of registration of land holdings, in other words a system of land titling 
where the state secured the validity of a land title registration instead of a deed. This land titling system 
was introduced in the French Congo first by decree on March 28, 1899 and extended to the French West 
African colonies by decree on July 20, 1900 (Ouedraogo H. M G., 1986: 105).  Two land decrees in 1906 
and 1932 reinforced the land titling system in the French West African colonies but a very small portion 
of the population took advantage of it. In 1928 a decree reorganized the management of the public 
domains and in 1935 of private land. An attempt to give a written legal framework offering a bridge of 
recognition of the customary land tenure system was launched by a decree in 1925 but broadly failed 
because of its complexity and incompatibility. In 1955, a reform initiated the recognition of collective or 
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individual rights related to the customary system, shifting the prosecution evidence onto the 
administration (Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986: 105-106).  
The 1932 decree was one of rather big importance for land tenure. Indeed it placed all 
registered land under the regime of the Civil Code (specifically articles 539, 713, 2262 and 2265). The 
opportunity to register a piece of land and/or a building was opened to everybody, including land 
holders under the customary system. The request had to be formulated in writing and joined by the 
identity and civil status certificate as well as a list of other items (localization of the plot of land, 
estimated value, over 3 years lease). For land holders under the customary system, an administrative 
certificate delivered by the administrative authority after a public inquiry was enough. Publication of the 
request was then published in the Official Journal, on display at the tribunal for at least 3 months, and 
similarly by the concerned city hall. In case of a conflict, the mayor and the local chief were called to 
resolve the matter. Once delivered, the land title was definitive and not contestable, and the plot of land 
or building fell under the Civil Code’s jurisdiction (Ouedraogo, H.M.G., 1986: 146-155).      
The priority for the colonial authorities was to reinforce the notion of private property and it 
started with the consolidation of the domain of the state. The concept of eminent domain has thus been 
a fundamental one. In the French colonies, the French state could claim a piece of land anywhere via 
eminent domain. Moreover, the Civil Code gave great opportunities to the State to claim land in the 
African context, as it stipulated that land and goods that had no owner could be claimed by the state 
(article 713 in the Civil Code). A broader policy of state owned land exploited in the form of concession 
then took shape in the colonies and was mostly concerned with agriculture production. The urban 
context was a very small and limited matter.    
  Despite Independence in 1960, Burkina Faso has maintained the exact same legal framework 
maintaining a principle of legal permanence or continuity. The Independence did not mark a true 




maintained. The 1932 Decree was nationalized without modification and two laws (1960 and 1963) 
organized the system of concessions (a version of the 1935 decree) and the broader technical aspects of 
planning (Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986: 146).   
The ruling elite could not deny a certain interest for the economic structure developed by the 
colonial administration. The idea of a “modern law” was pushed forward by the authorities as a 
“national unity and emancipation” issue as a symbiosis of state-building and legal development 
(Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986: 142). In the 1970s, the food crisis in the Sahel that culminated with the 1973-
74 famine and the energy crisis later on pressed for land reforms that the authorities announced on 
several occasions, but no real legal enterprise was undertaken (Ouedraogo, H.M.G., 1986: 142-146).           
 
7.1.2. The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine: The 1984 Law  
The Burkinabe economic structure based on agriculture for exportation was rightly perceived as 
a remittance from the French colonization. The food crisis in the 1970s had highlighted the fragility of 
this economic structure and the need for subsistence agriculture became a prime concern. Moreover 
the Burkinabe demographic and agricultural structure positioned the country as a regional satellite - 
especially in regard to the booming Ivorian economy - as initially designed in colonial economic 
development plans. Most of the capital and investments were foreign and the Burkinabe bourgeoisie 
was very small in size and quite weak (Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986: 174-177).  
In addition to this failing economic structure, a clear urban crisis had developed. The food crisis 
had pushed a large rural population to the urban centers after the 1973 famine and without 
discontinuity in the following decades. This new urban population kept a profound rural bond and the 
idea that one should be able to grow his/her own food (especially after the 1973-74 famine episode), 
even in the urban context has marked the specific urban form of Ouagadougou. The housing crisis was 




for most people and favoring a small privileged part of the population. Informal settlements, called 
unplanned areas (“zones non-loties”) in the Burkinabe context, developed at larger scales (Ouedraogo 
H.M.G., 1986: 207-210).   
In this context, agriculture self-sufficiency, modernization of the infrastructure and rational 
planning became a popular political agenda that Sankara’s revolution gathered49. From the 1960s to 
1984, very few housing projects were developed whereas the urban population increased by almost 
eight times from about 59,000 inhabitants in 1960 to 460,000 inhabitants in 1985 (Ministère des 
Infrastructures, de l’Habitat et de l’Urbanisme, 1999: 18). According to the Statistical Institute for 
Demography (Institut Statistique de la Démographie), 63% of the population in Ouagadougou lived in an 
unplanned area in 1983 (Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012). 
Souleymane Ouedraogo had participated in the drafting of the famous 1984 R.A.F. Law (Réorganisation 
Agraire et Foncière – Land and Agriculture Reorganization) while he was part of the Ministry of Finance. 
The elderly but dynamic man, a renowned living memory of land policies in Burkina Faso over the past 
four decades, was very passionate when talking about land reforms. He has and continues to dedicate 
his life to the Burkinabe institutions and development. Clearly, the 1984 Law was the most exciting 
moment of his career. He described the 1984 Revolution as an urban movement. The last planned 
housing project in 1978 (Lotissement de la Patte d’Oie) had raised a lot of complications due to the 
damages’ process for the land owners and negotiations with the chiefs --who often happened to be the 
land owners--  and highlighted a growing concern in relation to the urban housing crisis and to a certain 
extend the rampant corruption. The revolutionaries were coming from the unplanned areas, they took 
power asking for one plot per family with a farmable plot to insure self-sufficiency, stressed Souleymane 
in our interview. It was a strong movement hungry for more equality and it did not include the 
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customary institutions, on the opposite, it pointed them as a corrupted colonial body that had 
maintained strong inequalities.  
Souleymane then told me that there was a customary tribunal in the center of Ouagadougou 
that was destroyed by the revolutionaries, where today the BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest) is located on the Place de la Révolution (Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, 
Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012). Indeed in 1903, the “indigenous tribunals” were created and 
renamed “tribunal for local law” in 1946. There was a complex fully institutionalized (under the colonial 
administration) structure of customary tribunals: First Degree tribunals, Second Degree tribunals, Appeal 
Courts, and a Supreme Court in 1960 with the transfer of the Burkinabe files from Dakar to 
Ouagadougou after Independence (Lompo, 2003: 1160, 1188). The 1984 Revolution did not eliminate 
the dual judiciary system as the customary courts were replaced by the People’s tribunals in 1985 - the 
Popular Courts of Conciliation, the Departmental Popular Courts and the Popular Courts of Appeal- and 
kept the classical jurisdictions (Lompo, 2003: 1165, 1162).    
Souleymane participated in the writing of the preliminary inter-ministerial report regarding land 
management that led to the R.A.F. (Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière – Land and Agriculture 
Reorganization): the idea of a massive land reform or agrarian revolution was central. In 1984, only 
5,635 land titles were registered across the entire country and that included the state’s land titles 
(Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986: 169). The R.A.F. (Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière – Land and Agriculture 
Reorganization) marked the dissolution of the land titles and customary land: all land was to be under 
the National Land Domain (Domaine Foncier National). The nationalization of land gave birth to 
permanent or temporary usufructs with a license to live or work on a given land plot (Interview with 
Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012; Nikiéma, 2012).   
The 1963 Law had favored a state monopoly on land but the state at that time had sought to 




(Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986: 229). The development of the informal settlements was not happening 
anarchically. The customary institutions were seen as being behind a large capitalist operation from 
which the state had no control. The local chiefs were gaining a certain financial power (Ouedraogo 
H.M.G., 1986: 230). Hubert M. G. Ouedraogo, a jurist, anthropologist and international expert in land 
tenure, demonstrated in his PhD dissertation that the rapidity of the R.A.F.’s setting up and completion 
could only be the result of a long-lasting frustration inside the state’s administration that had built-up 
long before the revolution, nurturing some thoughts and background work to thwart the customary 
power (Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986: 234). Article 3 of the 1984 Ordinance states that “the National Land 
Domain is the exclusive and full property right of the State” leaving no ambiguity regarding the 
disappearance of the customary power in Burkinabe institutions (Ouedraogo H.M.G., 1986: 237).      
During the 1970s and 1980s, the African continent was not spared from the Cold War tensions. 
The Communist ideology of modernization and the socialist ideology had a lot to offer to the newly 
independent countries. As I presented in the previous chapters, the Mossi society was based on a rather 
socialist model; the resource scarcity and environmental inhospitality had contributed to such societal 
ideology of redistribution and inclusiveness. On the other hand, the modern ideology, revisited by 
Communism, presented a tempting alternative to develop on a different path than the one dictated by 
the former colonies. The 1984 revolution in Burkina Faso was truly in this tradition.    
 
7.1.3. The Liberal Doctrine: The 1991 Constitution and Following Laws 
The 1984 Revolution singled out an already weak country and Blaise Compaoré, one of 
Sankara’s comrades, took power after a military coup in 1987 that claimed Sankara’s life. Compaoré 
called for a “rectification” of a revolution that had plunged the country into a personality cult, and he 
posed a project of continuation of the revolution and democratic openness (Loada, 2010: 269). If this 




stay in power for 27 years and that is pragmatism. He conducted a transitional period from 1987 to 1991 
during which he kept in place the existing revolutionary institutions even maintaining, for example, the 
legal vocabulary developed by the Revolution where law, decree, order, memorandum (ordonnance, 
décret, arrêté, circulaire in French) were replaced by local languages as zatu, kiti, raago, koeega (Code 
Civil du Burkina Faso, 2011: vii). The 1991 Constitution signaled the beginning of a democratization 
process in which, if a multiparty system was allowed, the reality was that a political change never 
happened despite a regular electoral calendar until a military coup in 2014.  
The country was in a terrible economic shape and in 1991 Burkina Faso signed an aid convention 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank that included a Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) and thus a negotiation on the status of private property in Burkina Faso. Souleymane 
Ouedraogo who was then director of the National Sugar Company (COMOE now SOSUCO, one of the 
main agrifood private companies in Burkina and owned as a majority by the Aga Khan) was called to 
“adapt the R.A.F. to the World Bank’s request in the SAP’s context” (Interview with Souleymane 
Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012). The National Land Domain was maintained but was not 
exclusive anymore, giving to the Civil Code a fresh primary role. The notion of private property was thus 
reintroduced and the administration re-organized following the international institutions’ 
recommendations regarding a potential decentralization policy (Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, 
Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012).   
For Souleymane, the R.A.F. (Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière – Land and Agriculture 
Reorganization) could be seen as a successful reform for the urban areas but had no impact in the rural 
areas. Indeed, he explained that the legitimacy of land use in the countryside comes from History, that it 
is the result of a cultural heritage, and thus does not need an administrative framework and control 
from the State, whereas in the urban areas, the story is very different because of the absence of this 




lotissement in the Burkinabe context, a sort of cadastral division. The problem as Souleymane pointed 
out, is that the promised plot areas for each family were very large (500 sq.m. so the equivalent of 5,382 
sq.f.) resulting in low density, widely spread and large areas to service, which turned out to be infeasible 
(Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012).           
In 1996, the Law 014/96/ADP50 was passed to address a number of problems related to land 
management in Burkina Faso. This law introduced two significant changes in the approach of land 
management. The first one is a decentralization outcome: the communes were put in charge of 
managing land issues on their territory instead of the central government at the ministerial level. In 
some ways, the rationale can be understood as a power shift to the better authority to address a local 
problem, and the reality can be understood as a delegation of a political and financial burden giving the 
potential tensions related to land and the growing infrastructure problem raised by the disastrous 
cadastral division done under the Revolution era. The second one is a more liberal approach with land 
and the notion of property with the definitive reinstatement of land titles that were suppressed in 1984 
and a set of defined rules framing real-estate business paving the road for further privatization and 
commercialization of land property (Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 
14, 2012; Nikiéma, 2012). This second point came after a series of law and decrees related to the 
organization of the notarial activity51 (Code Civil du Burkina Faso, 2011: 962).          
The 1996 Law also marked the return of customary institutions in the land management 
process. Although, this return was appraised by professionals as a timid one, it did introduce a tool that 
has become a very important bridge between the modern legal system and the customary institutions. 
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This tool is the palaver’s report52 (procès-verbal de palabre). The word palaver (palabre in French) refers 
to the West African use of the term to describe the traditional practice of holding long discussion in 
order to resolve a dispute by allowing the clarification and acceptation of a situation after much 
deliberation. There is thus a clear reference in the term “palaver’s report” to the customary system. The 
palaver’s report is one simple document stating the date, the names of the state’s representatives (tax 
department and land advertisement in charge of the publication of land status, administrative center or 
préfecture), the name of the person placing the request, the names of the customary institutions’ 
representatives (local chief, chief of land, elders and customary owners of the piece of land concerned 
by the procedure), and the location of the piece of land concerned by the procedure and the reason for 
the procedure. It can attest to the boundaries of the plot, the validity of a sale or exchange. The 
document states the decision of the discussion and all participants sign the document. When no 
signature is possible, the index finger is inked and used to sign with a finger print (Figure 52). The 
palaver’s report is basically a documentation of otherwise only orally validated evidences on the use and 
ownership of the land.                  
 
Figure 52: Examples of Palaver’s reports (source: Maître Oumarou Ouedraogo) 
 
                                                          
52
 Article 184 in the application decree 2007-610/PRES/PM/MAHRH (Politique Nationale de Sécurisation Foncière en milie rural) 







Examples of Palaver’s reports (source: Maître Oumarou Ouedraogo) 







Examples of Palaver’s reports (source: Maître Oumarou Ouedraogo) 





    The palaver’s report was a tool in the middle of a vast reform and an active legal period; it 
thus kept a small role in the overall land approach. Table 6 below shows the intense legal activities 
regarding land rights and management that followed during the next decade. It demonstrates a political 
will to organize the economic activity of the country following a classic model. Budgetary concerns and 
transparency policies also appear to be central, as well as the notion of urban planning and larger 
planning policies. There is also at the same time (but not included in Table 6) a fair amount of laws and 
decrees related to water management, which is needless to say a primary concern in a Sahelian belt’s 
country.    
Table 6: List of the Legal Dispositions Regarding Land Rights and Management from 2000 to 2008 
2000 Order 10-2000 AGRI/MEE/MEF/MATS/MRA of February 3, 2000 regarding the organization of villages ‘commissions 
for the land organization.  
 Decree 2000-69-70 of March 3, 2000 regarding land management for pluvial agriculture. 
2002 Order 2002-12 MIHU/MATD of March 11, 2002 regarding the procedures for the elaboration and approbation of 
regional plans.    
2006 Law 17-2006/AN of May 18, 2006 regarding urban planning and construction rules. 
 Law 29-2006/AN of December 7, 2006 regarding special procedures for land titles’ discharge. 
2007 Decree 2007-483 of July 27, 2007 regarding the organization of advisory structures for urban planning and 
construction.  
 Decree 2007-488 of July 27, 2007 regarding the procedures for authorizing and implementing housing projects.  
 Decree 2007-489 of July 27, 2007 regarding the procedures for elaboration, approbation and revision of land use 
plans. 
 Decree 2007-490 of July 27, 2007 regarding the procedures for elaboration, approbation and revision of regional 
plans.  
 Law 33-2007/ AN of December 6, 2007 regarding the finance’s law for the budget State-Management 2008 
(modification of the Law 14-96/ADP). 
2008 Decree 2008-04 of January 10, 2008 regarding the procedure to acquire a certificate of conformity.  
 Decree 2008-010 of January 10, 2008 regarding the procedure to acquire a certificate of urban planning. 
 Decree 2008-011 of January 10, 2008 regarding the procedure to acquire a license to demolish.  
 Decree 2008-034 of February 6, 2008 regarding the creation, attributions, organization and management of the 
CEFAC (Center for the Facilitation of Construction Acts). 
 Decree 2008-035 of February 6, 2008 regarding the procedures to obtain a building license. 
 Law 24-2008/AN of May 6, 2008 regarding a modification of the Law 14-96/ADP of May 23, 1996 regarding the 
R.A.F.  
 Decree 2008-277 of May 23, 2008 regarding the creation, attributions, organization and management of the 
guichets uniques du fonciers (land titling procedure).  
 Decree 2008-278 of May 23, 2008 regarding the application of Law 24-2008/AN. 
 Decree 2008-704 of November 14, 2008 regarding regarding the creation, attributions, organization and 
management of the CONA-SFR (Committee for securing land rights in the rural areas).   
 Law 57-2008/AN of November 20, 2008 regarding the real estate business in Burkina Faso. 





The series of reforms and laws conducted during Compaoré’s presidential terms have been 
marked by the international aid community’s rules. The president of Burkina Faso made a point of 
bringing the small state into the world economy as it was struggling with endemic poverty and droughts. 
His pragmatism brought him to always include the Mossi institutions in political matters resulting in the 
recognition of these institutions at a very local level with the palaver’s report.        
 
7.2. From the French Influence to the American Influence: A Turn in Development Aid 
7.2.1. Understanding the Development Project of Ganzourgou  
As Souleymane was recounting the stories of the different land reforms in Burkina Faso, one 
name was coming back, and this name was cited by nearly all my interlocutors in Ouagadougou: 
Ganzourgou. In order to understand the political and economic approach of land regulation in Burkina 
Faso, it is important to understand what the Ganzourgou development project has been about.  
The Ganzourgou province is located in the Plateau-Central region about 40 km (about 25 miles) 
east to Ouagadougou and is on the road from Ouagadougou to Niamey in the neighboring Niger. In 1974 
a large project called “the Voltas Valleys Plan” (Aménagement des vallées des Voltas, AVV) was launched 
and financed by the French Development Agency (then named Caisse Centrale de Coopération 
Economique). Between 1968 and 1974, the Ganzourgou province benefited from a program of 
eradication of the conditions for the onchocerciasis disease53, a result of advanced health research 
conducted in Bobo Dioulasso. Once freed from the disease, the Ganzourgou, that had experienced a 
very low population density because of onchocerciasis disease, was considered a territory ready to be 
populated. The primary objective of the AVV was to ease the population pressure on land in the Mossi 
Plateau Central by promoting a large agricultural program. This program was concerned with securing 
subsistence farming, developing a modern agricultural system for food-production and cash crop and 
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finally preserving the environment by renewing the forest ecosystem that had been pressured by the 
need for firewood for Ouagadougou and that represented an important threat to the fragile soil balance 
(Cogno, 1995: 110). It involved 56 villages that became a state-managed zone from 1974 to 1991. This 
zone was “colonized” in a very organized structure and strictly managed.  A permit to settle was 
attributed by the AVV based on the “colon’s” application following a set of established criteria. A dense 
management structure was put in place with villages’ committees and development units’ committees 
grouped into six to ten villages following strict terms of reference. In the beginning, land titles were 
supposed to be delivered to the new migrants but the nature of these land titles was never defined and 
in the end no land titles were delivered (Ouedraogo, Nama, Bagré and Sidibé, 2006: 6).  
Souleymane explained that this program was developed without consulting with the customary 
chiefs who had thus come to the conclusion that there was some kind of political trap associated with 
the plan. The local population consequently did not apply to this program and watched the new settlers 
take advantage of this opportunity. These new settlers were coming from the Yatenga (Ouahigouya), 
Bam (Kongussi), Sanmatenga (Kaya) and Namentenga (Boulsa) in the northern part of Burkina Faso. The 
program was quite successful and the quality of life and resources of the “colons” had noticeably 
improved creating tensions between the “colons” and the local population who stayed away from the 
program (Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012; Thieba, 2009: 16).    
At the end of the Voltas Valleys Plan in the early 1980s, the alteration of the management of the 
program induced a progressive migrants’ flow around the “colons” who were then renamed the “official 
migrants”. The new migrants were called “spontaneous migrants”; they included autochthones and 
parents in a very broad sense of the official migrants. The “spontaneous migrants” phenomenon was 
putting the entire project at risk, compromising the agricultural equilibrium. Several projects following 
the steps of the Voltas Valleys Plan were put in place: UP1 – Unité de Planification (1988-1990), PDR/G – 




rural du Ganzourgou (1996-1999). But these different programs did not stop the migrants’ flow and the 
growing number of conflicts related to land in the Ganzourgou which had become a case study for land 
conflict and land management in Burkina Faso (Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, 
November 14, 2012; Cogno, 1995:113).         
By the end of the 1990s the Ganzourgou was experiencing recurrent conflicts related to land. 
These conflicts involved the settlers’ villages, the autochthones’ villages, the tree fellers in dry seasons 
and farmers in rainy seasons, the traditional presence of nomadic herders known as Fulani (Peul in 
French) who were pushed South because of the recurrent droughts in the North and the fishermen 
along the Voltas, known as the Bozo who came from Mali (Cogno, 1995: 113). Ivory Coast was known to 
have implemented a successful land management program known as a Rural Land Plan (Plan Foncier 
Rural PFR) and a team from the Department of Taxes (Direction Générale des Impôts) was sent to the 
Ivory Coast to study the case and see if an adapted version of such plan would be possible in Burkina 
Faso54. In 1999, a Rural Land Plan was launched in the Ganzourgou financed by the French in a 
framework cooperation agreement between France and Burkina Faso through the French Development 
Agency (Ouedraogo, Nama, Bagré and Sidibé, 2006: 7-8; Thieba, 2009: 11). 
The Rural Land Plan was based on unprecedented large demographic and socio-land inquiries in 
a precisely mapped area based on aerial pictures. A large information campaign was also launched to 
gather local support in the project. Data were double-checked and entered into a GIS map of the area. 
The maps and land information files were made public in order to confront any dispute regarding a 
piece of land. Initially planned to last 2 years, the Rural Land Plan quickly confronted the complexity of 
the land issue in Ganzourgou and the unwillingness of the local population to take clear positions. 
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Moreover, there was a legal doubt as the validity of land titles in this rural context would be accurate in 
the current legal framework (Ouedraogo, Nama, Bagré and Sidibé, 2006: 11-12). 
The project established a good database of land registers that served to advance another pilot 
program: a pilot program to secure land rights (Opération pilote de sécurisation foncière, OPSF), also 
financed by the French Development Agency. This pilot program was based on three rationales. First it 
established a large mediation effort in order to find a consensus on the legitimacy of the institutions 
involved and a way to manage the land resource. Second, it set technical assistance to establish the local 
conventions resulting from the first rationale, the mediation. Third, it launched a judicial initiative to 
facilitate the evolution of the legal framework for the entire country based on the experiences of the 
Ganzourgou (Ouedraogo, Nama, Bagré and Sidibé, 2006: 13-14).  
The OPSF was a noticeable effort to combine the inherent feature of land in searching for an 
acknowledged legitimacy and the extrinsic feature of land in the definition of its legal framework 
(Ouedraogo, Nama, Bagré and Sidibé, 2006: 18). From this point of view the pilot project brought very 
interesting outcomes, even though the Ivorian model initially did not take in consideration enough of 
the specificities of the Burkinabe administration (Ouedraogo, Nama, Bagré and Sidibé, 2006: 17). In 
other words, some time and effort was lost in the process because of mismatch between the document 
realized by the pilot project and the official legal requirements to fulfill a land title application. The 
French Development Agency refused to continue financing the project that came to an end in 2006 and 
the last step of the project regarding the land titles’ discharge was never realized (Interview with 
Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012). In 2009, none of the land titles had been 
delivered to their beneficiaries even though they were ready and signed at the Tax Division of 
Ganzourgou (Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012; Thieba, 2009: 




In 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a U.S. foreign aid agency granted 60 
million dollars to Burkina Faso for a Rural Land Governance Project for a five-year period. One of the 
emphases of this MCC project was securing land rights. The American consulting firm Tetra Tech ARD 
was mandated to conduct the expertise work. When I met Souleymane, one of his hats was as an expert 
for Tetra Tech ARD. The MCC had taken an interest in the pilot project of Ganzourgou and, according to 
Souleymane, strengthened the local capacity to finish the pilot project and to finally deliver the land 
titles to their beneficiaries (Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012).          
      
7.2.2. The 2009 Law: Securing property rights with the Customary Authorities   
 The land project in Ganzourgou, financed by the French Development Agency has been a source 
of reflections and inspirations for the 2009 Law. The palaver’s report was a good tool but the 
relationship between the state authorities and the customary institutions needed to be strengthened in 
order to ensure a certain degree of trust that was necessary for the customary institutions to participate 
in the process. The experience of Ganzourgou had highlighted the issue of trust and much work had 
been put in place to regain this trust. Souleymane Ouedraogo had mentioned during my interview with 
him that the main issue of the 1996 Law was that it did not address the problem of secured property 
rights in the rural areas due to judicial duality related to the strong upholding of the customary powers 
(Interview with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Ouagadougou, November 14, 2012). In other words, despite 
the tool of the palaver’s report, the rural areas had kept their own local arrangements based on the 
customary system and stayed away from the modern institutions. Another issue that the Ganzourgou 
project had highlighted was the lack of protection for minority groups who were not part of the original 
chiefdoms, and for women who traditionally had no access to land (Traoré-Ouédraogo, 2009). 
 The 2009 Law’s objectives were to (1) ensuring equal access to land rights; (2) promotion of 




promotion of a rational and sustainable management of natural resources; and (4) ensuring social peace 
(Loi N034-2009/AN, 2009: 2). This law applied to the rural communes including rural communes 
administratively attached to an urban center. It introduced in the national framework the concept of 
land charters that was developed in Ganzourgou in the pilot program to secure land rights (OPSF). The 
customary institutions were part of the process within the charter as well as in program to secure land 
rights through a village sub-commission (Loi N034-2009/AN, 2009: 22-23). Conciliation was favored in 
case of a dispute and, here again, the customary institutions were identified as a primary local actor (Loi 
N034-2009/AN, 2009: 27). The 2009 Law institutionalized the role of the customary institutions within 
the modern system. All my interlocutors in Burkina Faso, who were involved in land management, 
recognized in this law a major progress that finally was trying to reconcile the two institutional systems, 
the inherited institutional burden from the French colonization.     
 The 2009 Law interestingly enough also marked the end of the French aid in this matter and in 
fact exposed the major shift operating in the broader French policy of aid in Africa. Serge Michailof is 
one of the most renowned French experts in the development aid field; he spent 15 years with the 
French Development Agency in Africa, 8 years as the regional director and senior advisor at the World 
Bank, and 3 years as the executive director for operations for the French Development Agency as well as 
vice-president of its private sector subsidiary Proparco. In his book Notre maison brûle au Sud (2010), he 
analyzed development aid cycles since their beginning in the post-World War II era to the 2000s. The 
Ganzourgou project follows wonderfully the cycles that the development aid has gone though. In some 
ways the 2009 Law in Burkina Faso was a result of a long development aid experiment conducted by the 
French. Taking a closer look at these development cycles reveals the influences shaping the national 
policies, the modern state and its institutions in the African context; it is thus important to understand 
them in order to fully comprehend the major shift that took place in the second half of the 2000s in 




 The French Development Agency has a very peculiar history worth mentioning as it is indicative 
of the broader development philosophy of the French and their foreign policy toward their former 
colonies. The Caisse Centrale de la France libre was initially created by Charles De Gaulle in 1941 from 
London to serve as the treasury of the France libre, in opposition to the Vichy government. This 
“alternative” Bank of France was located and protected in and by the colonies (in Alger) which, 
enpowered by their monetary autonomy, embodied the France Libre as a legitimate state. In 1944, it 
became the Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre-Mer 55 with a thank-you mission: financing 
infrastructure development in the colonies because they had represented the France libre during the 
war and played an important role in weighting in favor of De Gaulle’s recognition as the legitimate 
leader of France in 194556 (Michailof and Bonnel, 2010: 74-75). But the independence of the colonies in 
the late 1950s came in a very tense international context with the Cold War, and the French 
development aid mission took a more complex turn. The Third World’s political ambitions and the race 
for energy and primary resources in a booming economic context shifted the development aid mission 
from a generous aspiration into a foreign policy tool (Michailof and Bonnel, 2010: 79). Moreover, the 
Chinese Revolution in 1949 was seen as an important indicator of the potential wider threat that rural 
poverty could bring. Communism was perceived as feeding and growing on rural poverty, hence fighting 
rural poverty became a central political agenda for the West. Rural and agricultural programs were 
pushed forward, the fight against poverty became a priority of development aid and Robert McNamara, 
when director of the World Bank (from 1968 to 1981), was instrumental in developing this approach in 
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 There is also an interesting “side story” to keep in mind. In 1945, the CFA franc (African Financial Community) was created to 
spare the colonies from the franc devaluation induced by its weakness right after World War 2 and as the franc was indexed on 
the US dollar following the Bretton Woods Agreement. It also favored exports from the colonies to France. The CFA franc is still 
in use in the following countries, forming the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, 





the 1970s (Michailof and Bonnel, 2010: 82). The Ganzourgou project was completely in line with these 
concerns.   
The 1980s were marked by the necessity for macro-financial reforms: in West Africa, the 
predominance of the state in the commodities’ markets was leading to a production disaster57 
(Michailof and Bonnel, 2010: 86-87). With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the question of the 
political legitimacy of development aid was raised. The Western states were cutting their budgets and 
the rise of NGOs was seen as a natural equilibrium. The IMF and World Bank were playing dominant 
roles, pushing forward a multilateral form of aid as opposed to bilateral aid that had more direct foreign 
policy implications. According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD, the 
development aid amounts went down from $60 billion in 1991 to $47 billion in 1998 (Michailof and 
Bonnel, 2010: 97).  
In the late 1990s, the effects of the Washington Consensus were pointed out as the cause for 
growing inequalities and a return to a more comprehensive approach toward poverty was put in place 
by the World Bank with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (Michailof and Bonnel, 2010: 98). 
2000 also marked the launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) led by Jeffrey Sachs who 
had argued in the late 1990s that only massive financial aid to poor countries could save them from the 
poverty trap (Michailof and Bonnel, 2010: 96). The MDGs gathered the whole aid effort around a 
comprehensive eight goals’ plan to aim for 2015. From the World Bank to NGOs through bi-lateral 
agencies, even pop stars and Hollywood actors and actresses, everybody was praising the MDGs as an 
almost biblical project, turning the public opinion around from what had been previously perceived as a 
giant waste of public money in bureaucracy and corruption into a “saving the planet” effort (and saving 
ourselves). Despite this worldwide communication plan, organized from New York City, Ivory Coast and 
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In 1994, a much needed devaluation of the CFA franc was decided. The decision came very late and is considered as one of the 




Burkina Faso kept a very close relationship with France. The long historical bond and cultural exchanges 
seemed to run very deep, but something was about to change drastically.    
 
7.2.3. The 2012 Law: An American Enterprise   
 The American aid intervention in Africa needs to be put back in its larger context in order to fully 
understand the philosophy behind it. In March 2002, few months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New 
York City and Washington D.C., President Georges W. Bush launched a large aid program that would see 
“the volumes of aid […] grown dramatically […], faster than at any time since the Marshall Plan” 
(Lancaster, 2008: 4). Nourishing similar resentment of meddling toward the USAID and the CIA, 
President Bush58 created a new fund and agency: the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Although the MCC presents itself as a development aid body, 
it is remarkable to note that it never mentioned the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), even 
though the MDGs were set as a global reference in the development field for the past decade; instead 
President Bush explained the rationale for the creation of the MCA as follow:  
We also work for prosperity and opportunity because they help defeat terror. Yet persistent 
poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair. And when governments fail to 
meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror. 
(President Bush, 2002 cited in Brainard and all, 2003: 2-3). 
 
If Afghanistan was definitely in the mind of international politics at that time, there is another failed 
state in line: Somalia brings right from the beginning a special interest from the U.S. foreign aid policy to 
the African continent. Simultaneously, the US Department of Defense is taking on an aid-giving mission 
in Africa with the creation in 2006 of a new military command for Africa, AFRICOM59 (Lancaster, 2008: 
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 Rock musician Bono who is close to Jeffrey Sachs, was influential in President Georges W. Bush’s decision to increase US 
foreign aid. Bono is a devout Christian, who is known to have a lobbying power among the religious conservatives in 
Washington D.C. (Lancaster, 2008:16-17) 
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 The US Army desperately tried to settle the base for AFRICOM in Africa, but the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011) 
had maintained a certain influential power over the continent by among all, pouring Libya’s oil money into development 




8). The Sahelian belt’s countries, subjects to a growing terrorist activity, were of a particular importance, 
and Burkina Faso benefited from over half a billion dollars grant between 2005 and 2014 from the MCA 
(www.mcc.gov). The MCC started with a relatively small program related to girls and education between 
2005 and 2008 (12.9 million dollar grant) and in 200960 it became a grant of nearly 481 million dollars 
that was allocated to Burkina Faso (www.mcc.gov). From 2009 to 2014, the French Development Agency 
granted 157.5 million euros to Burkina Faso (www.afd.fr).  
The creation of the Millennium Challenge Account and the Millennium Challenge Corporation is 
quite unique in the U.S. history as it did not involve a reorganization of the existing aid agency, USAID 
(Brainard and all, 2003: 7).  The MCC mission is described as follow on their website: 
MCC is advancing American values and interests by reducing global poverty through economic 
growth. The MCC model fulfills this mission by focusing on policy reforms, economic growth 
opportunities that deliver tangible results and shared learning on what is and is not working. 
This approach makes development assistance more effective, improves the lives of the world’s 
poor and creates the markets of the future, with whom companies can do business and trade. 
(www.mcc.gov/pages/about) 
 
For the purpose of this institutional analysis, it is important to stress how the nature of the political 
agenda behind the US aid policy shift, in order to comprehend how big this aid policy shift is. It is the 
biggest disruption in the local affairs in Africa since the French colonization, marking it in some ways,as 
the beginning of a new colonial era with a full blown military endeavor.  
AFRICOM has been extremely active with training programs in the Sahelian belt countries, 
legalizing their military presence on the ground and building ties with the local armies61. But these 
programs have been backfiring (or not?) as the military coup in Mali in March 2012 was led by Capt. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the continent would not welcome any more Western military bases, and the US had to fall back on a command base in 
Germany (in Stuttgart) for AFRICOM.    
 
60
 In 2009, Libya was the chair country for the African Union and Gaddafi took the leadership of the African Union.  According to 
Wikileaks, there were a number of confidential diplomatic cables in the U.S. administration raising worries about Gaddafi’ 
potential influence against the American interests onto the African continent (source: Documentary Arte “Guerre de l’Ombre 
au Sahara”, 2015). 
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 The death of Gaddafi in 2011 during the military intervention in Libya from the NATO forces has largely facilitated the U.S. 





Amadou Haya Sanogo, a most promising trainee from the US Army who was sent several times in 
training to the US (Washington Post, March 24, 2012). Interestingly enough, Burkina Faso, considered a 
stable country in the region for nearly three decades, experienced a military coup in November 2014, 
led by Lt. Col. Isaac Zida, another promising trainee from the US Army, who was also sent in training to 
the U.S. twice at the MacDill Air Force Base in Florida (The Washington Post, November 3, 2014). The 
usual U.S. policy protocol requires suspending military relations with a country where an elected civilian 
leader62 is overthrown by a military coup, but no such decision was made with Burkina Faso. The country 
has received over 15 million dollars in counterterrorism funding for 2013-14 and is hosting a Pentagon 
secretive Special Operations base to conduct reconnaissance flights across West Africa and medical 
evacuations (The Washington Post, November 3, 2014).        
The Afghanistan and Iraq experiences have stressed the importance of strong institutions in 
order to allow re-building a country or avoiding a failed state. Former Secretary of State, Condoleezza 
Rice talked about “transformational diplomacy” in which foreign assistance is essential “to empower 
developing countries to strengthen security, to consolidate democracy, to increase trade and 
investment, and to improve the lives of their people”; the ultimate goal of the U.S. foreign policy being 
to avoid having failed states such as Afghanistan or Somalia that could host a growing terrorist threat 
(Lancaster, 2008: 29). This overall policy did not stop with the Bush administration; the Barack Obama 
administration has continued and even increased this policy shift in foreign aid. In 2007, Defense 
Secretary, Robert Gates, giving an address at the Kansas State University, stated that: 
One of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has 
been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, 
long-term success.  
The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed 
by civilian agencies in the past . . . forced by circumstances, our brave men and women in 
uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and 
mentoring city councils—usually in a language they don’t speak. They have done an admirable 
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job. And as I’ve said before, the Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these non-
traditional capabilities – something the ROTC cadets in this audience can anticipate.  
But it is no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise.  
What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian 
instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic 
action, and economic reconstruction and development.(Robert Gates cited in Lancaster, 2008: 
44) 
 
The choice not to use the usual institutional setting was reiterated. In 2008, USAID saw its development 
assistance account (development-oriented bilateral aid) cut by one-third from the 2007 level (Lancaster, 
2008: 36). At the same time, the budget allocation for the Economic Support Fund controlled by the 
Department of State raised by 25% profiting mostly the Millennium Challenge Account (Lancaster, 2008: 
36).  
  In Burkina Faso, one of the large MCC programs was related to securization of land rights. From 
my first day of field work, the name of MCC was on everybody’s lips, especially since the new law 
related to land, voted in 2012, was perceived as the result of the MCC work on land tenure. I obtained a 
meeting with the National Coordinator of the MCA-Burkina Faso, Bissiri Sirima, pretty easily, because it 
was set up by former Prime Minister, Tertius Zongo. Sirima is an economist trained in France and a 
senior official who served in the Ministry of Finance at different levels from 1983 to 2006; he has thus 
experienced first-hand the different foreign aid policies (Marché Africains, 2011: 8). In 2006, he was 
appointed at the MCA-Burkina Faso. He welcomed me warmly in the secured building, where IDs had to 
be given in the entrance in exchange of a visitor’s pass after checking the appointment confirmation. 
The interview was not so much an interview; it felt more like a courtesy meeting that could only happen 
because of Tertius Zongo. The meeting was short; I was introduced to the Lands Project Director, 
Koudrègma Zongo, who was asked by his big boss to open all documentation to me (Interview with 
Bissiri Sirima, November 8, 2012). After all, it seemed very useful. Coming from an American university, I 




harass Koudrègma Zongo over the phone who very reluctantly finally accepted to meet with me63; and 
the American representative (resident coordinator) for MCA in Burkina Faso never returned my 
numerous calls.     
 Koudrègma was very defensive at first. But when he realized that I was actually interested to 
hear about their work in detail, he was quite fascinating to listen to. Their project was very ambitious 
and very interesting and the team was young and passionate. The pilot project was in Loumbila, a 
commune located between Ouagadougou and Ziniaré, where it is said that the new international airport 
would be located, as Ouagadougou’s current airport is literally in the city center. The pilot project was 
set around three main components: first, communication regarding the existing laws, second, 
institutional capacity building, and third, technical assistance to the municipality to manage land tenure. 
The communication component was innovative and diverse, using radio programs, focus groups, 
advertisement spots on TV, filmed plays to reach and inform the broadest public. The institutional 
capacity building component relied mostly on mapping capacity though training in GIS in order to 
develop complete cadastral maps. The third component regarding the technical assistance to 
municipalities was very dependent of the second component and the mapping exercise. The idea was 
that once the cadastral maps were completed, land conflicts would come to an end as they would have 
been cleared out though the mapping process. Then, when ambiguity over land ownership was 
dissipated, the law could be applied and everything outside the law would be illegal according to 
Koudrègma (Interview with Koudrègma Zongo, November 15, 2012).  
 GIS mapping was really central in the MCC land project. This technical tool seemed to hold all 
the solutions for a comprehensive management of the land as well as to act as a pacifier tool in resolving 
conflicts thoughout the mapping process. On July 2, 2012, only three years after the well-received 2009 
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law, a new law64  was passed regarding land management. The 2012 Law introduced the cadaster as the 
management tool for land. The customary institutions were not mentioned once in the law and the 1996 
Law was officially abrogated. The palaver’s report thus became obsolete. During my field work, a few 
months after the 2012 Law was passed, the professionals I met with (lawyers, land experts, surveyors) 
could not hide a certain surprise and bewilderment toward this step back regarding the customary 
institutions. For sure, the mapping capacity improvement with GPS technology could open possibilities 
for better mapping and improve land management; a problem that was already addressed in the 2006 
experts’ report (with Souleymane Ouedraogo, Roger Nama, Francis Sidibé and Alain Bagré, renowned 
surveyor in Burkina) and that had pointed out the lack of technical support in terms of mapping and 
surveys. This report also pointed out the very small number of available surveyors in Burkina Faso, 
raising the need for more professional training programs (Ouedraogo, 2006).  
 If all efforts for mapping were most welcome, the question concerned the rationale of the law, 
in the sense that it jeopardized the officialization of the role of the customary institutions that had 
revealed themselves over the different political experiences, to be, whether we like it or not, a 
fundamental element in the political balance, locally and nationally. The sudden and large cash flow 
from the MCA program in Burkina Faso evidently raised a risk of overwhelming the absorption capacity 
of the Burkinabe institutions (also known as Dutch disease) and the power equilibrium in a small 
country. It also highlighted the disruptive potential of a program such the MCC in the local power 
balance through legal pressure. In this context, the role of the American aid program in the military coup 
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7.3. Practice and Analysis of the Legal Frameworks 
 MCC ordered several expert reports regarding the judiciary system in Burkina Faso. The 
expertise was conducted by Tetra Tech ARD, an international development services’ company based in 
Arlington in Washington D.C. whose clients are, among others, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. 
Department of Defense and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (www.tetratechintdev.com). Tetra 
Tech ARD highlighted the fragility of the judiciary system and pushed for a reform of the justice system’s 
organization (TetraTech ARD, 2012). In this last part, I take a closer look at what is happening in the 
tribunal in regards to land conflicts and present some field evidences from the Tribunals of Grande 
Instance in Ouagadougou and Ziniaré.          
 
7.3.1. Getting the Data 
An important part of my research was to access the modern institutions and assess its 
functioning. In order to assess its functioning, I focused on the conflict resolution process which takes 
place in the tribunal in the modern intitutions’ setting: Tribunals de Grande Instance of Ouagadougou 
and Ziniaré for my case study. If accessing the customary form of conflict resolution process was a 
challenge, accessing the modern form of conflict resolution process posed in some ways similar 
challenges. For one, I could not really access a session in trial as I could not be informed of the nature of 
the cases being presented on a certain day. Moreover, the process (in the forms of procedures and 
trial), because it is written in the law, is quite defined. I was more interested to see if it was used by the 
people and in what volume. And again, because it is part of a modern state administration, all should be 
recorded. Accessing the records raised a major issue: confidentiality breach.              
During my field work, I had the chance to be chaperoned by a respected and powerful couple, 
Tertius and Priscille Zongo. He was the Prime Minister of Burkina Faso from 2007 to 2011 and left a 




General Secretary of Justice (Secrétaire Général de la Justice), the second highest person after the 
Minister in the Ministry of Justice, and scheduled an audience with him to grant me access to the 
registry books of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou and the Tribunal de Grande Instance 
de Ziniaré (see annex 3). After the audience at the Ministry of Justice, where it was made clear that I just 
had been granted a favor, I was expected at the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou to meet 
with the Chief Registrar (Greffier en chef), Esq. Julien Kouda.  
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou is located in the city center on a very busy 
street. It was very busy inside and outside. To get inside, I had to go through a security check where I 
had to leave my passport and announce the purpose of my visit. As my visits became more frequent, the 
guards who recognized me just greeted me in, but I still had to leave my ID at the entrance’s check 
point. Esq. Kouda was an extremely busy man. A lot of people were waiting outside his office, in a dark 
hallway. A first large room filled with defensive secretaries was a crucial point before getting in his office 
where a constant procession of clerks, lawyers, administrative personal was grasping a signature or a 
quick attention for an urgent question. I understood better the defensive secretaries giving the volume 
of work that was going in and out of the large office. Kouda was very clear and straightforward. I was 
clearly welcome as a researcher but he made also very clear that I was walking on a thin line and that I 
could look at the registries but could not use any names mentioned and definitely not contact a person 
involved in a case even through their lawyer.  
Thus a certain Georges was in charge of providing the registries to me. I was set at a desk in a 
small room with no windows and another woman who disapproved my presence or at least felt it was 
not right that I could access this information. But as I thought I would be more in a kind of library where 
I could see what existed, Georges explained to me that I had to ask him the year I am interested in and 




since the Seventies he decided to introduce me to the tribunal and its archives. He was a sweet and 
devoted person who was holding the keys of every room in the tribunal.  
The court rooms looked like court rooms. The courtyard was filled with bikes, not that the 
tribunal had a particular green policy: there were all foreclosures (Figure 53). Then we approached the 
door of the archives room. A serious lock was barring the entrance.  
Figure 53: The Courtyard at the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou and the Entrance of the Archive 
Room. 
       
 
Georges started explaining me that it was the basement of the tribunal and that they had suffered 
several floods. We took few steps down, the air and smell from the dust and mold made breathing quite 
uncomfortable, and I discovered Ali Baba’s cave: there were tons of diverse objects. The archive room 
was also the sealed objects room (Figure 54): from motorcycles to human skulls, everything was there, 
weapons, drugs, antiques, suitcases, radio sets, TVs, motocycles etc. Among all that, the registries were 
in some places orderly arranged and in other places they were forming a garbage pile on the floor all 
covered in dust like everything else. I could just imagine what it would be like when it was flooded and 
that everything was floating with everything in muddy water. Georges showed me what he had 
managed to organized neatly and he had given a priority to the registers of births, marriages and deaths 
and then the tribunal registries from the most recent to the oldest (Figure 55). His main problem was 























months in his training with him and so he was able to find some of his way into this surprising cave but 
not all.  






































































On the above picture on the right, there are the registries that Georges prepared for me. He was able to 
find them for 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. I was not able to access the 
one for 2011 because a number of clerks needed it. I was happy not to work in the archives’ room and I 
started looking at them and thought that I could make photocopies of the pages I was interested in but 
it turned out that there was no copy machine in the tribunal and I could not exit the tribunal with the 
books to make photocopies. I decided then to take a picture of each entry I was interested in.  
 At the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ziniaré, I was welcomed by the Chief Registrar also, 
Célestin Zoundrana who had prepared the registries for me. The building was quite recent as before 
1995, Ziniaré was part of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of Ouagadougou. The registries were in good 
conditions and the pace of things was much smoother than in the big city.  
 
7.3.2. Analysis of the Data 
 Going through the record books from the tribunals de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou and 
Ziniaré allowed me to notice some trends: in the 1980s conflicts were related to goods of a certain value 
such as cars or fridges; in the 1990s, cases related to divorce appeared as well as matters related to civil 
status certificates65; in the 2000s, legal recognition of adoption cases were becoming frequent. Most 
cases were subjects to civil matters but the real transformation was the rise of commercial matters over 
this period of time.      
I ended up with a large file of pictures of entries from the logbooks from the Tribunals de 
Grande Instance de Ouagadougou and Ziniaré. I had been careful in following a chronological order in 
taking the pictures while in the tribunals to avoid confusion later on (Figure 56).  
 
 
                                                          
65




Figure 56: My desk at the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou and the Logbooks as well as an example 
of entry. 
   
The logbooks were in variable conditions and paper and/ink had not always aged well so it was quite a 
challenge at time to be able to read the entries. Thus these data can’t be considered fully accurate as it 
is possible that I missed some entries or that some cases were not entered but it is as close as possible 
to inform us on the situation going on in the judicial system. 
 From these pictures, I create a matrix for every year referencing the picture number, the type of 
entry (court decision, deliberation, and adjournment), the parties involved, the type of case, and the 
content of the decision. These matrixes are available in the annex section (see annex 4). In order to 
comply with the Burkinabe justice and respect my engagement toward the Ministry of Justice, I have 
erased for annex 4 the columns with the names of the parties. For 1980, 1990 and 2000, the log books 
were not complete or too damaged so I completed with data from 1981, 1991 and 2001 respectively to 
have a total of 12 months for each year.  
I created 4 categories of cases. The first one relates to request of land title duplicate and 
confirmation or regularization of a sale act of example and does not involve another party so it is a 
simple request to the tribunal. The second one relates to property limits disputes and to my great 
surprise, I found only one such case in the whole time sample that is in 2008. With all the parceling 
































or value disputes: it involves a bank and it relates to a validity of the sale when a third party contests it, 
or a dispute on the price or a question of mortgage. This is the real transformation in the society that we 
can see from these data: the banking industry takes off and property value is then dealt with at the 
tribunal. The fourth one concerns plain property disputes, typically the one that would be dealt with in 
the customary system: a dispute between widows and/or heirs when the man responsible for the 
household passes, or two private parties and in more recent time, one of the private parties can be a 
business.             
 The following graph (Figure 57) presents the results of this analysis. There is an overall slow 
increase of the cases from 1980 to 2008 and a sharp increase in 2009 and 2010. However the slow 
increase from 2005 to 2008 is relative as jurisdictions borders changes then, for example Ziniaré gets its 
own tribunal in 2005. So it is reasonable to consider that this increase was in fact sharper. 
Figure 57: Number and Distribution of Cases Related to Land Property Brought to the Civil and Commercial and 
Administrative Tribunal of Ouagadougou from 1980 to 2010.  
Source: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou. Graph & Analysis: Julie Touber, 2015. 
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 Requests related to land titles (in green on Figure 18) appeared only in 1990 and then in 2007 
and on. In 1990, these requests concerned only duplicates of land titles which makes sense giving the 
political context announcing the opening of the market economy. Out of the five requests done in 1990, 
two were made by one single bank. In 2007, requests related to land titles included, on top of requests 
for duplicates, property titles’ transfer to validate a sale. In 2008, all the requests were made by the 
same person for several buildings in Ouagadougou. In 2009, many more requests were formulated and 
concerned requests of duplicates from companies, individuals (often a widow and/or the children of a 
deceased person); there were also a number of property titles’ transfers to validate a sale. This trend 
was confirmed and kept increasing in 2010.      
I found only one conflict related to a property limit dispute (in red on Figure 18). It happened in 
2008 between an individual and an association. The case appeared in the tribunal logbooks only once as 
an adjournment and no decision followed, which makes me think that an agreement between the two 
parties was reached.   
Cases related to property sale involving a banking institution (in light brown on Figure 18) are 
quasi-inexistent in 1980, 1990 and 2000. In 2009 and 2010, they increased enormously, demonstrating a 
growing interest from the population in relying on the banking system to access private property in the 
modern institutions setting. A typical case in 2010 involved a large bank versus a party A and a party B, 
regarding a plot of land of 252 sq. meters (about 2,712 sq.ft.) in Sig-Noghin, a commune of 
Ouagadougou. The bank wanted to claim its mortgage loan and sued the lienee, party B, together with 
the joint guarantee, party A. A first judgement declared the inadmissibility of the claim from party A who 
argued that the case did not prove his quality as joint guarantee. A second judgement declared the bank 
in its legal right to claim the mortgage loan and condemned the parties (A and B) to honor their debt 
despite a sale validity threat because of a date issue. This type of cases concerns plots of land and 




for the banks is thus limited and the court seems to be committed to create a secured environment for 
business.  
The last category in pink on Figure 18 includes more diversity in cases. There are cases of sale 
annulment: for example, in 2000, a son, after his father’s death, sold the family property to party B, 
whereas his mother and four sisters were still living on the property; the court chose to annul the sale 
and restituted the property title to the widow. Other cases are related to property assignation: for 
example, in 2000, the court decided to go on site of a property claimed by one brother against another 
brother after the death of the parents to decide who was really living on the family property. According 
to informal conversations, such decision implies that there is a consultation on site with the customary 
institutions (the local chief) in order to decide who is in his/her right. But there are also conflicts related 
to the price of the land or building. For example, in 2009, two individuals who had concluded a sale 
brought a case to the court because they disagreed on the price for the sale. Cases related to a conflict 
on a sale price, sale agreement or some sale conditions such as the usufruct became more and more 
common in 2009 and 2010.      
In Ziniaré, the situation seems different. Evidently, the tribunal does not deal with the same 
population but the jurisdiction is not small and includes 12 municipalities forming a large arc in the 
north of Ouagadougou from the West to the East: Sourgoubila, Kaye, Bousse, Niou, Toeghin, Manega, 
Dapelogo, Loumbila, Zitenga, Ziniaré, Absouya, Nagreongo. Table 7 below shows the number of cases 
related to land disputes that went through the court in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ziniaré.        
Table 7: Cases Related to Land Disputes at the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ziniaré from 2005 to 2012. 
 Civil Cases Administrative Cases Commercial Cases total 
2005 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 
2007 1 0 0 1 
2008 0 0 3 3 
2009 0 0 0 0 
2010 3 1 1 5 
2011 2 0 4 6 
2012 inc. 1 0 2 2 




No true trend can be identified from these data. There is an overall rise of the cases’ number but the 
numbers are very small so it is difficult to draw a conclusive argument (note that year 2012 is 
incomplete as my field trip took place in November 2012). But there is detailed information on some 
cases that inform us on the type of dispute.  
 The first example involves two groups claiming to be two families but it becomes clearer as the 
story goes that they are really two communities, most likely from two territories. The dispute erupts 
from an ongoing construction of a mosque conducted by one group onto the land of the other group 
who had agreed for the other community to use the land for agricultural activities but not for building. 
The second example, and there are several similar cases, concerned returnees from Ivory Coast with 
more or less complexity in their cases. A father may have left in the 1980s to Ivory Coast and left the 
title to a son who have himself left for Ivory Coast later on in the 1990s and who is returning in the late 
2000s to find his land occupied by someone else who got some permission from the person who had 
been put in charge of the land at the departure of the father in the 1980s and who is usually deceased. 
Both these examples also show that when a dispute falls outside the customary jurisdiction, either in 
terms of territories or in terms of generational gaps through migrations, that the tribunal, the modern 
institution, is seized.     
 The MCC has also conducted some surveys on conflict resolution processes in the region. The 
team surveyed 17 communes and from mid-2010 to mid-2011 (12 months), and they accounted for the 
number of conflicts related to land that were brought to the tribunal (at the departmental level66), to 
the city hall, and to the village (customary institutions). From their surveys, 78% of conflicts were 
brought to the village (and they hypothesized that it may actually be higher), 19 % of conflicts were 
brought to the tribunal and 3% of conflicts were brought to the city hall (MCC working document, 2011: 
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2). They also pointed out that the conciliation commissions put in place by the 2009 Law were not used 
and lacked legitimacy to the local actors (MCC working document, 2011: 2).  
 This analysis shows that the customary system keeps an important role in the rural areas and 
that the modern system is seized when a conflict falls outside the customary jurisdiction. The data from 
the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Ouagadougou shows very clearly that the development of the 
banking activities relies on the modern system. This is the only clear trend that one can affirm. The land 
pressure and the rise of land value in the urban context are most likely joined with commercial activities 
and the rise of banking activities. While this economic dynamic relies fully on the modern system, it 
concerns only one small part of Ouagadougou, as the data from Ziniaré do not expose a similar trend. 
The role and strength of the customary system seems to me to still be largely under-estimated, even in 
the urban context. Ziniaré is a good example: in Chapter 6, the study of the Chiefdom of Ziniaré 
exhibited a low level of conflicts according the Chief of Land, yet the data from the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance of Ziniaré do not show a major increase of land conflicts; thus it is reasonable to assume that 
most conflicts related to land are mitigated through the customary system as a whole, meaning that the 
pressure from the community not to expose in the public place a “full-blown” conflict, forces the 









The customary institutions were a political construct of the colonial power to serve its interests 
at a precise moment in History. In return, the customary authority was given some power that has 
served its interests as well. This arrangement perverted what the original Mossi institutions were. The 
relationship between the customary and modern institutions has to be considered at all time since the 
beginning of the 20th century as a symbiotic relationship. Because it is a symbiotic relationship, 
Independence did not change the arrangement between the customary and modern institutions. On the 
contrary, the political choice from both parties to keep using the terminology of customary and modern 
sealed the arrangement. But like in any arrangement, the question of power balance is a difficult one 
and evolves with time and needs.  
This dissertation demonstrated that the customary institutions are extremely formalized and are 
a fundamental instrument in managing land still to this day. The analysis of my fieldwork data 
highlighted that the customary institutions are very efficient in managing daily matters when they 
comply with the customary setting, as intended during the colonial period. For example, population 
control was a great colonial preoccupation and part of the customary institutions’ setting was to prevent 
population movement by restraining access to rights and services once a person left his/her unit of 
housing (the family and the village). In that sense, the customary institutions are still today very efficient 
in managing local issues, i.e. issues related to their territory. But the urbanization process of the 
Ouagadougou’s region has put a lot of pressure on the customary system. The Chiefdom of Taab Tinga 
struggles with a great number of migrants whose rights are much lesser than those of the original 
inhabitants weakening the local power equilibrium. The returnees from Ivory Coast also see their rights 




the modern institutions to claim some rights back. In that sense, the customary institutions feel 
threatened by the urbanization process.    
This dissertation also highlighted that the urbanization process puts an economic pressure on 
the customary institutions which have not been able to cope with it. These institutions have indeed no 
framework to deal with real estate activities. The case of Koubri and the sharp increase of conflicts 
involving a banking institution at the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Ouagadougou, demonstrate that 
the modern institutions, in these cases, have a role to play for the population.  
Turning to the modern institutions for the Burkinabe population is usually a fall back solution 
when either a case is outside the judicial power of the customary institutions (like in the Koubri ‘s case 
and for real-estate matters) or the plaintiff is confronted to a situation that the customary system may 
not judge in full fairness according to his/her point of view (for migrants, returnees from Ivory Coast and 
women). The informal character of the customary institutions is not perceived by the population. But 
the symbiotic institutional design of the customary and modern systems was developed to precisely 
leave the customary part outside the market economy. In this context, the reason for the persistence of 
land informality is found in the fact that it is the customary institutions that manage land matters. The 
massive use of the customary system prevents most of the Burkinabe population to enter fully in the 
market economy. The low level of economic development of such country is thus inevitable.   
This dissertation also highlighted a major evolution of the symbiotic arrangement between the 
modern and the customary institutions. Roger Nama is the former director of the National Planning 
Department at the Ministry of Economy and Finances where he spent most of his career from 1982 to 
2011. He is the only person who gave me the most lucid analysis of what all my interlocutors described 
and what I had observed: by entering in modern politics, the customary authority has made of the 
Burkinabe society a schizophrenic society (Interview with Roger Nama in Ouagadougou on November 




institutions since the very beginning of their symbiosis, it is rather new for customary chiefs to 
participate in the political life in the modern institutions’ setting. What Robert Nama meant is that this 
evolution of some customary chiefs’ political role, introduced a double perversion. On one side, it 
threatens the legitimacy of the customary authority by degrading the main quality (wisdom) that a chief 
is supposed to carry in the ugly political confrontation that an election process usually brings67; and on 
the other side, it threatens the potential democratic functioning because the very nature of the 
customary chief puts him above any other candidates in an election. This is where the schizophrenic 
nature of the Burkinabe society is expressed. In this context, neither the managerial quality of the 
customary institutions, nor the quality of providing with a democratic and economic potential realism 
from the modern institutions can be maintained and both institutional sets are deeply weakened.  The 
entire functioning of the state falls into the risk of collapsing.   
   The legitimacy of the customary authorities in the country is not opposable; they are, rightly or 
wrongly, perceived as the traditional roots of the Burkinabe society. They are the Burkinabe identity and 
it would seem inconceivable to challenge it. Yet by definition, they are incompatible with a true 
democratic regime, as it is today and in the Western sense, because their legitimacy hold on principles 
of collective rights that do not recognize the individual rights as a supreme precept. This is the core 
struggle of an on-going state building exercise which is suffering from a serious institutional disease.    
“There is the law and, there is the practice: this is the problem of land here [in Burkina Faso]”, 
concluded Roger Nama (Interview with Roger Nama in Ouagadougou on November 14, 2012). The 
incapability for the complex institutional setting to resolve this problem is not the result of 
incompetence; it is the result of survival mechanisms. The participation of some customary chiefs in the 
political arena may be part of a survival strategy to respond to the ideology of democratization.   
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The Polish-American political scientist Adam Przeworki highlights mechanisms of blocking and 
reproducing of institutions: the response of a set of institutions, once “populated by organizations”, to 
exogenous change is determined by processes of blocking or reproducing depending on the special 
interests of these organizations reinforcing path dependency (Przeworki, 2004: 172). The nature of 
institutions, like a living organism, is primarily set to assure its survival, so once institutions are set, they 
reproduce themselves and block undesirable change; but like any living organism, they also have to 
adapt to certain changes in order to maintain their primacy.  
The following graph, Figure 58, shows such mechanisms in Africa as it could be extended to 
numerous cases across the continent that have followed similar development paths of customary and 
modern institutions inherited from the colonial period. The blue and pink lines represent respectively 
the modern and the customary institutions and their power over time.  
Figure 58: The Institutional Schizophrenia’s Cycles in Africa. 
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much more segregated institutional setting with a modern ideology based on mercantilism for England, 
resulting in stronger extractive institutions in the colonies and clearer private property rights for only 
one part of the population (Westerners). Later, the Panafricanist movement flirted very much with the 
Marxist ideology that offered an alternative modern ideology that was in opposition to the West. This 
ideology was brought to Burkina Faso in 1983 by Sankara’s revolution. Then, in the case of Burkina Faso, 
Compaoré maintained a fuzzy relationship with the customary institutions and mitigated large pieces of 
the programs imposed by the international institutions promoting the neoliberal modern ideology in the 
1990s. He avoided a cycle of blocking and reproducing while such cycle may be observable in other 
countries in Africa. The new American aid policy based on a modern ideology of promoting democracy 
as a necessary condition for freedom and entrepreneurship has induced a new blocking and reproducing 
cycle accompanied by high states of political instability.  
Economic development in these conditions is unlikely to happen in a fair and sustainable way. 
Roger Nama pointed to the presence of large inequalities in the Burkinabe context, whereas the Mossi 
society was based on an idea of fair re-distribution. According to him, citizens would need to be 
protected from the municipal power that has not been challenged yet; and true customary chiefs should 
be in place. This meant getting rid of the chiefs that are becoming wealthy from their activity of chief, 
the “profiteers” as he called them, and no participation in political matters. Roger Nama added that in a 
consultation program he had run with customary chiefs, he was surprised to see that most of the 
customary chiefs were intellectuals who did not want to get involved in politics but were pushed into it 
as politicians systematically politicize conflicts (Interview with Roger Nama in Ouagadougou on 
November 14, 2012).       
The uniqueness of the African case is that the blocking and reproducing mechanism is 
happening mostly internally, because they are part of the same entity. When the modern institutions 




respond by reproducing a modern adaptation of themselves, bringing back their legitimacy in the official 
statal structure. I called this mechanism “the institutional schizophrenia’s cycles” because it presents 
itself as an independent layered institutional setting which it is not: this is where the medical analogy 
makes sense; they have to be understood as one and unique entity that is trying to survive as such. I 
mentioned in Chapter 3 that I chose a theory-building process-tracing methodology. The theory I 
present of the African institutional schizophrenia’s cycles highlight unique institutional survival 
mechanisms, and could be tested in other African countries and in time. It also challenges the nature of 
the international aid that does not account for this peculiar situation.             
Hernando de Soto’s land titling theory is concerned uniquely with the modern institutions’ 
setting. In the African context, it is doomed to fail because the practice of land tenure is managed by the 
customary institutions. The control of the land tenure and population matters by the customary 
institutions is the result of an economic development policy designed during the post-World War I 
period by the colonial powers in Africa with the complicity of the customary authorities. This economic 
development policy focused on very specific goals: cash crop production (controlled by the modern 
institutions) and good local management (controlled by the customary institutions). This policy is still 
dominant and does not provide local economic development as it was not designed for that purpose68.   
Informality does not exist in the eye of the population in Africa because what is outside the 
modern institutions is extremely formalized by the customary institutions. In order to bring the informal 
economic life into the formal economic activity, a large reform would be needed not only for the 
modern institutions, but also for the customary institutions. The customary institutions have proved to 
be a very efficient managerial force and there is thus a lot to gain from them. In that sense, the 2009 
Law and the palaver’s report brought some positive prospect in the Burkinabe case. But the customary 
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institutions have also blocked potential local economic development, gender equality and rights for 
minorities. The Burkinabe case shows that the judicial system can be improved if more financial means 
are directed toward the justice infrastructure to offer an accessible alternative outside the customary 
authorities when needed.              
Land is not a commodity in the African context, it has thus to be considered as such.  Any 
program to secure land and property rights can only be envisaged as a temporary loan of a piece of land. 
It would thus make sense to only consider long-term leases (emphyteusis) and build a solid arrangement 
between the modern and customary institutions around such project.    
 Injecting massive cash flows through the international aid as recommended by Jeffrey Sachs, 
will not resolve the African development issue as it would create a massive power unbalance between 
the modern and customary institutions creating political precariousness, reinforced by the fact that the 
modern institutions don’t have the absorptive capacity for such flows. In that regard, the U.S. policy 
toward Africa through the MCA/MCC has created political precariousness69. In West Africa, the French 
development aid has accumulated a lot of knowledge that is getting lost in the on-going race for quick-
win results. This trend may have dramatic long-term effects as institutions are deeply weakened.  
The question of why Africa has fallen behind economic development has nourished a debate on 
the role of geography and institutions. Both geography and the inherited institutions from the colonial 
period have been studied and discussed. While the geography’s school (Diamond, 1997; Landes, 1998; 
Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2003 and 2005) has focused on the physical difficulties of the African 
continent, the institutions’ school (De Soto, 1989; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001 and 2002; 
Boone, 2003; Collier, 2006 and 2007) has focused only on the modern institutions. A lesser third school 
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which could be named the population school has been concerned with rarely the customary institutions 
and most often the ethnic fragmentation of the African population (Bates, 1990b; Easterly and Levine, 
1997; Easterly, 2001; Posner, 2004). Yet there is a big piece missing that does concern geography and 
institutions (modern and customary) together which is never discussed. And I believe that it holds the 
key for Africa to step in sustained economic and social improvement.  
The relationship between geography and the customary institutions is very unique in the African 
case as I discussed in Chapter 1. Indeed, the expression of power for a customary authority is not 
measured in terms of territory but in terms of population. In that sense, the Mossi Kingdoms were very 
powerful and respected as such (as the population density was higher than the ones observed in other 
parts of West Africa); this is also why the Mossi Kingdoms became such a popular object of conquest 
between the French, German and British colonial empires. In Chapter 4, I discussed the Mossi 
understanding of territory’s borders which is not defined in terms of physical geography (georeferenced 
places) but in terms of human geography (number of villages or volume of people).  This notion of 
power (for the customary institutions) and space (human geography) is fundamental in today’s 
organization of the population. If the customary institutions have maintained their power over land 
management, they also have maintained their power over the control of the population. In his latest 
book, Serge Michailof stresses the amazing demographic challenge that Africa faces: with a fertility rate 
over 7 children per woman in the Sahelian countries these past years and a demographic growth rate of 
2.7% in Sub-Saharian Africa, Africa has also fallen behind in terms of demographic transitioning 
(Michailof, 2015: 42). This demographic situation can only be understood in the context of the 
relationship between the customary institutions and land that is valued only if populated. Thus any 
development effort will have to consider shaping a demographic transition with the customary 




This is where the work of Henri Levèbvre is, I believe, very relevant and overlooked in the 
African context. While the orientalist and post-colonial discourse is a fundamental one in the African 
context, it has remained an intellectual rhetoric that is not visible in the development field today. On the 
contrary, the strength of the neoliberal approach, which has evolved into a military/economic 
development joint program to promote peace and democracy, has remained totally intact. The dialectic 
approach of a problem proned by Lefèbvre could in my opinion offer a negociation space in the African 
context because of the built dualism of the customary and modern institutions. In some ways, the 
palaver’s report is the result of what Lefèbvre could promote through a dialectic process: the palaver’s 
report is the synthesis of a clear property title and its anti-thesis the customary land use recognition. In 
this sense a large body of issues could be discussed following this pattern as presented in the following 
table: 
Table 8: Examples of Problem Solving Mechanisms following Henri Lefèbvre’s Philosophy in the African Context.   
Issue Thesis Anti-thesis Synthesis 
 individualism individual  
How to have secured and clear  
land title? 
Property Rights  
(modern authority) 
Use-value of Land 
(Customary Authority) 
Palaver’s Report 
 rationalism reason  
How to promote planning in the 
urban environment?   
Technical Planning 
(modern authority) 
Analysis of the needs 
(Customary Authority) 
Mixed Planning Commission 
 Objectivism (of a 
natural order) 
Objectivity   
How to promote equal rights for 
women and minority groups?  
Customary system 
does not provide 
such rights 
Modern system 
should guaranty and 
enforce such rights 
National dialogue organized 
by the modern authority but 
following the administrative 
setting of the Customary 
authorities. (Charter for 
Equal Rights)   
 modernism tradition  
How to favor a democratic 
setting?  
Modern system is 
supposed to 
guarantee rules of 
democracy 
Customary system 
does not work on a 
democratic basis 
Include the customary 
administration as a 
consultative body working 
together with the democratic 
institutions.  
 Urban Rural  
How to build the African city?  The Modern 
authority is urban 
The customary 
authority is rural as 
Creation of a low density 








includes urban agriculture 
and a good transportation 
system.   
 Nationalism (the 
chief becomes a 
fetish)  
National Identity  
How to raise taxes and promote 
transparency?  
Customary system is 
very efficient and not 
transparent 
Modern system is not 
efficient but more 
transparent  
Women Council for 
Transparency work with the 
customary authorities and 
the local governements for a 
national program (education 
and health targets for ex.)  
Table by J.Touber, 2016. 
 
Looking at political, social and economic issues in terms of access to rights (attached to duties) and 
crossing boundaries whether it is in terms of scales, environments, actors, fields as Lefèbvre always 
seeked to in order to fight alienation offers a great potential in the African context, alienated by the 
colonial heritage from inside and outside. Through such processes and officialization of the inclusion of 
the two systems –modern and customary-, it becomes possible to consider a safer and secured 
apprehension of land and thus minimize the importance of a dense population onto a territory as a 
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Language and Cultural Concepts  
This glossary intends to clarify some terms and expressions that have been translated from 
Moré to French to English, and are likely to accumulate some misinterpretations in the translation 
process; and French terms that entitle a very unique notion in the Burkinabe context.   
 
Commune: a commune is a French term for municipality but is also associated to the French Revolution as this 
administrative level was put in place after the French Revolution and carries a geographical egalitarian sense.   
 
Moogo: moogo means the “world” in Moré. It represents the different Mossi political entities as a whole, with the 
different Mossi kingdoms.  
 
Moré: The language spoken by the Mossi people. I chose the spelling used by the American anthropologist Elliott 
Skinner, but French anthropologists spell it moore.  
 
Mogho Naba: The Mossi “king”, the “king” of the Moogo and the Ouagadougou kingdom.  
 
Mossi: Noun and adjective to designate the Mossi people. I refer to the spelling used by the American 
anthropologist Elliott Skinner, but French anthropologists will use Moose or Moosi (plural noun; Mooga or Moaga 
sing.) and moose (adj.).    
 
Naam: naam means power in Moré. This term is associated to a concept of power, attached to the Mossi or 
Nakombse, the original Mossi warriors.  
 
Tenga: tenga means land in Moré. This term is associated to a social concept, attached to the representation of 
the people from the land, the diverse ethnic groups who populate an area and offer a place to the naam. Tenga is 
also a divinity.   
 
Waogdogo’s dynasty: The spelling of Ouagadougou as Waogdogo by the anthropologists and historians marks 
the pre-colonial nature of the institution.   
Zone lotie or lotissement: in the Burkinabe context, a zone lotie or lotissement is a planned area. This does not 
necessarily mean that the area is built and equiped. It usually means that land plots have been registered but no 
road or infranstructure have been developed.   
Zone non-lotie: a zone non-lotie is an unplanned area which means that the land is not registered but it 






ANNEX 1: Comparative Evolution of the Population of Burkina Faso with the World Population and 
World Urban Population 
 
Urban Population Growth from 1960 to 2008 (% of urban population – mean values) 
Data from UN-HABITAT 
 
Julie Touber, 2010 
Population in informal settlements from 1990-2005 (% of population – median values) 
Data from UN-HABITAT 
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ANNEX 3: Letter from the Burkinabe Ministry of Justice authorizing me to conduct research in the 









ANNEX 4: Land Conflicts Matrixes from the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou for 1980, 1990, 2000, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
2010.   
 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou 
 
1980 
    
     # # picture Délibéré / Renvoie / Jugement objet description 
1 9491 D vente de parcelle _ 
2 9492 jugement 207 Expulsion  Décision: Le tribunal reconnait l'action de ND. Ordonne L de vider les 
lieux et de payer une indemnité de 51 600  FCFA à ND. 
3 9493 jugement 211 vente de parcelle Décision: Le tribunal déclare ZI propriétaire de la moitié de la parcelle 
et ordonne la mutation de permis de construire.  
4 9494 jugement 213 vente de parcelle Décision: _ 
5 9495 R propriété de bâti sur une parcelle _ 
6 9496 D propriété de bâti sur une parcelle _ 
7 9498 jugement 20  Assignation en expulsion Décision: Le tribunal ordonne l'expulsion de la veuve Y. Ordonne Y aux 
dépens.  
8 9500 jugement 69 vente de parcelle Décision: Le tribunal déclare la vente de parcelle à BA valide et 
ordonne l'expulsion de KM 
9 9501 R vente de terrain bâti _ 
10 9503 jugement 80 Assignation en expulsion Décision: le tribunal ordonne l'expulsion de CJ. Condamne CJ aux 
dépens.   
11 9504 R vente de terrain   Besoin de se déplacer sur les lieux pour des problèmes de délimitation 
de terrain.  
12 9505 jugement 105 Autorisation de parceler  Décision: le tribunal déboute la demande de NS de parceler. 
Condamne TB à payer 120 000 FCFA à NS.  
13 9506 jugement 132 vente d'immeuble Décision: immeuble de la BAFI est adjugé à 113 200 000 
14 9507 D vente d'immeuble _ 










Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou 
 
1990 
    
     
# # picture Délibéré / Renvoie / Jugement objet description 
1 9511/9512/9513 D assignation en déclaration de propriété voir photos pour tous les détails. 
2 9515 jugement 81 vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal déclare la vente de parcelle valable et ordonne l'expulsion  de 
SS. Aux dépens de SS.  
3 9517 jugement 98 assignation en expulsion  Décison: Le tribunal ordonne l'expulsion de ST. Aux dépens de ST 
4 9519 jugement 127 Vente immobilière Décison: vente du centre loti attribué à une troisième partie au prix de 1 700 
000FCFA 
5 9521 D duplicata de titre foncier demande de duplicata de titre foncier numero XXXX 
6 9523 jugement 191 duplicata de titre foncier Décison: le tribanal délivre un duplicata de la copie du titre foncier numéro XXXX 
7 9524 jugement 195 Duplicata du PUH n XX du 4 janv 1979 Décision: le tribunal autorise le conservateur du titre foncier à délivrer un 
duplicata du PUH nXX. Aux dépens de B.  
8 9526 jugement 235 bis Duplicata de titre foncier  Décision: le tribunal autorise le conservateur de la propriété foncière à délivrer à 
la B un duplicata de la copie du titre foncier nXXX du centre lôti de Ouagadougou. 
9 9527 jugement 257 Vente de parcelle Décision: Le tribunal déclare parfaite la vente intervenue entre LG et ML et par 
conséquent aux droits de ML, propriétaire de la parcelle. Condamne LG aux 
dépens.  
10 9530/9531 jugement 323 Duplicata du titre foncier Décision: le tribunal autorise la délivrance d'un duplicata du titre foncier nXXXX 
parcelleX du lot nXXX du centre lôti de Ouagadougou.  
11 9532 jugement 347 Assignation en droit de propriété Décision: Le tribunal constate que KY détient un titre de propriété  concernant la 
parcelle nXX et qu'il en est donc propriétaire jusquà preuve du contraire. Déboute 
donc TO  de sa demande d'annulation du PUH et lui donne 6 mois pour libérer la 












Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou 
 
2000 
    
     
# # picture Délibéré / Renvoie / Jugement objet description 
1 9534 jugement 936 vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal déclare SF propriétaire de la parcelle nXX lot XX section TD du 
secteur 30 de la ville de Ouagadougou au prix de 3 650 000FCFA outre les frais taxés à 
la somme de 323 456FCFA. Aux dépens de BF 
2 9536 jugement 1091 Assignation d'expulsion Décison: le tribunal ordonne le déguerpissement de BR de la parcelle nX du lot XX du 
secteur 12 de Ouagadougou. Condamne BR à payer à KS la somme de 200 000FCFA 
de dommages et interests. Aux dépens de BR. 
3 9537 jugement 1098 Assignation d'expulsion Décision: le tribunal ordonne le déguerpissement de OA de la parcelle XX du lot XX 
section IM de la commune de Bogodogo du secteur 15 de Ouagadougou. Aux dépens 
de OA.  
4 9539 jugement 1165 Assignation en propriété Décision: le tribunal ordonne le restitution à SL de sa fiche provisoire d'attribution  
relative à la parcelle XX du lot XX secteur RS du secteur 16 de la ville de Ouagadougou 
détenue par NS. Aux dépens de NS. 
5 9541 jugement 45 Vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal annula la vente de la parcelle X lot XXX du secteur 11 de la ville 
de Ouagadougou intervenue le 18/11/1987 entre OI et KS. Ordonne la restitution du 
PUH et l'expulsion de KS. Aux dépens de KS.  
6 9542/9543 jugement 49 assignation en propriété Décision: le tribunal ordonne la mutation de la parcelle nXX lot XX section LD tu 
secteur 23 de Ouagadougou au nom de KM. Ordonne l'expulsion de YK.  Aux dépens 
de YK.  
7 9544 jugement 73 Assignation en propriété Décision: le tribunal déclare ZB recevable de son action. Condamne KT à vider les 
lieux à savoir la parcelle XX lot XX section NA du secteur 21 de la ville de 
Ouagadougou. Aux dépens de KT. 
8 9546/9547 jugement 115 vente de parcelle Décison: le tribunal déclare nulle la vente de la parcelle XX section SN de la ville de 
Ouagadougou pour non respect des dispositions de l'article 305 du code des 
personnes et de la famille. Aux dépens de DO.  
9 9548 jugement 119 Assignation en propriété Décision: le tribunal  déclare CH propriétaire de la parcelle XX lot XX section WE au 
secteur 10 de la commune de Baslsuy ville de Ouagadougou. Ordonne l'expulsion des 
héritiers de T. Aux dépens de T. 
10 9550 jugement 205 Assignation en propriété Décision: le tribunal ordonne un transport sur les lieux à l'effet d'identifier les 
occupants effectifs de la parcelle et d'accomplir tout autre acte utile à la 
manifestation de la vérité.  
11 9552 jugement 302 annulation de vent Décision: le tribunal ordonne l'annulation de vent intervenue entre CG et OM le 
20/01/1997 concernant la parcelle XX du lot XX section MD du secteur 22 de la 
commune de Sig-Noghin. Le tribunal donne raison à RL et annule le jugement n334 








12 9554 jugement 380 Assignation en propriété Décision: le tribunal constate le propriété de OS sur la parcelle nXX lot XX section LC 
du secteur 24 de Ouagadougou. Aux dépens de SH 
13 9555 jugement 430 vente de parcelle Toutes les formalités ont été accomplis sans que BY ne réponde d'un seul acte. 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la parcelle X du lot XX de la section CE du secteur 11 de 
Ouagadougou, objet du PUH  n1109XX du 05/07/1998 adjugé au bénéfice du B au 
prix de 5 000 000 FCFA. Aux dépens de BY. 
14 9557 D vente de parcelle SA et PR ont vécu ensemble pdt 18ans. SA a vendu la parcelle 3 500 000FCFA mais PR 
n'était pas au courant. Elle désire acheter la parcelle mais HKA qui a acheté la parcelle  
s'y oppose et demande au tribunal de débouter PR. 
15 9559 jugement 481 vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal constate la vente de la parcelle XX lot XXX secteur 2 de 
Ouagadougou objet du PUH en date du 23 mai 1970 entre IPM et NO et ordonne 
l'expulsion de IPM de la dite parcelle. Aux dépens de IPM. 
16 9560 jugement 498 assignation en expulsion Décision: le tribunal déclare recevable la demande de Mme O/S H et ordonne 
l'expulsion de GM de la parcelle XX, Lot XX section TD du secteur 30 de 
Ouagadougou. Déboute GM de toutes ses demandes. Aux dépens de GM.  
17 9562 jugement 525 Assignation en propriété Décision: le tribunal constate que ON est attributaire de la parcelle nXX lot XX section 
IR de la commune de Bogodogo secteur 15 et ordonne l'expulsion de ZL. 
18 9563 jugement 541 vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal déclare la vente intervenue entre Ofrançois et KR de la parcelle 
nXX lot XX section DK secteur 10 de Ouagadougou parfaite. Au dépens de OS 
19 9565/9566 jugement 647 Assignation en propriété Décision: le tribunal ordonne le déguerpissement de TS de la parcelle nXX lotXX 
section WC du secteur 10 de Ouagadougou et faisant l'objet du PUH n0126XXX du 
11/08/93. Ordonne la restitution à TB et condamne TB à rembourser TS la somme de 
800 000FCFA, représentant la valeur des investissements réalisés sur la parcelle 
litigieuse. Dépens partagés.  
20 9568 jugement 660 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal adjuge à B l'immeuble faisant objet du PUH nXX du 27/4/1982 à 
la somme de 150 000 000FCFA. Condamne OS aux dépens.  
21 9570 jugement 718 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à la vente de l'immeuble formant la parcelle XX 
lot XX section MI secteur 22 de Ouagadougou jusqu'à l'issue de la procédure initiée 
au fond.  
22 9571 jugement 723 vente d'immeuble L'huissier procède aux enchères et l'immeuble est adjugé à la S à la somme de 29 159 
570FCFA. Décision: le tribunal ordonne l'abjudication de l'immeuble formant la 
parcelle nXX lotXX objet du titre foncier nXXXX de Ouagadougou à la S.  
23 9573/9574/9575 jugement 756 vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal ordonne vente aux enchères en 3 lots. Les trois lots sont 










Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou 
 
2006 
    
     # #
picture 
Délibéré / Renvoie / Jugement objet description 
1 8185 D vente immeuble _ 
2 8186 jugement 019 Assignation en annulation de vente Décision: annulation vente de parclle prononcée 
3 8187 R Assignation déclaration de propriété _ 
4 8188 jugement 048 vente immeuble Décision: Rejet de la demande d'annulation de vente 
5 8189 D Assign en déclaration de propriété _ 
6 8190 D Assign en déclaration de propriété _ 
7 8191 R Assign en annulation de vente de parcelle indications références parcelle 
8 8192 jugement 089 Assign en nulité de vente Décision: rejet de la demande de nulité de vente et annule la vente 
consentie le 18 nov 1987. Expulsion de KS et autres occupants 
9 8193 R vente immeuble _ 
10 8194 R vente immeuble absence de dires 
11 8195 D vente immeuble _ 
12 8196 jugement 115 vente immeuble Décision: Réclame 37 272 216 F  +  114 054 F taxes à la SGBB 
13 8197 R vente immeuble _ 
14 8197 R vente immeuble _ 
15 8198 D Assign en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
16 8199 D vente immeuble _ 
17 8199 D vente immeuble _ 
18 8200 R ass. En résolution de vente _ 
19 8201 R Assignation déclaration de propriété _ 
20 8202 D vente immeuble _ 
21 8203 R vente immeuble _ 
22 8204 D annulation de vente _ 
23 8205 jugement 148 vente immeuble Décision: annule vente immeuble pour violation de parcelle à la 








24 8206 R Assign en déclaration de propriété _ 
25 8207 radiation vente immeuble Le tribunal ordonne la radiation du dossier pour défaut de 
diligences. 
26 8208 D propriété de parcelle _ 
27 8209 jugement 172 annulation de vente Décision: Réclamation mal fondée et rejette l'action. Frais à la 
charge de AD  
28 8210 jugement 173 vente immeuble Décision: Annule saisie immobilière servie à Sanne Hamidou et 
déboute Sanne Hamidou du surplus. Condamne la BACB aux 
dépens  
29 8211 jugement 174 vente immeuble Décision: Annule saisie immobilière servie à Kadore Noufou. 
Condamne la BACB aux dépens  
30 8212 R Assignation en annulation de vente _ 
31 8213 jugement 181 vente immeuble Décision: L'immeubles est adjugé à la S à la somme de 15 000 
000FCFA 
32 8214 R vente immeuble Renvoi pour vérification de l'accomplissement des formalités 
33 8215 R vente immeuble _ 
34 8216 désistement vente immeuble Désistement de SH condamne de facto SH auc dépens 
35 8217 D déclaration de vente _ 
36 8218 D annulation de vente _ 
37 8219 R vente immeuble Le tribunal constate l'absence de dires et observations. 
38 8220 R Confirmation de propriété _ 
39 8221 jugement 210 annulation de vente Décision: rejette fin de non recevoir du défaut de qualité du 
demandeur soutenu par WA. Recoit l'action de STEE sur la forme 
mais fond mal fondée. Condamne STEE aux dépens.  
40 8222 R vente immeuble _ 
41 8223 D propriété   _ 
42 8224 D vente parcelle _ 
43 8225 R vente immeuble _ 
44 8226 jugement 228 Assignation en déclaration de propriété et en expulsion Decision: Déclare OKA  recevable. Ordonne expulsion de SM. 
Déboute OKA du surplus des ses ddes. Aux dépens de SM.  
45 8227 jugement 230 assignation  en déclaration de propriété et expulsion Confirme la vente conclue à AD  DR de la parcelle X du lot XXX dans 
secteur 17. Ordonne expulsion des occupants. Aux dépens de AD 
OS 








47 8229 jugement 250 vente immeuble Décision: immeuble adjugé à la B à 2 200 000 FCFA 
48 8230 jugement 259 revendication parcelle Décision: déboute SM  de sa demande étant mal fondée. 
Condamne SM a payé 150 000 FCFA à CA. Aux dépens de SM 
49 8231 R annulation de vente _ 
50 8232 R confirmation de vente _ 
51 8233 jugement 278 assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle Décision: renvoi le dossier à la mise en état. 
52 8234 D  assignation en résolution de vente _ 
53 8235 D assignation en résolution de vente _ 
54 8236 D assignation en déclaration de vente _ 
55 8237 jugement 290 Assignation en nullité de vente Décision: déclare un invalidité de l'action de la dame BE pour 
défaut de qualité. Aux dépens de BE. 
56 8238 R Exécution de contrat de vente Renvoi pour production de l'acte de représentation par Y 
57 8239 D assignation en résolution de vente _ 
58 8240 jugement 305 Assignation en déclaration de vente Décision: Déclare la vente parfaite. GI est le légitime propriétaire 
de la construction réalisée sur la parcelle querelleuse. Ordonne 
l'expulsion de OK. Condamne OK a payé 1 000 000 FCFA pour tous 
chefs de préjudices. Déboute GI du surplus de sa demande.   
59 8242 jugement 306 Assignation en déclaration de propriété   Décision: Déclare la plainte de YT recevable. Condamne TA. Aux 
dépens de TA.  
60 8243 R propriété - expulsion _ 
61 8244 R vente d'immeuble Le tribunal constate l'absence de dires et observations. 
62 8245 R vente d'immeuble _ 
63 8245 R vente d'immeuble _ 
64 8246 R vente d'immeuble _ 
65 8246 R vente d'immeuble _ 
66 8247 R vente d'immeuble _ 
67 8248 R annulation de vente _ 
68 8248 R annulation de vente _ 
69 8249 R Assignation aux fins d'homologation de vente _ 








71 8251 R vente d'immeuble Le tribunal constate le dépot au greffe des dires et observations et 
renvoie le dossier pour le respect du principe du contradictoire.  
72 8252 R vente d'immeuble _ 
73 8253 D vente d'immeuble _ 
74 8254 R Assignation en annulation de vente _ 
75 8255 R vente d'immeuble _ 
76 8256 jugement 345 vente d'immeuble Décision: la parcelle est abjugée à la B à 6 600 000 FCFA et par 
ailleurs les frais d'honoraires de l'avocat sont fixés à 1 504 500 
FCFA. Le tribunal condamne STS à payer les frais d'avocats.  
77 8257 jugement 346 vente d'immeuble Décision: l'immeuble est abjugé à SH à la somme de 6 000 000 
FCFA. Par ailleurs condamne SB à payer la somme de 1 000 000 
FCFA à titre des frais d'avocats.  
78 8257 désistement vente d'immeuble Le tribunal donne acte à la BICIA - B de son désistement d'instance.  
79 8258 jugement 349 vente d'immeuble Décision: Donne raison à BM et annule saisie immobilière par B. 
Condamne B aux dépens.  
80 8259 R Assignation en validité de vente _ 
81 8260 R homologation de vente _ 
82 8261 R vente d'immeuble _ 
83 8262 R nullité de vente   _ 
84 8263 D Assignation en liquidation et en partage de bien 
immobilier professionel  
_ 
85 8264 jugement 366 Assignation en restitution et expulsion Décision: Condamane CBE à payer la somme de 350 000FCFA à 
DMS. Rejete la demande de surplus de DMS. Condamne CBE aux 
dépens.   
86 8265 jugement 367 Assignation en expulsion Décision: le tribunal déclare l'action de CH recevable et prononce 
l'expulsion de TB. Déboute CH de sa demande de dommages et 
intérêts. Déclare la demande de TB recevable et condamne CH à 
payer 7 201 210 FCFA au titre d'indemnités pour les réalisations sur 
la parcelle. Dépens partagés. 
87 8266 jugement 368 Assignation en liquidation de partage de succession Décision: le tribunal déclare l'action de OTA recevable.  
88 8267 jugement 385 Assignation  en éxécution d'un contrat de vente 
d'immeuble 
Décision: le tribunal déclare l'action de YA recevable.  










Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou 
 
2007 
     
# # picture Délibéré / Renvoie / Jugement objet description 
1 8438 R Assignation en expulsion et en destruction de 
construction 
_ 
2 8439 jugement 033 Vente d'immeuble formant la parcelle nXX, Lot XX, 
secteur XX 
Décision: Statuant contradictoirement en matière civile, 
déclare irrecevable les dires et observations de YI; ordonne la 
poursuite de la procédure.  
3 8440 R Assignation en validité de vente et en expulsion _ 
4 8441 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété et en 
accomplissement de formallité de transfert de 
propriété. 
_ 
5 8443 R Vente d'immeuble  _ 
6 8444/8445 R Assignation en validité et interprétation de contrat et 
en déclaration de propriété 
_ 
7 8446 R Assignation en validité de vente    _ 
8 8447 D Confirmation de vente _ 
9 8448 R vente d'immeuble _ 
10 8449 jugement 305 Assignation en vente d'immeuble Décision: statuant publiquement, contradictoirment en matière 
civile et en dernier ressort: recoit les contestations formulées 
par YI et les déclare mal fondées et les rejette. Ordonne la 
poursuite de la procédure et maintient l'adjudication à ce jour. 
Adjuge à B la somme de 16 100 000 CFA. Cf photo pour + infos.  
11 8450 R Assignation en validité d'un contrat de vente, en 
déclaration de propriété et en expulsion. 
_ 
12 8450 R Assignation en revendication de propriété immobilière 
et en expulsion.  
_ 
13 8451 D Assignation en partage d'un parcelle à usage 
d'habitation 
_ 










15 8454 R Vente d'immeuble _ 
16 8455 D Assignation en revendication de parcelle et en 
annulation de vente 
_ 
17 8456 R vente d'immeuble cf photo #8458 
18 8457 D Assignation en partage d'un parcelle à usage 
d'habitation 
_ 
19 8459 jugement 464 Partage d'un parcelle à usage d'habitation Décision: le tribunal donne acte à la dame veuve O née Z et 3 
autres de leur désistement d'instance. Ordonne la radiation du 
dossier.  
20 8460 R titre foncier _ 
21 8462 jugement 496 Vente d'immeuble formant la parcelle nXX du Lot XX 
de la section HT au secteur 15 du centre loti de la ville 
de Ouagadougou, objet du PLH n45/10/VO du 1979. 
Décision: le tribunal annule l'acte de vente. 
22 8463 D Assignation en confirmation d'échange de propriété 
ou en restitution et en paiement 
_ 
23 8464 D Assignation en confirmation de vente _ 
24 8465 D Assignation en homologation de vente et en expulsion _ 
25 8466 D Assignation en revendication de propriété et en 
expulsion.  
_ 
26 8467 jugement 525 Vente d'immeuble formant la parcelle X, lotXX; 
secteur 9, quartier Gaunghin Nord, objet du PUH de 
1996 et de la fiche de reception nXX déposée le 31 
janvier 2007 du centre loti de la ville de Ouagadougou.  
décision: le tribunal déclare irrecevable les dires et 
observations de K F et ordonne la poursuite de la procédure.  
27 8468 jugement 535 Vente d'immeuble Le tribunal prend acte du désistement de B 
28 8469 D confirnation de vente _ 
29 8471 D vente d'immeuble _ 
30 8472 D Déclaration de propriété _ 
31 8473 R Assignation en validité de vente de parcelle _ 
32 8475 jugement 567 Assignation en revendication de parcelle et en 
annulation de vente 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte bien fondée et annule en 
conséquence la vente de la parcelle XX du lot 26 section XX du 
secteur 22.  
33 8476 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété et en 
expulsion 
_ 
34 8477 jugement 635 Assignation en revendication de propriété et en 
expulsion.  








35 8478 jugement 638 Vente de constructions formant la parcelle XX lot 25, 
section XX secteur 22 de la commune de 
Ouagadougou, objet de la fiche de reception nXX 
déposée le 31/01/2007 à la recette des domaines et 
de la publicité foncière Kadiogo, quittance nXXXXXXX 
décision: le tribunal constate l'absence des dires et observation 
de RZML et ordonne la poursuite de la procédure.  
36 8479 jugement 646 Assignation en confirmation de propriété et en 
expulsion 
Décision: le tribunal annule l'acte d'assignation. 
37 8480 jugement 650 Assignation en confirmation de vente Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de NJM bien fondée et 
confirma la vente de la parcelle XX du lot XX section MD 
secteur 22 du centre loti de Ouagadougou.  
38 8481 jugement 654 Assignation en homologation de vente et en expulsion Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de MA mal fondée et la 
rejette. Le tribunal confirme la vente de la parcelle G, lot 
XXXbis, secteur XX du secteur 17 de la ville de Ouagadougou 
conclue entre BPM et KS.  
39 8482 jugement 655 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal irrecevable les dires et observations de KF 
et ordonne la poursuite de la procédure.  
40 8483/8484 jugement 657 vente d'immeuble Décison: adjugée à la S la somme de 8.696.845 CFA 
41 8485 R vente d'immeuble _ 
42 8485 R vente d'immeuble _ 
43 8486 R vente de terrain _ 
44 8487 D Assignation en déclaration de propriété et en 
expulsion 
_ 
45 8488 R vente d'immeuble _ 
46 8489 R vente de terrain plus d'info sur photo 
47 8490 R vente d'immeuble _ 
48 8491 D vente d'immeuble _ 
49 8492/8493 jugement 754 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare recevable les dires et observations 
de OSK et annule la procédure de B pour absence de 
notification du cahier des charges. 
50 8494 D vente d'immeuble _ 
51 8495 jugement 755 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal dit que l'immeuble formant la parcelle XX 
lot XXX secteur 7 objet du PUH nXXXXXXX est adjugé à la 
somme de 43.094.873CFA. 
52 8496 R Assignation en confirmation de vente _ 
53 8497 jugement 802 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal rejette les dires et observations de TS 
54 8497 jugement 803 Déclaration de propriété Décision: le tribunal après avoir délibéré conformémént à la loi 
suspend sa décision jusqu'à l'interprétation d'une décision 








55 8498 jugement 806 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal prononce l'abjudication de l'immeuble 
formant la parcelle XX lot XX section IP du centre de 
Ouagadougou au profit de la B.   
56 8498/8499 jugement 807 vente de terrain Décision: le tribunal prononce l'abjudication du terrain urbain 
formant la parcelle XX lot XXX au profit de la B.   
57 8500 R Assignation en conformation de propriété immobilière _ 
58 8500 R confirmation d'échange avec soulte et en propriété _ 
59 8501 R validité de vente de parcelle _ 
60 8502 R validité de vente immobilière et mutation de titre de 
propriété 
_ 
61 8503 R saisie vente d'immeuble _ 
62 8504 R vente de saisie immobilière _ 
63 8505/8506 jugement 860 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare les dires et observations de TS mal 
fondés et prononce l'adjudication de l'immeuble formant la 
parcelle XX du lot XX de la section HT objet du PUH du centre 
loti de Ouagadougou à la société G. 
64 8507 R Assignation en confirmation de propriété  _ 
65 8508 R Assignation en confirmation de propriété _ 
66 8509 jugement 915 Etablissement de duplicata de titre foncier Décision: le tribunal fait droit à la requête.  
 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou 
 
2008 
     
# # picture Délibéré / Renvoie / Jugement objet description 
1 8511 R Assignation en validité d'un contrat de vente en 
déclaration de propriété et en expulsion 
_ 
2 8512 R vente immobilière _ 
3 8513 R  Assignation en validité d'un contrat de vente en 
déclaration de propriété et en expulsion 
_ 
4 8514 R contestation de bornage de propriété Alain Bagré expert géomètre 
5 8514 R vente immobilière _ 
6 8515 R assignation en nullité d'hypothèque _ 








8 8517 R Revendication de propriété, nullité d'acte de vente 
et expulsion 
_ 
9 8518 R vente d'immeuble _ 
10 8519 R vente de terrain _ 
11 8520 R vente d'immeuble _ 
12 8520 R vente d'immeuble _ 
13 8521 R vente d'immeuble _ 
14 8522 R vente d'immeuble _ 
15 8523 R vente d'immeuble _ 
16 8524 R vente d'immeuble _ 
17 8525 R vente d'immeuble bâti _ 
18 8526 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété _ 
19 8527 R Saisie vente d'immeuble _ 
20 8528 D Assignation en confirmation de vente et en 
propriété 
_ 
21 8529 jugement 963 Saisie vente d'immeuble Décision: Le tribunal rejette les dires et observation de KA et autre. 
22 8530 R Assignation en nullité de vente d'immeuble _ 
23 8530 R requête de déclaration de propriété d'immeuble _ 
24 8531 R assignation en revendication de propriété 
immobilière et en expulsion 
_ 
25 8532 R vente immobilière _ 
26 8533 D Assignation en confirmation de vente et en 
propriété 
_ 
27 8534 R requête de déclaration de propriété d'immeuble _ 
28 8535 jugement 964 vente d'immeuble Décision: Le tribunal prononce l'abjudication de l'immeuble au profit 
de la SG pour la somme de 36.088.925 CFA 
29 8536 R vente d'immeuble _ 
30 8537 R vente immobilière _ 
31 8538 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété et en 
accomplissement de formalité de transfert de 
propriété 
_ 
32 8539 D Assignation en déclaration de propriété _ 
33 8540 jugement 024 Assignation en confirmation de propriété 
immobilière 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la requête de BA mal fondée et la rejette.  
34 8541 D vente d'immeuble _ 
35 8543/8544 jugement 034 vente de terrain Décision: le tribunal donne raison aà BR et annule la vente de la 
parcelle XX lot XX section DW du secteur 23 de la ville de 








36 8545 D assignation en revendication de propriété 
immobilière et en expulsion 
_ 
37 8546 R vente d'immeuble _ 
38 8546 R déclaration de propriété d'immeuble objet du titre 
foncier 
_ 
39 8547 R Assignation en nullité de vente _ 
40 8547 R assignation en déclaration de propriété _ 
41 8549 jugement 060 Assignation en expulsion Décision: le tribunal reconnait le plainte de CP comme bien fondée et 
ordonne l'expulsion de BD de la parcelle XX lotXX section NR du 
secteur 19 de la ville de Ouagadougou. 
42 8550 jugement 62 succession décision: le tribunal reçoit le plainte de NG et la déclare partiellement 
fondée. Ordonne par conséquent la liquidation et le partage des 
biens autres que le logement familiel objet de la parcelle nXXX lot XX 
quartier K  du centre de Ouagadougou. 
43 8551 R vente d'immeuble _ 
44 8552 jugement 082 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal prononce la radiation du dossier à la suite 
d'accord intervenu entre les parties. 
45 8553 R validité d'une vente immobilière et mutation de 
titre de propriété 
_ 
46 8554 D Assignation en confirmation de propriété  _ 
47 8555 R assignation en déclaration de vente parfaite et en 
propriété 
_ 
48 8556 jugement 118 Saisie vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal prononce l'abjudication de l'immeuble bâti objet 
du PUH nXXXXXXX et date du 11 octobre 2006 formant la parcelle XX 
du lot XX section XX du secteur 25 de la ville de Ouagadougou à la 
somme de 11.100.000CFA au profit de S. 
49 8557 jugement 119 confirmation d'échange de soulte et en propriété 
ou restitution de soulte 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de la veuve O bien fondée et 
confirme par conséquent l'échange avec soultes intervenu entre O et 
IJP relativement à la parcelle nXX, lotXX section XX du secteur 22 de la 
ville de Ouagadougou.  
50 8558 jugement 120 assignation en confirmation de vente et en 
propriété 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de la veuve B bien fondée et 
confirma la vente intervenue entre feu B et TZN relativement à la 
parcelle nXX du lot XXX du secteur ? de la ville de Ouaga. 
51 8559 R vente d'immeuble _ 
52 8560 D vente d'immeuble _ 
53 8561 D assignation en confirmation de propriété 
immobilière 
_ 










55 8563 jugement 171 Assignation en déclaration de propriété Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de NS mal fondée et la rejette. 
56 8564 D validité de vente de parcelle _ 
57 8565 R confirmation de propriété _ 
58 8566 R validité d'une vente immobilière et mutation de 
titre de propriété 
_ 
59 8567 R déclaration de propriété d'immeuble objet du titre 
foncier 
_ 
60 8567 R déclaration de propriété d'immeuble objet du titre 
foncier 
_ 
61 8568 D assignation en revendication de propriété 
immobilière et en expulsion 
_ 
62 8569 D vente immobilière _ 
63 8570 D vente immobilière _ 
64 8571 jugement 224 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal prononce la radiation. 
65 8572 jugement 236 Assignation en confirmation de propriété Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de OS bien fondée et déclare 
que la parcelle nXX lotXX section NH du secteur 19 de Ouagadougou 
appartient à OS. 
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2009 
     
# # picture Délibéré / Renvoie / Jugement objet description 
1 9816 R Assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
2 8917 R vente d'immeuble _ 
3 8918 R Assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle 
et en revendication de propriété 
_ 
4 8919 R Assignation en restitution d'un bien immobilier _ 
5 8920 ? vente d'immeuble le tribunal dit ne pas être saisi. 
6 8921 D annulation de vente _ 
7 8922 D validité de vente _ 
8 8923 jugement 02 annulation de vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal rejette la fin de non recevoir soulevée par le 








9 8924 D Assignation en confirmation de vente    et   en 
expulsion 
_ 
10 8925 D vente sur saisie immobilière détails cf photo 
11 8926 R vente sur saisie immobilière détails cf photo 
12 8927 R annulation de vente _ 
13 8928 R nullité de vente _ 
14 8929 D vente d'immeuble détails cf photo 
15 8930 D vente d'immeuble détails cf photo 
16 8931 D vente d'immeuble détails cf photo 
17 8932 R Déclaration de propriété de l'immeuble objet 
du titre foncier nXXXX 
_ 
18 8933 jugement 088 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare nulle la procédure de saisie 
immobilière. 
19 8934/8935 jugement 105 vente sur saisie immobilière Décision: le tribunal adjuge l'immeuble à FdDev 
20 8936 jugement 106 vente d'immeuble Décision: immeuble est attibué à B 
21 8937 jugement 107 vente d'immeuble Décision: immeuble est attibué à B 
22 8938 D vente d'immeuble _ 
23 8939 R Etablissement d'un duplicata de titre foncier _ 
24 8940 D Assignation en nullité de vente et expulsion _ 
25 8941 D Assignation en validité de vente _ 
26 8942 jugement 112 Validité de vente immobilière et mutation de 
titre foncier 
Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
27 8943 jugement 138 Déclaration de propriété de l'immeuble objet 
du titre foncier  
Décision: le tribunal déboute EMY 
28 8945 jugement 142 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne la radiation de la saisie immobilière 
et condamne la B  à payer BA. 
29 8946 D opposition de vente de parcelle _ 
30 8946 D établissement de duplicata de PUH _ 
31 8946 D Assignation en dééclaration de propriété _ 
32 8947 R Assignation en nullité de vente d'immeuble _ 
33 8948 R Revendication de propriété _ 
34 8948 R Assignation en mutation de titre foncier _ 
35 8949 R Etablissement de duplicata de PUH _ 
36 8949 R Assignation en validité de vente immobilière _ 
37 8950 R Délivrance d'un duplicata de titre foncier _ 
38 8951 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété _ 
39 8951 R vente d'immeuble _ 
40 8952 R vente d'immeuble _ 








42 8954 D annulation de vente _ 
43 8954 D Annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
44 8954 D Etablissement de duplicata  _ 
45 8955 D Duplicata de titre foncier _ 
46 8955 D expulsion _ 
47 8956 R Délivrance d'un duplicata de titre foncier _ 
48 8957 D déclaration de propriété _ 
49 8958 jugement 156 Délivrance d'un duplicata de titre foncier Décision: le tribunal déclare irrecevable la requête de AL. 
50 8959 jugement 163 litige relatif à une parcelle Décision: le tribunal déclare la requête irrecevable. 
51 8960 jugement 178 délivrance de duplicata de PUH Décision: le tribunal ordonne la délivrance du duplicata de PUH 
nXXXXXXX du 01/10/03 relatif à la parcelle X lotXXX de secteur 17 
de Ouagadougou. 
52 8961 jugement 198 Assignation en déclaration de propriété Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis 
53 8961 jugement 199  Assignation en confirmation de vente    et   en 
expulsion 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la vente valable et ordonne 
l'expulsion.  
54 8961 jugement 200 opposition de vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal déclare l'action irrecevable. 
55 8962 R Assignation en annulation  de vente de parcelle _ 
56 8963 D Etablissement de duplicata de titre foncier _ 
57 8963 D Etablissement du duplicata de PUH _ 
58 8964 R Assignation en confirmation d'échange de 
propriété 
_ 
59 8965 D Assignation en validité de vente de parcelle _ 
60 8966 D Assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
61 8967 D Assignation en validité de vente immobilière _ 
62 8968 R Assignation en nullité de vente immobilière _ 
63 8968 R vente d'immeuble _ 
64 8969 D Assignation en déclaration de propriété _ 
65 8970 R Assignation en nullité de vente d'un parcelle _ 
66 8970 jugement 207 vente d'immeuble Décision: illisible 
67 8971 jugement 208 vente de deux immeubles Décision: le tribunal adjuge à la B la somme de 156.913.376  CFA. 
68 8972 R Delivrance de duplicata de titre foncier _ 
69 8973 jugement 209 vente d'immeuble Décision: adjugé  au créancier à la mise à prix. 
70 8974 D vente d'immeuble _ 
71 8974 R Assignation en nullité de vente d'immeuble _ 
72 8974 D Homologation d'acte de vente _ 
73 8975 jugement 226 Etablissement de duplicata de titre foncier Décision: le tribunal fait droit à la requête. 
74 8976 D Délivrance de duplicata de titre foncier _ 








76 8978 jugement 238 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal déclare la procédure irrégulière et annule la 
vente. Condamne la S. 
77 8979 jugement 254 Déclaration de propriété de l'immeuble objet 
du titre foncier nXXXX 
Décision: le tribunal déboute YEM.  
78 8980 R vente d'immeuble _ 
79 8981 jugement 265 Assignation en nullité de vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne la radiation du dossier.  
80 8982 D Assignation en revendication de propriété, en 
nullité d'acte de cession et en expulsion 
_ 
81 8982 R Assignation en revendication de propriété 
immobilière et en expulsion 
_ 
82 8983 R Assignation en confirmation de propriété et en 
annulation de vente 
_ 
83 8984 R Assignation en reconnaissance de droit de 
jouissance 
_ 
84 8985 D Assignation en validité de vente immobilière _ 
85 8986 R Assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
86 8987 R Requête aux fins de délivrance d'un duplicata 
de titre foncier 
_ 
87 8988 jugement 267 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la défaillance de S et annule la vente 
aux dépends de S.  
88 8989 jugement 269 annulation de vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal déclare l'action de Veuve I irrecevable.  
89 8990/8991 jugement 286 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare les dires et observations de SB fondés 
et annule en conséquence la saisie immobilière entreprise par S. 
90 8992 jugement 289 assignation en validité de vente Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de Veuve B bien fondée et 
dit que la vente de la parcelle X lot XXX du secteur 3 de  Ouaga 
objet du PUH nXXXXXXX du 24/07/1989 est valide.  
91 8993 D vente d'immeuble _ 
92 8994 R Etablissement d'un duplicata de titre foncier _ 
93 8995 R Mutation de propriété _ 
94 8996 D Délivrance de titre foncier _ 
95 8997 R validité de vente immobilière et en déclaration 
de propriété 
_ 
96 8998 R Annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
97 8999 R annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
98 9000 R Homologation d'acte de vente _ 
99 9001 R déclaration de propriété immobilière _ 








101 9003/9004 jugement 313 vente de la construction formant la parcelle XX 
lot XX section X du secteur 22 de Ouagadougou 
Décision: le tribunal déclare les dires et observations du défendant 
bien fondés et annule la procédure de saisie immobilière de la B. 
102 9005 jugement 320 Délivrance d'un duplicata de titre foncier Décision: le tribunal ordonne la délivrance d'un duplicata de titre 
foncier nXXX de l'arrondissement de Sig Noyhin.  
103 9006 D Assignation en déclaration de propriété _ 
104 9007 R Assignation en annulation de vente immobilière _ 
105 9007 D Assignation en annulation de vente immobilière _ 
106 9008 R assignation aux fins de revendication de la 
propriété de parcelle et expulsion 
_ 
107 9009 D Assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
108 9010 D Assignation en rapport d'un immeuble _ 
109 9011 R Duplicata de titre foncier _ 
110 9012 R assignation en confirmation de vente et en 
déclaratin de propriété 
_ 
111 9013 D assignation en validité de vente immobilière et 
en déclaration de propriété 
_ 
112 9014 D assignation en confirmation de propriété et en 
annulation de vente 
_ 
113 9015 D Homologation d'acte de vente _ 
114 9015 R assignation en résolution de vente d'immeuble 
et expulsion 
_ 
115 9016 R assignation en revendication de propriété _ 
116 9017 jugement 325 Délivrance de titre foncier Décision: le tribunal fait droit à la requête et ordonne la délivrance 
d'un duplicata du titre foncier nXXX lotXX parcelle X de secteur 04 
de Ouagadougou. 
117 9018 R Assignation en déclaration de nullité de vente 
d'immeuble 
_ 
118 9019 R assignation en confirmation de propriété 
immobilière 
_ 
119 9020 R Assignation en confirmation   de vente et   en 
propriété 
_ 
120 9021 R Assignation en confirmation d'échange de 
propriété 
_ 
121 9022 R vente d'immeuble _ 
122 9022 R vente d'immeuble _ 
123 9023 R vente d'immeuble _ 
124 9024 R vente d'immeuble _ 
125 9025 R vente d'immeuble _ 








127 9028 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur photo 
128 9029 R Assignation en rapport d'un immeuble _ 
129 9029 R Assignation en validité de vente immobilière _ 
130 9030 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété _ 
131 9031 R Assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
132 9032 R Assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
133 9033 R assignation en validité de vente d'une parcelle 
et expulsion 
_ 
134 9034 R vente d'immeuble _ 
135 9035 D Duplicata de titre foncier _ 
136 9036 R vente d'immeuble _ 
137 9037 D Etablissement d'un duplicata de titre foncier _ 
138 9038 D Assignation aux fins de revendication de la 
propriété de parcelle  
_ 
139 9039 D Homologation d'acte de vente _ 
140 9040 D Duplicata de titre foncier _ 
141 9041 R Assignation en revendication de propriété 
d'immeuble 
_ 
142 9042 jugement 365 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare l'hypothèque nulle et condamne la B. 
143 9043 jugement 366 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal annule les poursuites de la B.  
144 9044 D vente d'immeuble _ 
145 9045 R Assignation en validité de vente immobilière _ 
146 9046 jugement 375 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal annule les poursuites de la B. et la saisie 
immobilière.  
147 9046 R Assignation en annulation de vente d'immeuble _ 
148 9048 jugement 376 Délivrance de duplicata de titre foncier Décision: tribunal constate le désistement d'instance. 
149 9048 jugement 377 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal adjuge la parcelle à la B. 
150 9049 jugement 378 Duplicata de titre foncier Décision: le tribunal rejette la demande.  
151 9049 jugement 379 vente d'immeuble Décision: pas lisible 
152 9050 R Etablissement d'un duplicata de titre foncier _ 
153 9050 jugement 386 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal annule la saisie immobilière de la B. 
154 9051 R 









155 9052 R 
Assignation en revendication de propriété 
immobilière   _ 
156 9052 R vente d'immeuble _ 
157 9053 R Assignation en nullité de vente immobilière _ 
158 9054 jugement 393 vente immobilière Décision: immeuble adjugé à la B. 
159 9055/9056 jugement 394 vente immobilière Décision: illisible 
160 9057 jugement 401 Homologation d'acte de vente Décision: le tribunal rejette la demande.  
161 9058 D vente d'immeuble _ 
162 9059 R assignation en homologation de vente 
d'immeuble et en mutation 
_ 
163 9060 R assignation en revendication de propriété de 
parcelle  et expulsion 
_ 
164 9061 ? assignation en validité d'une vente immobilière _ 
165 9062 D Assignation en déclaration de propriété _ 
166 9062 R annulation de vente _ 
167 9063 D assignation en annulation de vente _ 
168 9063 D Assignation en rapport d'un immeuble _ 
169 9064 ? vente d'immeuble _ 
170 9065 D assignation en validité d'une vente immobilière _ 
171 9066 jugement 414 Assignation en mutation de titre de propriété Décision: le tribunal constate le désistement d'instance de KZ 
172 9067 jugement 415 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate l'absence de dires et observations et 
renvoie le dossier à l'audience d'adjudication 
173 9068 jugement 419 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
174 9069 jugement 421 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
175 9070 D vente d'immeuble _ 
176 9071 D vente d'immeuble _ 
177 9072 D confirmation de propriété et annulation  de 
vente 
_ 
178 9073 R assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
179 9074 D Assignation en validité de vente et en 
déclaration de propriété 
_ 
180 9075 jugement 460 vente d'immeuble Décision: déclare les dires et observations du défendant 








181 9076 jugement 466 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate le désistement de la B. 
182 9077 D vente d'immeuble _ 
183 9078 D vente d'immeuble _ 
184 9079 R Assignation en confirmation du droit de 
propriété 
_ 
185 9080 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété et en 
expulsion 
_ 
186 9081 R assignation en déclaration de propriété et en 
expulsion 
_ 
187 9081 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété et en 
expulsion 
_ 
188 9081 R Assignation en déclaration de propriété et en 
expulsion 
_ 
189 9082 R assignation en revendication de propriété de 
parcelle  et expulsion 
_ 
190 9083 R vente d'immeuble _ 
191 9084 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur photo 
192 9085 D Etablissement de duplicata de titre foncier _ 
193 9086 R vente d'immeuble _ 
194 9086/7/8/90/91/92 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur photos 
195 9093 R vente d'immeuble _ 
196 9093 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur photo 
197 9094 R vente d'immeuble _ 
198 9095 R assignation en confirmation de propriété _ 
199 9095 R Assignation en déclaration parfaite de propriété _ 
200 9096 jugement 468 Assignation en déclaration de propriété 
immobilière 
Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à statuer jusquà 
l'intervention de la décision du juge pénal.  
201 9097 jugement 472 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
202 9097 jugement473 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
203 9098/9099 jugement 490 declaration de nullité de vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déboute le plaintif.  
204 9100 D vente d'immeuble plus d'infos sur photo 
205 9101 R Assignation en revendication de propriété 









206 9102 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur photo 
207 9103 D Assignation en confirmation en vente et en 
déclaration de propriété 
_ 
208 9104 D assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle _ 
209 9105 jugement XXX assignation en annulation de vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
210 9105/9106 jugement 507 vente de terrain Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
211 9106/9107 jugement 508 assignation en revendication de propriété 
immobilière 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de SKH irrecevable.  
212 9108 jugement 511 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
213 9109 jugement 512 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
214 9110 jugement 518 vente d'immeuble Décision: illisible 
215 9110 R assignation en annulation de vente _ 
216 9111 R vente d'immeuble plus d'infos sur photo 
217 9112 D nullité de vente immobilière _ 
218 9112 D annulation de vente de parcelle en licitation de 
partage et en paiement 
_ 
219 9113 R annulation de vente de parcelle et confirmation 
de propriété et expulsion 
_ 
220 9114 R annulation de vente de parcelle et confirmation 
de propriété et expulsion 
_ 
221 9115 jugement 533 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare la procédure de saisie immobilière de 
B nulle.  
222 9116 jugement 536 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne l'expulsion du plaintif ZH et reconnait 
les dires et observations du défendant comme valides.  
223 9117 jugement 544 rapport d'un immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare la requête des héritiers irrecevable.  
















    
# # picture Délibéré / Renvoie / 
Jugement 
objet description 
1 9120 annulé vente immobilière _ 
2 9120 D vente immobilière _ 
3 9121 R vente immobilière _ 
4 9121 annulé vente immobilière _ 
5 9122/9123 D vente immobilière plus infos sur photos 
6 9124 D vente immobilière plus infos sur photo 
7 9125 D vente immobilière _ 
8 9126/9127 jugement 001 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal adjuge l'immeuble bâti formant la parcelle X 
lotXXX quartier Dapoga II   de Ouaga objet du PUH nXX (1982) à T. 
(voir photos pour plus infos) 
9 9128 D vente immobilière _ 
10 9129/30/31 jugement X vente immobilière Décision: immeuble adjugé à la B (voir photo pour détails) 
11 9132 D vente immobilière _ 
12 9133 R assignation en reconnaissance de 
droit de jouissance 
_ 
13 9134 jugement 015 assignation en confirmation de 
propriété et en annulation de 
vente 
Décision: le tribunal annule la vente entre les parties et déboute le 
défendant. plus infos sur photo 
14 9135 R Assignation en revendication de 
parcelle 
_ 
15 9136 R assignation en revendication et en 
déclaration de propriété 
_ 
16 9137 R vente immobilière _ 
17 9137 R assignation en résolution de vente 
immobilière et paiement 
_ 
18 9138 R assignation en déclaration parfaite 
de propriété 
_ 
19 9139 R établissement de duplicata de  titre 
foncier 
_ 
20 9140 jugement 028 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal constate le désistement de la B. 
21 9140 jugement 029 annulation de vente Décision: le tribunal déboute le plaignant. 
22 9141 jugement 030 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal annule la procédure de vente immobilière par 
la S. 









24 9142 jugement 032 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal déclare les dires et observations de la S 
irrecevables pour cause de déchéance.  
25 9143 jugement 039 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
26 9143 jugement 040 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
27 9144 jugement 045 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal se déclare incompétent. 
28 9145 D vente immobilière _ 
29 9145/9146 D assignation en résolution de vente 
immobilière et paiement 
_ 
30 9147 R vente immobilière _ 
31 9148 R vente immobilière plus infos sur photo 
32 9149 R vente immobilière _ 
33 9150/51/52 D vente immobilière plus infos sur photo 
34 9153/54 D vente immobilière plus infos sur photos 
35 9155 R vente immobilière _ 
36 9156/57 jugement X vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal déclare la parcelle nXX lotXX de la section XX 
au secteur 30 de la ville de Ouaga adjugée à la B 
37 9158 D Requête aux fins d'établissement 
d'un duplicata de titre foncier 
_ 
38 9159 jugement 067 assignation en annulation de vente 
de parcelle 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la demande du plangnant irrecevable.  
39 9160 D vente immobilière _ 
40 9161 R assignation en déclaration de 
propriété et en expulsion 
_ 
41 9162 jugement 081 vente immobilière Déision: le tribunal déclare les dires et observations des 
défendants mal-fondés.  
42 9163/64 jugement 083 vente immobilière Déision: le tribunal déclare les dires et observations des 
défendants mal-fondés.  
43 9165 R vente immobilière _ 
44 9166/67 jugement 089 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et 
déclare l'immeuble parcelleX lotXXX section X secteur 17 de 
Ouagadougou adjugé à la B.  
45 9168 R Assignation en validité de vente 
immobilière et en déclaration de 
propriété 
_ 
46 9169 jugement 096 (annulé) Etablissement du duplicata du titre 
foncier 
Décision: le tribunal fait droit à la requête. 
47 9170/71 jugement 100 Etablissement du duplicata du titre 
foncier 
Décision: le tribunal fait droit à la requête. 
48 9172 jugement 102 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal rejette les exceptions soulevées et renvoie le 
dossier à l'audience des crises. 








50 9174 R vente de terrain bâti plus info sur photo 
51 9175 R assignation en déclaration de 
propriété et en expulsion 
_ 
52 9175 R assignation en validité de vente   _ 
53 9176 jugement 110 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare l'abjudication de l'immeuble formant 
la parcelle XX lotXXX section CW du secteur 15 de Bobo Diolosso à 
la B. 
54 9177 R Etablissement du duplicata du titre 
foncier 
_ 
55 9178 D Assignation en validité de vente 
immobilière et en déclaration de 
propriété 
plus infos sur la photo 
56 9179 R assignation en déclaration de 
propriété et en expulsion 
_ 
57 9180 R vente d'immeuble _ 
58 9181/9182 D vente d'immeuble plus d'info sur photos 
59 9183 R vente immobilière _ 
60 9184/9185 D vente immobilière plus d'infos sur photos 
61 9186/9187 jugement 124 vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal déclare la requête de TA irrecevable et adjuge 
l'immeuble bâti formant la parcelle nXX lotXX section XX du secteur 
23 de Ouagadougou. 
62 9188 R Assignation en nullité de vente et 
en déclaration de propriété 
_ 
63 9189 jugement 126 assignation en resolution de vente 
d'immeuble et en paiement 
Décision: le tribunal recoit la requête de DHBG et la déclare mal 
fondée.  
64 9190 D assignation en confirmation de 
propriété   
_ 
65 9191 D assignation en annulation de vente 
d'immeuble 
_ 
66 9192/3/4/5/9196 D vente d'immeuble plus d'info sur photos 
67 9197/8 D vente d'immeuble _ 
68 9199 annulé vente d'immeuble _ 
69 9199 D assignation en validité 
d'hypothèque 
_ 
70 9200 D assignation en revendication de 
propriété immobilière et en 
expulsion 
_ 
71 9201/02 jugement 137 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal adjuge l'immeuble formant la parcelle XX lotXX 
section XX du secteur 30 de Bogodogo à la B.  








73 9204 jugement 140 vente d'immeuble Décision:     le tribunal annule la procédure de saisie immobilière. 
74 9205 jugement 142 vente d'immeuble _ 
75 9206/9207/9208 jugement 158 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sujet à la vente jusquà 
l'intervention de la décision de la chambre civile  de la cour 
d'appel. 
76 9209 jugement 160 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal adjuge l'immeuble formant la parcelle XX lotXX 
secteur 2 de la commune de Baskury  à la B. 
77 9210 jugement 161 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare que l'immeuble formant la parcelle XX 
lotXX section WC secteur XX commune de Baskury est adjugé à la 
B. 
78 9211 R Etablissement du duplicata du titre 
foncier 
_ 
79 9212 R Assignation en confirmation de 
propriété 
_ 
80 9212 D vente d'immeuble _ 
81 9212 D Assignation en annulation 
d'hypothèque 
_ 
82 9213 radié vente d'immeuble _ 
83 9214/15 jugement 162 assignation en paiement Décision: le tribunal dit que l'immeuble formant la parcelle X 
lotXXX section SD secteur 27 objet du PUH n XXXXXXX de 
Ouagadougou est adjugé à la B.  
84 9216 non saisine vente d'immeuble _ 
85 9216 jugement 164 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal la main levée des poursuites contre la société 
S. 
86 9217 R assignatin en validité de vente et 
en mutation de titre de propriété 
_ 
87 9218/19 jugement 174 vente de terrain bâti Décision: le tribunal recoit les dires et observations du defendants 
et les déclare mal fondés.  
88 9220 R vente d'immeuble _ 
89 9221 R vente d'immeuble _ 
90 9222/9223 jugement 187 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et 
déclare l'immeuble formant la parcelle XX lotXX  de la section ML 
du secteur 22 de Sy Noghin adjugé à la B.  
91 9224/9225 jugement 188 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et dit 
que l'immeuble formant la parcelle nXX lotXX section IM secteur 15 
du centre loti de la ville de Ouagadougou est adjugé à la B. 
92 9226 R vente d'immeuble _ 








94 9228 jugement 197 assignation en confirmation en 
vente et en déclaration de 
propriété 
Décision: le tribunal déboute le plaignant. 
95 9229/30 jugement 203 déclaration de propriété et en 
expulsion 
Décision: le tribunal déboute les ADF. 
96 9231 jugement 206 assignation en annulation de vente Décision: le tribunal annule la vente . 
97 9232/33 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur photos 
98 9234 D assignation en homologation de 
vente d'immeuble et en mutation 
_ 
99 9235 R assignation en validité de vente et 
en déclaration de propriété 
_ 
100 9235 R assignation en nullité   _ 
101 9236 jugement 207 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à la vente de l'immeuble 
objet de la saisie immobilière engagée.  
102 9237/38 jugement 214 assignation en validité de vente et 
en expulsion 
Décision: le tribunal reconnait la plainte comme bien fondée et 
ordonne l'expulsion du défendant. 
103 9239 jugement 222 assignation en résolution de vente   Décision: le tribunal prononce la résolution de la vente. 
104 9240 R assignation en annulation de vente _ 
105 9240 R assignation en revendication de 
propriété d'immeuble 
_ 
106 9241 R vente de terrain urbain _ 
107 9242 R vente de terrain urbain _ 
108 9243 R assignation en annulation de vente _ 
109 9244/45/46 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur photos 
110 9247/48 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur photos 
111 9249 jugement 223 vente d'immeuble Décison: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à statuer en attendant l'issue 
de la procédure en appel. 
112 9250 D assignation en validité de vente 
d'immeuble et en déclaration de 
propriété 
_ 
113 9251 jugement 235 assignation en nullité de promesse 
de vente 
Décision: le tribunal déboute le plaingnant de sa requête et 
ordonne son expulsion. 
114 9252/53 jugement 237 assignation en résolution de vente 
d'immeuble en en expulsion 
Décision: le tribunal prononce la résolution de la promesse de 
vente et déboute le plaignant, prononce son expulsion.  
115 9254 jugement 240 Assignation en nullité d'ume 
caution  
Décision: le tribunal déclare la nullité des conventions 
d'hypothèque. 
116 9255/56 jugement 248 vente de terrain Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis de la vente jusqu'à 
l'intervention de la décision de la chambre civile de la cour d'appel. 










118 9257 D Etablissement de duplicata de titre 
foncier 
_ 
119 9258 D vente de terrain _ 
120 9259 R assignation en résolution de vente _ 
121 9259 R assignation en résolution de vente _ 
122 9260 R assignation en confirmation de 
vente d'immeuble et en liquidation 
de sucession 
_ 
123 9261 jugement 258 Etablissement du duplicata du titre 
foncier 
Décision: le tribunal fait droit de la requête. 
124 9262 R vente d'immeuble _ 
125 9263 D vente d'immeuble _ 
126 9263 R vente d'immeuble _ 
127 9263 R vente d'immeuble _ 
128 9263 R vente d'immeuble _ 
129 9264 ? vente d'immeuble _ 
130 9266 R vente d'immeuble _ 
131 9567 jugement 274 assingation en annulation de vente 
de parcelle 
Décision: le tribunal déclare irrecevable la demande de la 
plaingnante. 
132 9267 jugement 275 assingation en validité de vente 
immobilière et en déclaration de 
propriété 
Décision: le tribunal déboute la demande du plaingnat et déboute 
la demande de la B.  
133 9268 jugement 276 assignation en nullité de vente 
immobilière 
Décision: le tribunal déclare irrecevable la demande des ADF. 
134 9268 jugement 277 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare BM dans son droit d'agir 
135 9270 jugement 278 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal rejette les exceptions soulevées et renvoie le 
dossier. 
136 9270 jugement 279 assignation en déclaration de 
vente parfaite 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la demande du plaignant sans objet. 
137 9270 jugement 280 Assignation en annulation de vente Décision: déclare les dires et observation des défendants mal 
fondés.  
138 9271 R Assignation en restitution d'un 
permis urbain d'habiter 
_ 
139-140 9272/9273 jugement 286 et 287 vente d'immeuble Décision: voir photos. Dossier compliqué 
141 9274 D Assignation en restitution d'un 
permis urbain d'habiter 
_ 
142 9275 D assignation en déclaration de 
propriété et en expulsion 
_ 
143 9275 D vente d'immeuble _ 
144 9276 D assignation en annulation de vente _ 








146 9276 D vente d'immeuble _ 
147 9277 jugement 289 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et 
déclare que l'immeuble appartient à la B. 
148 9278 R annulation de vente _ 
149 9278 R vente d'immeuble _ 
150 9279 R vente de l'immeuble bâti objet du 
PUH nXXXXXXX/XXXX du 
13/04/2004 
_ 
151 9280 D assignation en annulation de vente 
de parcelle et en confirmation de 
propriété et expulsion 
_ 
152 9281 R vente d'immeuble _ 
153 9282 R assignation en confirmation de 
propriété et en mutation de titre 
_ 
154 9283 jugement 296 assignation en annulation de la 
vente d'un immeuble 
Décision: le tribunal déclare la demande du plaignant irrecevable. 
155 9284 jugement 298 assignation en annulation de vente Décision: le tribunal annula la vente de la parcelle 
156 9285 jugement 300 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal annule la procédure de vente immobilière par 
la B. 
157 9286 jugement 316 vente de terrain urbain Décision: le tribunal déclare que l'immeuble formant la parcelle XX 
lotXX de la section OM  secteur 17 de la commune de Boulmiougou 
appartient à la B. 
158 9287 jugement 319 vente d'immeuble  Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à statuer jusqu à 
l'intervention de la décision de la chambre commerciale de la cour 
d'appel.  
159 9288/89 jugement 320 assignation en homologation de 
vente d'immeuble et en mutation 
Décision: le tribunal déclare recevable la plainte de SG et déclare 
mal fondée. 
160 9290 jugement 326 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal rejette la plainte de S. 
161 9291 D assignation en annulation de vente 
et en confirmation de propriété 
_ 
162 9292 R Etablissement du duplicata du titre 
foncier 
_ 
163 9292 R Requête aux fins d'établissement 
d'un duplicata de titre foncier 
_ 
164 9293 R Etablissements de duplicata de 
titre foncier 
_ 
165 9294 D vente d'immeuble _ 
166 9295 jugement 332 Assignation en confirmation de 
propriété immobilière 
Décision: le tribunal déboute les plaignants. 










168 9298 R assignation en annulation de vente 
et en confirmation de propriété 
_ 
169 9299/9300 jugement 352 assignation en déclaration de 
propriété et en expulsion 
Décison: le tribunal rejette la requête du plaingnant.  
170 9301/2 jugement 370 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal attribue la parcelle au défendant.  
171 9303 jugement 371 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare l'attribution de la parcelle au 
défendant. 
172 9304 jugement 372 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal adjuge l'immeuble à la B. 
173 9305 R Assignation en validité de vente 
d'une parcelle et expulsion 
_ 
174 9306 R Requête aux fins d'établissement 
d'un duplicata de titre foncier 
_ 
175 9307 R vente d'immeuble _ 
176 9308/09/10/11 jugement 375 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal dit que l'immeuble appartenant au défendant 
revient à la B. Voir pics +infos 
177 9312 jugement 376 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal décide d'adjuger la parcelle à la B. 
178 9313/14/15/16 jugement 377 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal adjuge l'immeuble à la B et déchoit le 
défendant de son droit à contester. + info sur pics. 
179 9317 R vente d'immeuble _ 
180 9318 jugement 380 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal annule le commandement aux fins de saisie 
immobilière et déboute la B. 
181 9319/20/21 ? vente d'immeuble infos sur pics 
182 9322 R revendication de propriété 
d'immeuble 
_ 
183 9323 jugement 394 annulation de vente Décision: le tribunal déclare la plainte de CBF bien fondée et 
annula par conséquent la vente. 
184 9324 jugement 395 annulation de vente Décision: revoie à la décision de mise en état 
185 9325 jugement 398 restitution de permis urbain 
d'habiter 
Décision: le tribunal déclare l'action du plaingnant recevable sur la 
forme mais la rejette sur le fond comme mal fondée. 
186 9326 R assignation en déclaration de 
propriété et en expulsion 
_ 
187 9327/28/29/30 D vente de terrain urbain plus infos sur photos 
188 9331 jugement 399 annulation de vente immobilière Décision: le tribunal déclare recevable la plainte et annule la 
procédure de vente immobilière. 
189 9332 jugement 400 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate l'annulation de la procédure 
190 9333 R requête aux fins d'homologation 
de vente 
_ 
191 9334 R assignation en annulation de vente 









192 9335 R vente d'immeuble _ 
193 9336 D assignation en nullité de vente _ 
194 9337 jugement 409 délivrance  de duplicata du titre 
foncier 
Décision: le tribunal rejette la demande 
195 9338 jugement 411 vente d'immeuble Décison: le tribunal déclare le défendant déchu de son droit à 
demander la nullité de la procédure, constate l'absence de titre 
foncier et en conséquence ordonne le sursis à la vente envisagée. 
196 9339 jugement 413 délivrance  de duplicata du titre 
foncier 
Décision: le tribunal accèpte la demande. 
197 9340/41/42 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur pics 
198 9343/44 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur pics 
199 9345 R vente d'immeuble _ 
200 9346 R vente d'immeuble _ 
201 9347 jugement 419 assignation en validité de vente et 
en mutation de titre de propriété 
Décision: le tribunal déboute la demande. 
202 9348 jugement 420 établissement de duplicata de  titre 
foncier 
Décision: le tribunal valide la requête. 
203 9349 jugement 429 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare les dires et observations du défendant 
mal fondés et ordonne en conséquence la vente . 
204 9350 D vente d'immeuble _ 
205 9351 D assignation en annulation de vente 
et en confirmation de propriété 
_ 
206 9352 jugement 434 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à statuer. 
207 9353 jugement 435 vente d'immeuble Décision: dossier est renvoyé à l'audience d'adjudication 
208 9354 jugement 436 vente d'immeuble Décision: dossier est renvoyé à l'audience d'adjudication 
209 9355/56 jugement 445 vente de terrain urbain Décision: le tribunal suspend la vente jusqu'à la décision de la cour 
d'appel. 
210 9357 jugement 446 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne la continuation de la procédure et 
déboute la B. 
211 9358 jugement 447 assignation en annulation de vente 
et en confirmation de propriété 
Décision: le tribunal déboute la plainte. 
212 9359 R assignation en déclaration de 
vente et en confirmation de 
propriété 
_ 
213 9360 R assignation en confirmation de 
propriété et en mutation de titre 
_ 
214 9361 D assignation en revendication de 
propriété 
_ 
215 9362 R vente d'immeuble _ 








217 9363 R vente de terrain _ 
218 9363 D vente d'immeuble _ 
219 9364 R vente d'immeuble _ 
220 9364 D vente d'immeuble _ 
221 9364 ? vente d'immeuble _ 
222 9365 R vente de deux terrains _ 
223 9366/67 jugement 456 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et dit 
que les immeublescommune de Bobo Dioulasso sone adjugés à la 
B. 
224 9368 D vente d'immeuble _ 
225 9369/70/71/72 jugement 458 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal surseoit à statuer dans l'attente de la décision 
de la chambre civile de la cour d'appel. Plus d'information sur 
photos. 
226 9373 jugement 459 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal surseoit à statuer dans l'attente de la décision 
de la chambre civile de la cour d'appel.  
227 9374 R opposition à commandement aux 
fins de saisie immobilière 
_ 
228 9374 R vente de terrain _ 
229 9375 D vente d'immeuble _ 
230 9375 D vente d'immeuble _ 
231 9375 D vente d'immeuble _ 
232 9376 jugement 476 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déboute le défendant et déboute la B de sa 
demande de paiement des frais exposés. 
233 9377 R vente d'immeuble _ 
234 9378/79 jugement 497 vente sur saisie immobilière Décisoin: rejette les dires du défendant et fixe l'audience 
d'adjudication. 
235 9380 jugement 498 vente sur saisie immobilière Décisoin: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et 
adjuge l'immeuble à la B.  
236 9381 jugement 500 vente sur saisie immobilière Décision: le tribunal déclare recevable les dires et observations du 
défendant et en conséquence annule la procédure de vente 
immobilière initiée par la B. 
237 9382/3 D vente de terrain _ 
238 9383 D vente d'immeuble _ 
239 9384/5/6/7 D vente de terrain plus infos sur pics 
240 9388/89 D vente d'immeuble _ 
241 9390/91/92 D vente d'immeuble plus infos sur pics 
242 9393/94 D vente d'immeuble _ 
243 9395 jugement 506 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à la vente jusquà l'obtention 








244 9396 R assignation en confirmation de 
propriété et en mutation de titre 
_ 
245 9397 R assignation en déclaration de 
propriété   
_ 
246 9398 D vente d'immeuble _ 
247 9398 R vente de terrain _ 
248 9399/9400 jugement 521 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et 
adjuge l'immeuble à la B. 
249 9401 R assignation en confirmation de 
vente et en expulsion 
_ 
250 9402 D vente de terrain urbain _ 
251 9403/9404/9405 jugement 533 vente de terrain urbain Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et dit 
que l'immeuble formant la parcelle nXX lotXX section RO secteur 
16 du centre loti de la ville de Ouagadougou est adjugé à la B. 
252 9405 jugement 533 bis vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la non saisie. 
253 9406/9407 D vente d'immeubles _ 
254 9407 R vente d'immeuble _ 
255 9408 jugement 538 vente d'immeuble Décision:  le tribunal déboute les défendants. 
256 9409 jugement 537 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare irrecevable les dires des défendants. 
257 9410 jugement 541 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal se déclare compétent et déboute le 
défendant. 
258 9411 jugement 543 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal annule la procédure de vente immobilière 
initiée par la B. 
259 9412 jugement 544 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal annule la procédure de vente immobilière 
initiée par la B. 
260 9413 R assignation en déclaration de 
propriété et en annulation 
_ 
261 9414/15 jugement 547 vente d'immeubles Décision: le tribunal ordonne la continuation de la procédure et 
déboute la B. 
262 9416/17 R vente d'immeuble _ 
263 9418 R vente de parcelle _ 
264 9419 ? vente d'immeuble le tribunal surseoit à statuer en attendant la décision de la 
chambre civile de la cour d'appel. 
265 9420/21/22/23 D vente d'immeuble plus d infos sur pics 
266 9424 D assignation en restitution d'un bien 
immobilier 
_ 








268 9426/6/7/8/9/30/31/32/33/34/35 D vente d'immeuble bcp d infos sur pics 
269 9436 D vente de parcelles _ 
270 9437 jugement 568 vente de parcelle Décision: le tribunal adjuge les parcelles à le B. 
271 9438 jugement 573 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal adjuge les parcelles à le B. 
272 9439/40/41 D vente de parcelle plus d'infos sur photos 
273 9442 D Assignation en confirmation de 
propriété immobilière 
_ 
274 9442 D assignation en déclaration de 
propriété et en expulsion 
_ 
275 9443 jugement 585 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal déclare les dires et observations des 
défendants recevables, mal fondés au fond et dévoute la B de la 
demande de frais. 
276 9444/45/46 D vente d'immeuble plus d'infos sur photos 
277 9447 R vente d'immeuble _ 
278 9448/50/51/52 jugement 594 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à statuer en attendant les 
décision de la cour d'appel. 
279 9453 jugement 595 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal ordonne le sursis à statuer en attendant les 
décision de la cour d'appel. 
280 9454 jugement 596 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et 
adjuge l'immeuble à lasomme de 22.000.000CFA. 
281 9455 R vente d'immeuble _ 
282 9456 R assignation en confirmation de 
propriété et en mutation de titre 
_ 
283 9457 jugement 603 vente d'immeuble Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et 
adjuge l'immeuble à la somme de 250.000.000CFA. 
284 9458/59 D vente d'immeuble _ 
285 9459/60 D vente d'immeuble _ 
286 9460 D vente de parcelle _ 
287 9462 D vente de parcelle _ 
288 9462 D vente d'immeuble _ 
289 9462 D vente d'immeuble _ 
290 9463 R vente d'immeuble _ 
291 9464 jugement 610 vente de parcelle XX et XX section 
23 
Décision: le tribunal constate la régularité de la procédure et 
adjuge les parcelles à la B. 
292 9465 jugement 611 vente de parcelle XX lotXX section 
RT 
Décision: tribunal rejette sur le fond les dires et observations du 
défendant. Fixe audience d'adjudication. 
293 9466/67 D vente d'immeuble _ 








295 9470 R vente d'immeuble _ 
296 9470 R assignation en validité de vente _ 
297 9471 R vente d'immeuble _ 
298 9472 jugement 619 requête aux fins de délivrance de 
duplicata de titre foncier 
Décision: le tribunal fait droit de la demande. 
299 9473 jugement 621 vente d'immeuble Décision:    Le tribunal reçoit les dires du défendant et les déclare 
mal fondés et renvoi le dossier à l'audience d'adjudication. 



















ANNEX 5: Dossier du titre foncier 
 








Step 1 Request for full property rights of a piece of land of the National Land Domain     
(Demande d’acquisition en plein propriété des terres du domaine foncier national)         
Original of the Sale Contract if applicable    
(Attestation d’attribution de parcelle) 
 








Step 2 Seisin from the Cadastral Services for the boundary marking 
(Saisine du service du cadastre pour le bornage du terrain) 
 
 



















Step 4 Registration (Bordereau analytique) 
 
 
          










     











    
 










               
